Goodman v. State
| Decision Date | 27 November 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 42147,42147 |
| Citation | 336 S.E.2d 757,255 Ga. 226 |
| Parties | GOODMAN v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Griffin E. Howell III, Carlisle & Newton, P.C., Griffin, for Stephen Howard Goodman.
Johnnie L. Caldwell, Jr., Dist. Atty., Thomaston, Paschal A. English, Jr., Christopher C. Edwards, Asst. Dist. Attys., and Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Dennis R. Dunn, Staff Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
A Spalding County jury found the appellant, Stephen Goodman, guilty of the murder and armed robbery of Lewis Miller. The appellant received two consecutive life sentences. He raises eighteen enumerations of error. We affirm. 1
The victim was a deaf mute traveling with two companions from Ohio to Florida. He approached the appellant at a Majik Market in Griffin, and he attempted to sell the appellant a card that showed how to communicate in sign language. When the appellant would not purchase the card, the victim asked him, by a written note, if he knew where he might buy some marijuana.
The appellant told the victim that he could find some marijuana for him, and the victim got into a car with the appellant and the appellant's half-brother, Ronnie Goss. After failing to find drugs at two locations, Goss, the appellant, and the victim drove to a lake allegedly to meet another person to make a drug deal.
The left rear tire on the appellant's car apparently went flat as the car approached the lake, and the appellant stopped to put on a spare. The appellant testified that the victim attacked him at that point in time. Goss testified that the appellant had earlier asked him to hit the victim over the head with a tire iron. He also stated at trial that the appellant asked the victim to loosen the lug nuts on the tire. Both Goss and the appellant testified that the appellant hit the victim in the back of the head, then in the front of the head with the tire iron. They then dragged the victim's body away from the scene of the killing.
Both Goss and the appellant testified that the other took the victim's wallet from his pants. Both also testified that they threw the tire iron in a creek after leaving the scene of the killing. Upon leaving the reservoir, Goss and the appellant picked up a friend and drove to Florida. After picking oranges for a number of days, they returned to Georgia. Goss and the appellant were arrested in Canton, Georgia.
1. In his first three enumerations of error, the appellant raises the general grounds. We find the evidence produced at trial sufficient to have authorized a rational trier of fact to conclude that the appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the murder and armed robbery of Lewis Miller. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. In his fourth enumeration of error, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in charging the jury on the concept of criminal negligence, since he was indicted for murder and armed robbery, which may not be based upon criminally negligent mens rea.
The trial court charged the jury on the concept of criminal negligence in defining the term "crime" on the second page of a jury charge that occupied twenty pages of the trial transcript. The court subsequently charged the jury on the elements of murder and armed robbery, the requirement of reasonable doubt, and the burden to be borne by the state. The concept of criminal negligence could not rebut the appellant's claim of self-defense, and the charge as a whole presented the law accurately, consequently the trial court's charge as to criminal negligence was harmless error. See generally, Boyd v. State, 253 Ga. 515, 322 S.E.2d 256 (1984).
3. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial upon the prosecutor's statement, in his final argument, that the appellant had "probably done everything that there's a law against." Upon the appellant's objection, the trial court stated, "[District Attorney] English, I will instruct you, as I instructed Mr. Newton, please, contain yourself to the evidence, and reasonable deduction therefrom; and ladies and gentlemen, I state to you again that the statements of the attorneys [are] not evidence in this case." While the prosecutor's comment was certainly not a comment on the evidence that appears in the record of this case, and was not a colorable deduction therefrom, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in merely correcting the prosecutor and instructing the jury rather than declaring a mistrial. Miller v. State, 226 Ga. 730, 177 S.E.2d 253 (1970).
4. The appellant attempted to introduce a pair of blood-stained blue jeans into evidence to show, apparently, that Goss participated in or carried out the crime.
Assuming that the blood-stained blue jeans were admissible, the court did not commit reversible error in excluding them in light of the evidence presented at trial that the appellant admitted hitting the victim in the head with a tire tool, that Goss helped move the body, and that the appellant had solicited Goss' help in robbing the victim.
5. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the state to introduce evidence of an independent crime that he allegedly committed, because the prior crime was not similar to the crime here in question.
The state introduced evidence that the appellant had previously hit another handicapped person in the back of the head with a tire iron as the handicapped person bent over to help repair the rear left tire of the appellant's car, and that the appellant then robbed the unconscious handicapped person. We find sufficient similarity. Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 73, 295 S.E.2d 727 (1982).
6. As the appellant has not shown that the testimony of a certain police officer would have raised questions as to the admissibility of the independent crime noted in Division 5, we find no reversible error in the trial court's refusal to hear the officer's testimony.
7. Appellant next charges that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence pictures of the victim's body on an autopsy table prior to and following an autopsy.
The pre-autopsy photograph shows the state of the victim's body and the location of his wounds. We find no error in its admission. See Hill v. State, 254 Ga. 213, 214, 326 S.E.2d 757 (1985). While the post-autopsy photographs might well be inadmissible under the standard established in Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 862, 302 S.E.2d 347 (1983), the standard set out in Brown operated prospectively, and this case was tried prior to this court's decision in Brown. Grant v. State, 251 Ga. 434, 306 S.E.2d 265 (1983). We find no error.
8. The appellant asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to question him as to various criminal activities in which he had been involved. We find no error. Phillips v. State, 254 Ga. 370, 329 S.E.2d 475 (1985).
9. The appellant asserts that the trial court should have made an in camera inspection of the police files in this case pursuant to his Brady motion. He also claims that the trial court should have declared a mistrial when it discovered that purportedly exculpatory evidence had actually been in the police files and not in the district attorney's files.
The trial court performed an in camera inspection of the prosecution's files. Evidence produced at trial showed that the police had possession of a knife belonging to the victim, and that they had found the knife in the area of the homicide. "There was no evidence that the [knife was] intentionally suppressed and since the evidence was available to the appellant during his trial, the rulings made in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 do not apply." Emmett v. State, 232 Ga. 110, 122, 205 S.E.2d 231 (1974). We find no error.
10. The trial court did not err in charging the jury as to the law of conspiracy. See Harris v. State, 236 Ga. 242, 223 S.E.2d 643 (1976).
11. The appellant contends that a certain potential defense witness should have been granted...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Wright v. State, S02A1350.
...protect the officers against claims for lost or stolen property, and protect the police from potential danger." Goodman v. State, 255 Ga. 226, 229(13), 336 S.E.2d 757 (1985). The testimony was that the officers involved conducted inventory searches as a matter of procedure for just such rea......
-
Baker v. State
...State, 236 Ga.App. 645, 650-651(4), 512 S.E.2d 913 (1999). 28. Burgeson v. State, supra at 105, 475 S.E.2d 580; Goodman v. State, 255 Ga. 226, 229(13), 336 S.E.2d 757 (1985). 29. Officer Wright could not remember whether Lieutenant Charles or Sergeant Culberson called for the roadblock at i......
-
Morrow v. State
...arrest and for the arrest warrant that was issued in Hall County at approximately the same time. Mincey, supra; Goodman v. State, 255 Ga. 226, 229(13), 336 S.E.2d 757 (1985) (probable cause may rest upon the collective knowledge of the In addition, the evidence shows that Morrow's subsequen......
-
Burgeson v. State
...when there is some degree of communication between them, instead of the knowledge of the arresting officer alone. Goodman v. State, 255 Ga. 226, 229(13), 336 S.E.2d 757 (1985). Burgeson and her cohorts fled the police after the attempted stop. Flight can be a significant factor in determini......