Boyes v. Shell Oil Products Co.

• Decision Date: 04 January 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-3692,98-3692
• Citation: 199 F.3d 1260
• Parties: (11th Cir. 2000) Stephen R. BOYES and Patrice Boyes, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SHELL OIL PRODUCTS COMPANY, Mobil Oil Company, and Tenneco Oil Company, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1260

199 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2000)

Stephen R. BOYES and Patrice Boyes, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SHELL OIL PRODUCTS COMPANY, Mobil Oil Company, and Tenneco Oil Company, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 98-3692.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 4, 2000.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. (No. 97-00001-CV-MMP), Maurice M. Paul, Judge.

Before CARNES, Circuit Judge, and RONEY and HILL, Senior Circuit Judges.

CARNES, Circuit Judge:

Stephen and Patrice Boyes own property in Gainesville, Florida that is allegedly contaminated with petroleum waste as a result of service stations previously owned or operated by Shell Oil Company ("Shell") and Tenneco Oil Company ("Tenneco").¹ The Boyes sued Shell and Tenneco for violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. 6901-6992, seeking an injunction requiring remediation of the contamination.² They also asserted various state law claims. On the basis of Burford abstention and, alternatively, the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the district court dismissed the RCRA claims without prejudice. In its analysis, the court relied heavily on 376.308(5) of the Florida Statutes, which prohibits the Boyes' suit for remediation. The district court then declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The Boyes appeal.

In Part I of this opinion, we outline the RCRA and its regulatory scheme and Florida's State Underground Petroleum Environmental Response Act and its regulatory scheme. We then describe the facts and procedural history of the case. Part II contains the standard of review. In Part III, we briefly outline Burford abstention and the primary jurisdiction doctrine and their applicability in a preemption case. We then provide a general discussion of federal preemption and proceed to consider whether Florida law is preempted by the RCRA.

As we explain in Part III, the RCRA neither expressly preempts all state law, nor occupies the entire field of underground storage tank regulation. However, 376.308(5) of the Florida Statutes is in direct conflict with 42 U.S.C. 6972, the RCRA citizen suit provision, and is thus preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Because 376.308(5) is preempted, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the Boyes' suit against Shell and Tenneco.

I. BACKGROUND

A. FEDERAL STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

In 1976, Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. 6901-6992, "to promote the protection of health and the environment...." 42 U.S.C. 6902(a). The "RCRA is a comprehensive environmental statute that governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste." Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483, 116 S.Ct. 1251, 1254, 134 L.Ed.2d 121 (1996) (citation omitted). As part of the RCRA, Congress provided for federal regulation of underground storage tanks. See 42 U.S.C. 6991-6991i. The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") subsequently promulgated release detection, prevention and corrective action regulations for underground storage tanks, and those regulations are enforceable by the EPA Administrator. See id. 6991b; 40 C.F.R. pt. 280 (1999).

A state underground storage tank program, however, can operate "in lieu of the Federal program" if the EPA Administrator formally approves the state program. 42 U.S.C. 6991c(d)(2).³ The EPA Administrator must approve a state program if, "after notice and opportunity for public comment," he determines that the program complies with the RCRA provisions and "provides for adequate enforcement of compliance...." Id. 6991c(d)(1). The RCRA also contains a citizen suit provision which grants federal district courts jurisdiction to hear suits against any person alleged to be in violation of any RCRA regulation or against any person for "past or present ... storage ... or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." Id. 6972(a).

B. STATE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

In 1986, under the State Underground Petroleum Environmental Response Act, Florida adopted the Early Detection Incentive ("EDI") program. See Fla. Stat. 376.3071(9). If a site contaminated by petroleum waste from an underground storage tank is accepted into the EDI program, Florida will absorb the full cost of remediating the site. See 376.3071(9)(b).⁴ The Florida Department of Environmental Protection ("FDEP")⁵ assigns each contaminated site a priority ranking and undertakes remediations in accordance with those rankings. See 376.3071(5).⁶ Florida later enacted 376.308(5), which prohibits any person from pursuing any "administrative or judicial action" to require remediation of a contaminated site that is eligible for the EDI program before the state has committed funding for the remediation. See 376.308(5).⁷

C. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

From 1958 to mid-1982, Shell Oil Company ("Shell") owned and operated a gasoline service station at 404 South Main Street in Gainesville, Florida.⁸ From 1980 to late 1985 or early 1986, Tenneco Oil Company ("Tenneco") leased property at 403 South Main Street in Gainesville, Florida on which a gasoline station was located. The 403 and 404 South Main Street sites are across the street from each other at an intersection. Both sites are contaminated with petroleum waste. The 403 South Main Street site that Tenneco leased was accepted into Florida's EDI program in October 1987; the 404 South Main Street site that Shell owned was accepted into the EDI program in October 1988.

The Boyes purchased 602 South Main Street, also in Gainesville, Florida, in July 1992. In March 1996, they purchased 601 South Main Street. The intersection where the 403 and 404 South Main Street properties are located is approximately two city blocks from the sites currently owned by the Boyes. The FDEP recognizes the Boyes' property as being within a plume of underground petroleum contamination that must be addressed during the remediation of the Shell and Tenneco sites.⁹

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 6972(c), the Boyes gave written notice to Shell, Tenneco, Mobil, the EPA, and the FDEP on June 19, 1996 of their intent to file suit under the RCRA. They filed suit against Shell, Tenneco, and Mobil on January 2, 1997.¹⁰ Counts I and II alleged violations of the RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(1)(A) and (B) respectively, and sought a permanent injunction requiring the removal of the entire petroleum contamination and its adverse impacts, as well as costs and attorney fees. Counts III, IV, V, VI and VII raised various state law claims and sought compensatory damages, as well as costs and attorney fees.

On October 23, 1988, the district court dismissed without prejudice Counts I and II, the RCRA counts, on the grounds that the district court was abstaining from exercising its jurisdiction based on the Burford abstention doctrine and, in the alternative, on the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Having abstained from exercising jurisdiction over the federal law counts, the district court also declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the Boyes' pendant state law claims, Counts III, IV, V, VI and VII, and dismissed them without prejudice. The Boyes filed this appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

While we ordinarily review the grant of motions to dismiss or summary judgment de novo, see Parks v. City of Warner Robins, Georgia, 43 F.3d 609, 612-13 (11th Cir.1995), "a district court's decision to abstain will only be reversed upon a showing of abuse of discretion." Rindley v. Gallagher, 929 F.2d 1552, 1554 (11th Cir.1991) (citations omitted). "An abuse of discretion occurs if the judge fails to apply the proper legal standard or to follow proper procedures in making the determination...." American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 127 F.3d 1398, 1401 (11th Cir.1997) (internal citation and quotation omitted)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. ABSTENTION

The decision that gave Burford abstention its name is Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943). In a later case, the Supreme Court summarized Burford abstention as follows:

Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a federal court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies: (1) when there are difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar; or (2) where the exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 2514, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The purpose of Burford abstention is to "protect[ ] complex state administrative processes from undue federal interference...." Id. at 362, 109 S.Ct. at 2515.

The primary jurisdiction doctrine is similarly concerned with protecting the administrative process from judicial interference. See United States v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63, 77 S.Ct. 161, 165, 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956). It is "a doctrine specifically applicable to claims properly cognizable in court that contain some issue within the special competence of an administrative agency. It requires the court to enable a 'referral' to the agency, staying further proceedings so as to give the parties reasonable opportunity to seek an administrative ruling." Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268, 113 S.Ct. 1213, 1220, 122 L.Ed.2d 604 (1993) (citations omitted). "[T]he main justifications for the rule of primary jurisdiction are the expertise of the agency deferred to...