Boynton v. Lenox Square, Inc., s. 28601
| Decision Date | 12 June 1974 |
| Docket Number | 28602,Nos. 28601,s. 28601 |
| Citation | 232 Ga. 456,207 S.E.2d 446 |
| Parties | Charles F. BOYNTON et al. v. LENOX SQUARE, INC., et al. LENOX SQUARE, INC., et al. v. Charles F. BOYNTON et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Guy Parker, Charles M. Lokey, Atlanta, for appellants.
Smith, Cohen, Ringel, Kohler, Martin & Lowe, William G. Grant, Robert W. Spears, Marion Smith, II, Atlanta, for appellees.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
These two appeals are from a judgment below with which neither side was completely satisfied.
In Number 28602 the taxpayers have appealed because the judgment below held that a local constitutional amendment was properly submitted and ratified in the 1952 general election.
In Number 28601 the taxing officials, the City of Atlanta, and Fulton County have appealed because the judgment below held that the 1973 assessments of the taxpayers' property were null and void.
The Joint City-County Board of Tax Assessors of the City of Atlanta and Fulton County increased the valuation and assessment of the property of the taxpayers for the year 1973 over and above what the valuations and assessments had been for the year 1972. Notices of the increases were mailed to the taxpayers. The notices sent to the taxpayers informed them that they had the right to demand arbitration on the amount of the assessment by filing a written demand for arbitration within ten days. The taxpayers filed a demand for arbitration within the time stated and they also filed with the Joint City-County Board of Tax Assessors a notice of appeal from the assessment to the 'County Board of Equalization' which they contended should have been established pursuant to a 1972 statute (Ga.L.1972, p. 1094).
The taxpayers then brought an action for declaratory judgment alleging that an actual controversy existed between them and the taxing officials, because the latter contended that arbitration pursuant to local statutes was the proper procedure for contesting real estate assessments and they, the taxpayers, contended that an appeal to a 'County Board of Equalization' pursuant to the 1972 statute was the proper procedure for contesting real estate assessments. The taxpayers further contended that since no 'County Board of Equalization' had been appointed pursuant to the 1972 statute, then they were denied due process of law in that no legal procedure had been validly established for them to legally contest the 1973 assessments upon their properties. The taxpayers asked that the trial court declare that the proper contesting method was by appeal to a 'County Board of Equalization'; they asked that the taxing officials be enjoined from proceeding with the arbitration method; and they asked that the 1973 assessments upon their properties be declared null and void because they had been deprived of the legal method of contesting the assessments by failure to appoint and organize a 'County Board of Equalization' to which appeals contesting real estate assessments must be taken.
The taxing officials, the city, and the county took the position that the procedure established by local legislation was unaffected by the 1972 statute establishing 'County Boards of Equalization,' that the local legislation established the procedure for contesting real property assessments in the city and county, and that such established procedure did not deprive the taxpayers of due process of law.
There were no issues of fact to be determined, and the trial judge entered a judgment. His judgment upheld the 1952 local constitutional amendment and the local statute passed pursuant thereto. However, his judgment held that the 1972 Act superseded the earlier local legislation with respect to the method of contesting real estate assessments, and since no 'County Board of Equalization' had been appointed and organized pursuant to the 1972 statute, the 1973 assessments were null and void in that the legal procedure for contesting them had not been implemented. As stated before, the taxpayers appealed from the ruling upholding the local constitutional amendment and the local legislation, and the Joint City-County Board and the two political subdivisions appealed from the ruling declaring the 1973 assessments null and void.
We first turn to the constitutionality of the local legislation which established a Joint City-County Board of Tax Assessors of the City of Atlanta and Fulton County. A resolution of this issue depends upon whether a local constitutional amendment was properly submitted and ratified in the 1952 general election.
The resolution (Ga.L.1952, p. 591) proposing the constitutional amendment provided in part as follows: 'The General Assembly of Georgia shall have the power by general, local or special law applicable to all counties having therein the greater part of a city with a population of 300,000 or more, . . . and to said city including any portions which lie in one or more counties, without regard to the uniformity provisions otherwise contained in this article, section and paragraph of this Constitution, to: (a) Provide for the establishment of a board of tax assessors, to define the jurisdiction, powers and duties thereof, . . ., (b) Authorize said board to assess all taxable property in the county and in the city for taxation by either . . ., (c) Create a board of tax appeals and equalization, by whatever name designated, and to define the jurisdiction, powers and duties thereof . . ., and establish procedures for appeals from assessments made by the board of tax assessors and for the equalization of said assessments which procedures shall be in lieu of any rights of arbitration or appeal heretofore existing in the county or in the city.'
Section Two of the resolution provided that ballots used in the ratification election should have printed thereon the following: 'For the ratification of the amendment to Article XI, Section I, Paragraph VI of the Constitution authorizing the General Assembly to provide for the assessment of property in counties having a city located therein with a population of more than 300,000 and such cities for tax purposes by a joint board of assessors and to create and provide for an agency to review and revise such assessments.'
The contention...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Chandler
...statute or any part thereof has no effect upon the adopting statute.'" Id. (citation omitted); see also Boynton v. Lenox Square, Inc., 232 Ga. 456, 207 S.E.2d 446, 450 (1974) (same); Campbell v. Hunt, 115 Ga.App. 682, 155 S.E.2d 682, 684 (1967) (same); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 17 (2006) Cons......
-
Rutter v. Rutter, A12A0661.
...Office of Legislative Counsel as amici curiae.3 A statute can be repealed expressly or by implication, see Boynton v. Lenox Square, Inc., 232 Ga. 456, 461(II), 207 S.E.2d 446 (1974), but we find no language in SB 316 that expressly and specifically repeals either HB 1576 or subparagraph (2)......
-
Noble v. Joint City-County Bd. of Tax Assessors of Fulton County
...this system, however, but by an arbitration system established by special legislation. 1974 Ga.Laws 3607. 2 See Boynton v. Lenox Square Inc., 232 Ga. 456, 207 S.E.2d 446 (1974). This law retains the arbitration system used in Georgia prior to the 1972 enactment of the County Board of Equali......
-
Lomax v. Lee
...political subdivision, see Sims v. Town of Baldwin, 249 Ga. 293(1), 290 S.E.2d 433 (1982).4 We point out that in Boynton v. Lenox Square, 232 Ga. 456, 458, 207 S.E.2d 446 (1974), this court took the position that the 1952 Amendment is a local constitutional amendment, although the issue her......