Bozeman v. Pollock
| Decision Date | 24 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-CIV-60493-BLOOM/Valle |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
| Parties | CYNTHIA BOZEMAN, Plaintiff, v. ALVIN POLLOCK, individually, and SHERIFF OF BROWARD COUNTY, Scott J. Israel, Defendants. |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendants, Alvin Pollock and Scott J. Israel's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or, in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial or Motion to Amend, Alter or Remit the Final Judgment, ECF No. [88] ("Motion"). After careful review of the Motion, the record, the parties' respective submissions, and the applicable law, the Court is now fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied.
Plaintiff Cynthia Bozeman ("Plaintiff" or "Bozeman") commenced this action on February 27, 2014, asserting claims against Defendants, Alvin Pollock ("Pollock") and Scott J. Israel, Sheriff of Broward County (collectively, "Defendants"), for false arrest cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. See Complaint, ECF No. [1].
On August 13, 2013, Bozeman filled out a Petition for Injunction for Protection against Domestic Violence pursuant to § 741.30, Florida Statutes ("Petition") against her live-in boyfriend, William Shaw ("Shaw"). Responding to the Petition, the Circuit Court of theSeventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida issued a Temporary Injunction for Protection against Domestic Violence ("TRO" or "Injunction") naming Shaw as the respondent. Shortly thereafter, Defendant Pollock and another deputy served the TRO upon Shaw and requested that Shaw vacate Bozeman's residence. Shaw complied and departed the area. A mere seven hours later, at 3:35 a.m. on August 14, 2013, Bozeman placed a 911 call indicating that Shaw had returned to her residence in violation of the TRO. Upon his arrival, Pollock found Shaw naked in the bedroom. According to Shaw, Bozeman had invited him back to the residence, even assisting him in hiding his car down the street in case officers or Bozeman's sister, were to pass by. Pollock then confronted Bozeman with Shaw's version of the night's events. When presented with Shaw's account, Bozeman states that she vehemently denied any such assertions. Pollock, however, claims that Bozeman did nothing and failed to deny Shaw's accusations. Pollock then arrested both Bozeman and Shaw for violating the terms of the TRO and placed the two in the back of his vehicle.
In early February 2015, the parties moved for summary judgment, primarily on the issue of qualified immunity. See Motions for Summary Judgment, ECF Nos. [34] and [38]. The Court denied the motions. See Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, ECF No. [52] ("Summary Judgment Order"). When viewing the record in the light most favorable to Bozeman,1 the Court found that Pollock conducted, at best, a cursory investigation into Bozeman's version of the events in contravention of the requirement that he "conduct a reasonable investigation to establish probable cause." See id. at 19-22; Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998) () (citation omitted); see also Howard v. Gee, 538 F. App'x 884, 890-91 (11th Cir. 2013) () (citation omitted). Because, according to Bozeman, Pollock immediately credited Shaw's version of the events and made "no effort to ascertain whether Bozeman, a petitioner for protection against domestic violence, was actually in need of assistance or was otherwise truthful," the question of qualified immunity was not susceptible to resolution at summary judgment. See Summary Judgment Order at 24. Accordingly, on June 8, 2015, this matter proceeded to a jury trial.
After three days of evidence, the case was submitted to the jury. Prior to its verdict, the jury asked two questions: (1) ; and (2) "Please clarify if instructions to Jury of law is what we follow (Court instruction to Jury) or injunction document (Florida Statute 741.30)." See Trial Transcript Excerpts, ECF No. [88-6] at 5:11-16, 6:17-20. The Court instructed the jury to rely on the jury instructions on the law as provided as to the first question, and to apply the law in the Court's instruction to the evidence of the case as to the second. Id. at 5:23-6:1, 8:16-19. The jury then returned a verdict in favor of Bozeman. Specifically, the jury answered "No" to the question of "Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . Pollock had probable cause to arrest [] Bozeman?" and "No" to the question "Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . Pollock had probable cause to arrest [] Bozeman?" See First Verdict Form, ECF No. [88-8]; Final Verdict Form, ECF No. [81]. The jury's initial verdict form awarded Bozeman $10,000 in compensatory damages. See First Verdict Form, ECFNo. [88-8] at 2. The jury also found punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence regarding Pollock's intentional misconduct (Question 7) in the amount of $50,000; however, the jury failed to award punitive damages on the lesser preponderance-of-the-evidence standard as to any potential malice or reckless indifference (Question 6). See id. at 2-3. Although Questions 6 and 7 required the application of different standards, the Court and the parties quickly recognized the potential inconsistency and instructed the jury to return to their deliberations regarding Questions 6, 7, and 8, concerning Bozeman's entitlement to, and the amount of, punitive damages. Trial Transcript Excerpts, ECF No. [88-6] at 17:23-18:19 ("I would ask that you return to the jury room to reconcile the inconsistency between Questions 6 and 7, and ultimately Question 8, and arrive at a verdict that is consistent with the law."). Upon re-deliberation, the jury reconsidered the aforementioned Questions and concluded that there was no liability for punitive damages under either standard and awarded Bozeman $60,000 in compensatory damages. See Final Verdict Form, ECF No. [81] at 2-3. Over Defendants' objection, the Court then entered judgment in favor of Bozeman in the amount of $60,000.00. See Final Judgment, ECF No. [84].
On July 8, 2015, Defendants filed the instant Motion seeking relief under Rules 50, 59, and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Mot., ECF No. [88]. Defendants assert that Pollock is entitled to qualified immunity and, therefore, judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) as to Bozeman's § 1983 claim because it was not "clearly established" that a petitioner who obtained an injunction or temporary restraining order could not be subject to arrest for violating the same. Next, Defendants contend that they are entitled to a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) as the jury instructions were erroneous and misleading. Last,Defendants seek to set aside the jury verdict under Rules 59 and 60 because the jury failed to follow the Court's instructions and returned with an improper "compromise" verdict. None of these arguments persuade the Court that a new trial is warranted.
At the close of Bozeman's case-in-chief and prior to the Court's submission of the matter to the jury, Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a). See Trial Transcript Excerpt, Day 2, ECF No. [85] at 5:23-13:17. Renewing their argument from their summary judgment motion, Defendants argued that the law was not clearly established that a petitioner for protection against domestic violence was immune from violating the injunction he or she obtained, especially the situation Pollock believed he was confronted with the night of the arrest. Thus, Defendants once again asserted that Pollock was entitled to qualified immunity. See id. Citing the same reasons for the denial of summary judgment, the Court denied the motion. Id. at 13:18-14:21. Pursuant to Rule 50(b), Defendants have timely and properly renewed their arguments once again.2
"Under Rule 50, a party's motion for judgment as a matter of law can be granted at the close of evidence or, if timely renewed, after the jury has returned its verdict, as long as there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party." Chaney v. City of Orlando, Fla., 483 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2007) (). Put simply, the sole consideration for the court concerns sufficiency of the evidence: as a legal matter, was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict. See id. (citing Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 2001) () (citation omitted). In making this determination, however, the jury's findings must be disregarded. See id. (). The standard by which the motion is reviewed is the same regardless of whether the motion is brought pursuant to Rule 50(a) or 50(b). Id. ().
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