Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com'n of Ventura County

Decision Date11 March 1974
Citation112 Cal.Rptr. 668,37 Cal.App.3d 842
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties, 6 ERC 1369, 4 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,338 Richard BOZUNG et al., Petitioners, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMMISSION OF VENTURA COUNTY et al., Defendants and Respondents; KAISER AETNA CORPORATION, Real Party in Interest-Respondent, City of Thousand Oaks, Intervenor-Respondent, Civ. 41948.

Carlyle W. Hall, Jr., A. Thomas Hung, Mary D. Nichols, John R. Phillips, Brent N. Rushforth and Fredric P. Sutherland, Los Angeles, for appellants.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Robert H. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nicholas C. Yost and Norman N. Flette, Deputy Attys. Gen., amicus curiae on behalf of appellants.

Dorothy L. Schechter, County Counsel, County of Ventura, and James L. McBride, Chief Asst. County Counsel, Ventura, for respondents and defendants.

Burke, Williams & Sorensen and Royal M. Sorensen, Los Angeles, for respondents City of Camarillo and its Councilmen.

Cohen, Whitfield & Osborne and Stanley E. Cohen and James L. Spencer, Oxnard, for real party in interest.

Raymond C. Clayton, City Atty., City of Thousand Oaks, for intervenor-respondent.

Hathaway, Clabaugh, Perrett & Webster and E. E. Clabaugh, Jr., Ventura, amicus curiae on behalf of appellees.

KAUS, Presiding Justice.

The significant issue in this appeal is whether the California Environmental Control Act ('CEQA') applies to the approval of annexation proposals by a Local Agency Formation Commission ('LAFCO'), where property development is intended to follow the annexation approval and annexation.

The action challenges the validity of an annexation by the City of Camarillo of about 677 acres, known as the Bell Ranch. 1 The plaintiffs 2 are: Richard Bozung, a Ventura County resident and taxpayer; Roger Boedecker, a Ventura County resident and taxpayer who lives near the annexed property, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; and the Ventura County Environmental Coalition, Ventura County residents and taxpayers, many of whom live in Camarillo or in the area of the annexation. The Attorney General has filed an amicus brief in support of plaintiffs on the central issue, the applicability of CEQA to LAFCOs.

The defendants are: The Ventura County Local Agency Formation Commission ('LAFCO'), which approved the annexation proposal, and the City of Camarillo ('Camarillo'). The real party in interest is Kaiser-Aetna ('Kaiser'), which owns the Bell Ranch. The City of Thousand Oaks filed a complaint in intervention, and, on appeal, an amicus brief on behalf of defendants.

FACTS

In 1963 the Legislature established in each county a countywide local agency formation commission ('LAFCO'). (Knox-Nisbet Act, Govt.Code §§ 54773-54799.5; see Stats.1963, ch. 1808, § 1.) One of a LAFCO's purposes is to encourage the orderly formation and development of local governmental agencies based on local conditions and circumstances. (Govt.Code, § 54774.) One of its duties is to approve or disapprove all annexation proposals submitted by cities within the county. (Govt.Code, § 54790.)

In 1967 LAFCO considered the development of 'spheres of influence' for Ventura County, held public hearings and eventually, in January 1968, adopted a 'spheres of influence plan'. Later, effective 1972, the Legislature amended the Knox-Nisbet Act to require that each LAFCO develop a spheres of influence plan. (Govt.Code, § 54774.)

Under the 1968 spheres of influence plan, Kaiser's property straddled the Las Posas and Camarillo spheres of influence. Las Posas then was, and still is, an unincorporated area. In August 1970 Kaiser was planning to develop property which included the Bell Ranch and requested LAFCO to readjust the spheres of influence. This was the first official notice that Kaiser intended to subdivide the ranch. In September 1970, after hearings, LAFCO approved a shift of the shpheres of influence lines so that the Bell Ranch property fell into the Las Posas sphere.

In October 1970 Kaiser requested the county to rezone 384.91 acres of its property. Apparently this request was denied or withdrawn. 3

LAFCO then held various hearings concerning the Las Posas Sphere of Influence. In October 1971 LAFCO shifted the sphere of influence line so that the Bell Ranch land came within the Camarillo sphere.

In April 1972, Camarillo and Kaiser petitioned LAFCO to approve Camarillo's proposed annexation of 677 acres of the Bell Ranch. Vital to our disposition of this case is that Kaiser's application stated that the land was presently used for agriculture and would be used 'for residential, commercial and recreational uses,' and that such development was 'anticipated . . . in the near future.' 4

On June 14, 1972, LAFCO adopted a resolution approving the proposed annexation. On July 26, 1972, Camarillo adopted an ordinance annexing the Bell Ranch to the City. Pursuant to Government Code section 35316, the ordinance was forwarded to the Secretary of State for filing. It was filed not earlier than August 28, 1972.

Additional facts will be developed in the discussion.

Plaintiffs filed this action on August 24, 1972. It contains six causes of action--five in mandate, one, the second, in declaratory relief. It prays for a writ of mandate to compel LAFCO to set aside its annexation approval and to prevent Camarillo from enacting the annexation ordinance. The various causes of action turn on the applicability of CEQA to LAFCO annexation approvals, and the duties of LAFCO under Knox-Nisbet to develop spheres of influence within the county and to approve annexation proposals. Defendants each filed both demurrers and answers. The answers indicate that the essential facts bearing on substantive matters are not disputed. In essence defendants deny all allegations of either duty or breach of duty, or both, as appropriate. The answers, therefore, do not really tender any factual issues; they did not become operative only because the trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend. The appeal is from the ensuing judgment. 5

ISSUES

Although the parties generally agree about the sequence of events, they agree about virtually none of the legal consequences. In the order in which we reach the issues, they disagree (1) whether the annexation may be challenged by mandate, which in turn depends on the question when the annexation was legally complete; (2) whether any one of the three plaintiffs has standing to bring the action; (3) whether a class action is proper; (4) whether CEQA applies to LAFCO approval of annexations; (5) what constitutes compliance with the requirement that LAFCO established a 'spheres of influence' plan; and (6) what factors must be considered before a LAFCO may approve an annexation.

I

We first discuss several issues which pertain to all or nearly all of the causes of action.

Propriety of Mandate

The annexation ordinance was adopted by Camarillo on July 26, 1972. Plaintiffs' petition was filed on August 24, 1972, and an alternative writ of mandate was issued that day. The ordinance was filed by the Secretary of State on August 28 or 29, 1972. Defendants contend that mandate is not the proper remedy, because the annexation 'complete'. '[Q]uo warranto is the proper remedy to attack a completed annexation proceeding, mandamus lies to terminate an incomplete proceeding.' (5 Witkin, Calif.Procedure [2d ed. 1971] § 20, p. 3794.) 6

Defendants' contention is without merit. 'Annexation proceedings are not complete before the filing by the Secretary of State of a certified copy of the ordinance approving annexation after the lapse of a 30-day period subsequent to the adoption by the city council of an ordinance to that effect. (Gov.Code, § 36937.) (See: Gov.Code, §§ 35316, 35317, and 35318.)' (Guerrieri v. City of Fontana, 232 Cal.App.2d 417, 419, 42 Cal.Rptr. 781, 783.) Whether for other purposes an annexation may be complete at an earlier date is beside the point. Mandamus will lie to challenge an annexation before it is final within the definition of the Government Code. (Norlund v. Thorpe, 34 Cal.App.3d 672, 676, 110 Cal.Rptr. 246; see Hazelton v. City of San Diego, 183 Cal.App.2d 131, 135, 6 Cal.Rptr. 723.)

Plaintiffs' Standing

Defendants contend that none of the plaintiffs has standing to bring this action because each lacks the 'beneficial interest' required to bring an action in mandamus. We disagree. Plaintiff Boedecker is a Ventura County taxpayer and resident who lives about 1800 feet from the annexed property; he had a very real and substantial interest in the challenged proceedings. (Cf. Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal.3d 541, 549, 99 Cal.Rptr. 745, 492 P.2d 1137.) Plaintiffs Bozung and the Ventura County Environmental Coalition have alleged that they will be harmed by the environmental effects of the challenged annexation; that allegation is sufficient. (United States v. SCRAP [1973] 412 U.S. 669, 683-685, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254, 269-270.) Moreover, plaintiffs have standing 'to procure the enforcement of a public duty, . . . (Kappadahl v. Alcan Pacific Co., 222 Cal.App.2d 626, 643, 35 Cal.Rptr. 354, 365.)

We do not perceive the significance attributed by defendants to whether plaintiffs live within or without the Camarillo city boundaries. Effects of environmental abuse are not contained by political lines; strict rules of standing that might be appropriate in other contexts have no application where broad and long-term effects are involved. (See United States v. SCRAP, supra, 412 U.S. at pp. 687-688, 93 S.Ct. at pp. 2415-2416, 37 L.Ed.2d 254, 269-270.)

Class Action

Plaintiff Boedecker brought the action on behalf of himself and 'all other property owners and taxpayers similarly situated.' Defendants contend that this is not a proper class action; we agree.

The various purposes of a class action are discussed in Vasquez...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com.
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • January 7, 1975
    ...of property intended for future development. After decision by the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, 112 Cal.Rptr. 668, reversing a judgment for defendants after their demurrers to the complaint were sustained without leave to amend, we granted a hearing in this cou......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT