Braatz v. Labor and Industry Review Com'n, 91-1891

• Decision Date: 18 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-1891,91-1891
• Citation: 168 Wis.2d 124,483 N.W.2d 246
• Parties: , 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,525, 60 USLW 2716, 74 Ed. Law Rep. 320, 15 Employee Benefits Cas. 1537 Theodore R. BRAATZ, Joanne Helen Wright, Susan R. Flemmen, Roxanne Lambert and Saundra O. Kortesma, Petitioners-Respondents, v. LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant. d . Oral Argument
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Page 246

483 N.W.2d 246

168 Wis.2d 124, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. P

41,525, 60 USLW 2716,

74 Ed. Law Rep. 320, 15 Employee Benefits Cas. 1537

Theodore R. BRAATZ, Joanne Helen Wright, Susan R. Flemmen Roxanne Lambert and Saundra O. Kortesma Petitioners-Respondents, v. LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant.^d

No. 91-1891.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Oral Argument Feb. 18, 1992.

Opinion Released March 10, 1992.

Opinion Filed March 10, 1992.

On behalf of the respondent-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of James E. Doyle, Atty. Gen., and Bruce A. Olsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., and orally argued by Bruce A. Olsen.

On behalf of the petitioners-respondents, the cause was submitted on the brief of Timothy E. Hawks and Linda S. Quartaro, and orally argued by Linda S. Quartaro, of Shneidman, Myers, Dowling & Blumenfield, of Milwaukee.

On behalf of the Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Council, the cause was submitted on the amicus curiae brief of Melissa A. Cherney, of Madison.

Before CANE, P.J., and LaROCQUE and MYSE, JJ.

MYSE, Judge.

The Labor and Industry Review Commission appeals a judgment reversing its determination that the Maple School District's collective bargaining agreement provision prohibiting duplicate health insurance coverage for its married employees does not violate the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. LIRC argues that the Act implicitly exempts issues involving health insurance coverage from its marital status discrimination proscriptions. LIRC contends that at the time marital status discrimination was made illegal, the state had in effect certain "discriminatory" practices with regard to health insurance coverage and its married employees, and, therefore, the legislature could not have intended to make such practices a violation of the Act. LIRC also argues that the district's policy discriminates on the condition that one's spouse is employed and receives health insurance coverage. LIRC contends that such discrimination is not based on marital status.

We conclude that there is no implied exception to the prohibition on marital status discrimination with respect to health insurance. Further, we conclude that the district's policy does discriminate on the basis of marital status. Therefore, we affirm the judgment reversing LIRC's decision.

The facts underlying this controversy are undisputed. LIRC found that all of the respondents are teachers employed by the Maple School District, that each is married, that the spouse of each is employed and that each of the spouses' employers offered health insurance benefits to the spouse. The 1986-87 collective bargaining agreement between the Maple Federation of Teachers and the Maple Board of Education provides that married employees with spouses who are employed and covered by comparable health insurance through their employment must elect to be covered by either the district's policy or the spouse's policy. ¹ Each of the teachers was forced, under the terms of this policy, to elect coverage under the district's health insurance policy or his or her spouse's policy.

Section 111.321, Stats., prohibits an employer from engaging in employment discrimination on the basis of marital status. Under sec. 111.322(1), it is employment discrimination to "discriminate against any individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment" on the basis of marital status. Section 111.32(12) defines marital status as "the status of being married, single, divorced, separated or widowed."

The only exception to the general prohibition against marital status discrimination expressly provided in the Act is found in sec. 111.345, which provides: "Notwithstanding s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of marital status to prohibit an individual from directly supervising or being directly supervised by his or her spouse."

Whether the district's policy violates the Act involves the interpretation and application of the statutes to an undisputed set of facts. The interpretation and application of statutes to an undisputed set of facts presents questions of law. State v. Michels, 141 Wis.2d 81, 87, 414 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Ct.App.1987). A court is not bound by an agency's conclusion of law. Local No. 695 v. LIRC, 154 Wis.2d 75, 82, 452 N.W.2d 368, 371 (1990). However, because LIRC has experience in interpreting what acts constitute marital status discrimination, we give deference to LIRC's conclusions of law. See DILHR v. LIRC, 161 Wis.2d 231, 246, 467 N.W.2d 545, 550 (1991). Because we accord deference to LIRC's decision in this case, we will uphold its interpretation of the statute as long as it is reasonable and not clearly contrary to legislative intent. Id.

In LIRC's decision, the only rationale it stated for concluding that the policy did not violate the Act was that the Act contains implied exceptions to its marital status discrimination prohibition regarding health insurance coverage. LIRC reasoned that the state, as an employer, had adopted health insurance practices that treated married employees differently from single employees. LIRC points to the fact that under sec. 40.52(1), Stats., a married state employee, whose spouse is also a state employee, cannot elect single coverage health insurance if the spouse is insured under a family coverage plan provided by the state. It also points to the fact that under secs. 40.52(1), 40.05(4) and 40.02(20), the state extends greater health insurance benefits to married persons because married persons are automatically entitled to receive dependent coverage while single persons are not. Because the state, as an employer, has health insurance practices that treat married employees and single employees differently, LIRC argues that other employers are entitled to do the same.

We first note that we have serious reservations whether a rule of statutory construction exists that holds we must look to the rules the legislature prescribes for the state, as an employer, to determine the scope of the rules it prescribes for other employers. See Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash.2d 62, 586 P.2d 1149, 1154 (1978). In addition, absent an ambiguity, we look to the plain meaning of the statute and do not resort to additional rules of construction. WPSC v. PSC, 156 Wis.2d 611, 618-19, 457 N.W.2d 502, 505 (Ct.App.1990). Here, LIRC does not assert that the statutory language is ambiguous. LIRC improperly seeks to create an ambiguity by using a rule of construction. Even assuming arguendo that there is a doctrine of implied exception to aid in statutory construction, and that resort to it is proper in this case, we still reach the conclusion that its application in this case is unreasonable.

LIRC states that the implied exception doctrine applies where the state engages in a statutorily authorized discriminatory practice at the time the legislature adopts another statute that would appear to make the state's conduct illegal. Because the legislature does not intend to make its own conduct illegal, the principle is that it intended to except such conduct from the purview of the Act.

The doctrine, however, only supports LIRC's determination in this case if it can be demonstrated...