Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Commission

• Decision Date: 16 November 1978
• Docket Number: No. 45357,45357
• Citation: 586 P.2d 1149,91 Wn.2d 62
• Parties: , 27 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1499, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8923 WASHINGTON WATER POWER COMPANY, Respondent, v. WASHINGTON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 62

91 Wn.2d 62

586 P.2d 1149, 27 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1499,

18 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8923

WASHINGTON WATER POWER COMPANY, Respondent, v. WASHINGTON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Appellant.

No. 45357.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Nov. 16, 1978.

Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., G. Saxon Rodgers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for appellant.

Paine, Lowe, Coffin, Herman & O'Kelly, Gary A. Dahlke, Spokane, for respondent.

ROSELLINI, Justice.

In this action, brought under RCW 34.04.070, the respondent obtained a declaratory judgment that a rule promulgated by the Washington State Human Rights Commission was in excess of its statutory authority. The statute under which the rule was made (RCW Title 49.60) defines unfair practices in employment and includes among such practices discrimination based on "marital status" (RCW 49.60.180).

The commission determined, after receiving a number of complaints, that there exists among some employers in the state an employment policy known as "anti-nepotism." Where a policy of this kind is adopted, the employer refuses to hire a spouse of an employee, and when two employees marry each other, one of the two is terminated. Some employers who have adopted this policy, among them the respondent, give the married couple an opportunity to decide which spouse will be discharged. ¹ Where such policies are in effect, the refusal to hire an applicant and the discharging of a spouse is done without any consideration being given to the actual effect of the marital relationship upon the individual's qualifications or work performance.

After conducting hearings and inviting and receiving comments from interested parties, the commission determined that this practice, in cases where no actual business necessity was involved, constituted discrimination within the meaning and purpose of RCW 49.60.180, .190 and .200. The commission adopted WAC 162-16-150, the pertinent part of which reads:

WAC 162-16-150. DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SPOUSE. (1) Authority. This section implements RCW 49.60.180, 49.60.190 and 49.60.200, which declare that discrimination because of marital status or sex is an unfair practice of employers, labor unions, and employment agencies, respectively.

(2) General Rule and Exception. In general, discrimination against an employee or applicant for employment because of (a) what a person's marital status is; (b) who his or her spouse is; or (c) what the spouse does, is an unfair practice because the action is based on the person's marital status. It may also be an unfair practice because of sex, where it burdens women much more than men, or men much more than women. However, there are certain circumstances where business necessity may justify action on the basis of what the spouse does, and where this is so the action will be considered to come within the bona fide occupational qualification exception to the general rule of nondiscrimination. "Business necessity" for purposes of this section includes those circumstances where an employer's actions are based upon a compelling and essential need to avoid business-related conflicts of interest, or to avoid the reality or appearance of improper influence or favor. ²

When, subsequently, it was confronted by employees who announced their intention to marry and to resist the discharge of one of the spouses, the respondent brought this suit to test the validity of the regulation. The superior court held that the words "marital status" should be given the literal meaning ordinarily accorded to them, and that one's "marital status", while it denotes the fact that one is or is not married, does not embrace the identity or situation of one's spouse. It held that the commission had exceeded its authority when it adopted a rule which forbade discrimination which looked beyond the employee's bare marital status to the identity and occupation of his or her spouse.

An administrative agency is limited in its powers and authority to those which have been specifically granted by the legislature. Cole v. Washington Utilities & Transp. Comm'n, 79 Wash.2d 302, 485 P.2d 71 (1971). The legislature, however, may delegate the authority to make decisions involving administrative or professional expertise, which are necessary to carry out the purpose of the act. The general rule is that the constitutional prohibition against delegation of legislative power does not preclude delegation to administrative offices or boards of the power to determine some fact or state of things upon which application of the law is made to depend, provided the law enunciates standards by which the officers or boards must be guided. O'Connell v. Conte, 76 Wash.2d 280, 456 P.2d 317 (1969).

The question before us, then, is whether the legislature intended to confine the commission, in its search for discriminatory practices, to instances where an individual is discriminated against solely because he is divorced, or widowed, or single, or married, without reference to the identity, occupation, affluence, or other attribute of the spouse.

Any inquiry into the legislative intent requires that we examine the statute as a whole and give effect to all its parts. Greenwood v. State Bd. for Community College Education, 82 Wash.2d 667, 513 P.2d 57 (1973). In determining legislative intent, the purpose for which a law was enacted is a matter of prime importance in arriving at a correct interpretation, and a thing which is within the object, spirit, and meaning of the statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter. In re Estates of Donnelly, 81 Wash.2d 430, 502 P.2d 1163 (1972).

At the beginning of the chapter is found its statement of purpose, which declares that it is enacted for the protection of the public welfare, health, and peace of the people and in fulfillment of the provisions of the constitution of this state concerning civil rights. It expresses a legislative finding that practices of discrimination against any of its inhabitants because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, marital status, age or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical handicap are a matter of state concern, that such discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state. It further declares that the state agency which is created in the chapter and upon which it confers powers with respect to the elimination and prevention of discrimination, is given general jurisdiction and power for such purposes. RCW 49.60.010.

In RCW 49.60.020, a liberal construction of the statutory provisions is directed to achieve their purpose. In RCW 49.60.030, the right to be free from discrimination is declared to be a civil right. While there is a definition section following, no attempt is made to define "race, creed, color, sex, marital status, or handicap." The legislature did find it necessary, however, to include "ancestry" within the definition of "national origin."

The legislature set up what is now known as the Human Rights Commission and gave it certain functions, powers and duties, among them the formulation of policies to effectuate the purposes of the chapter (RCW 49.60.110) and the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the chapter and the policies and practices of the board in connection therewith (RCW 49.60.120(3)). The legislature gave the commission power to create advisory agencies and conciliation councils to study the problems of discrimination

in all or specific fields of human relationships or in specific instances of discrimination . . . to make recommendations to the board for the development of policies and procedures . . .

RCW 49.60.130.

Provision is made for the holding of hearings and subpoenaing of witnesses. The act designates unfair practices with respect to credit transactions, insurance transactions, labor unions, employment, employment agencies, places of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, amusement, and real estate transactions. RCW 49.60.170-.200, .215, .220-.224. It is made an unfair practice to discriminate against a person opposing an unfair practice (RCW 49.60.210) or to aid a violation (RCW 49.60.220). The remainder of the chapter is devoted to enforcement provisions.

RCW 49.60.180(1) makes it an unfair practice for an employer to refuse to, among other things, hire any person because of such person's marital status, unless the refusal is based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.

Reading this chapter as a whole, it is apparent that the legislature intended to give to the commission broad powers to investigate and formulate policies with respect to practices which involve discrimination based upon those attributes, conditions, and situations which it had found to constitute an unfair basis for such discrimination. It did not attempt to designate all of the practices which constitute such discrimination, but rather gave the board the authority to do so, after conducting the investigations, consultations and hearings provided for in the chapter. The designation of the types of discrimination condemned, taken in conjunction with the statement of policy and purpose, furnished guidelines for the board's determination.

Here complaints of citizens that they had been discriminated against...