Braddock Motor Freight, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission

• Decision Date: 13 February 1963
• Docket Number: No. 37810,37810
• Citation: 174 Ohio St. 203,22 O.O.2d 173,188 N.E.2d 162
• Parties: , 22 O.O.2d 173 BRADDOCK MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., Appellant, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION of Ohio, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 203

174 Ohio St. 203

188 N.E.2d 162, 22 O.O.2d 173

BRADDOCK MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., Appellant, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION of Ohio, Appellee.

No. 37810.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Feb. 13, 1963.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Although specific findings of fact distinct from the opinion best fulfill the purpose and requirements of Section 4903.09, Revised Code, a Public Utilities Commission order will not be reversed for violation of such statute, where the opinion incorporates or contains findings on all essential facts.

2. Where there is no dispute as to the facts, the reasonableness of a determination by the Public Utilities Commission, under Section 4921.02, Revised Code, as to a 'regular route' operation of a motor transportation company depends upon the applicable law.

3. Chapter 4921, Revised Code, does not establish any definitive policy with respect to the nature of the service rendered or the degree of the competition allowed between holders of irregular-route and regular-route certifications.

4. Under Section 4921.04 and 4921.07, Revised Code, the Public Utilities Commission may adopt regulations to regulate motor transportation companies and, in doing so, may go beyond the bare statutory framework of Chapter 4921, Revised Code. The commission cannot disregard or refuse to apply such regulations but may interpret and apply them, and an order of the commission which is not inconsistent with the statutes or with a reasonable interpretation of its own regulations is valid.

The appellant, Braddock Motor Freight, Inc., filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio against Schipper's Express, Inc. Braddock holds a certificate as a regular-route carrier with termini at Cincinnati and Columbus. Schipper's is the holder of a certificate as an irregular-route carrier only, with its base point being Cincinnati.

In its complaint Braddock charges that Schipper's violated the statutes of Ohio, the rules of the commission and the restrictions in its certificate by engaging in a 'regular operation' between Columbus and Cincinnati and by 'operating as a regular certificated carrier and in open, direct competition with complainant.' The attorney examiner recommended a finding in favor of Braddock. The commission rejected the recommendation and dismissed the proceeding. Braddock has appealed under the provisions of Section 4903.13, Revised Code.

The facts with respect to Schipper's operations are contained in the commission's opinion and order and in the attorney examiner's summary of evidence which was adopted by the commission. In essence, these are:

Both in and away from its base point of Cincinnati, Schipper's distributes business cards listing specific points which are 'frequently served' by Schipper's. It engages in active personal solicitation of business and places advertising in various media. It picks up and delivers freight in Columbus at the docks of a local Columbus cartage company and has terminal facilities there for the servicing of Schipper's equipment. Its equipment and that of the cartage company are used interchangeably. Schipper's has advertisements in Columbus which list the telephone number and address of the cartage company. It has freight equipment going from Cincinnati to Columbus and from Columbus to Cincinnati every working day, with the average being about two shipments per day. The freight going between these points is substantially for the same customers repeatedly.

Nelson Lancione, Columbus, for appellant.

Mark McElroy, Atty. Gen., Herbert T. Maher and Andrew R. Sarisky, Columbus, for appellee.

John L. Muething, Cincinnati, Earl Merwin, George, Greek, King & McMahon and Herbert Baker, Columbus, for Schipper's Express, Inc. BUFFEY, Judge.

Braddock's first contention is that the commission did not make findings of fact as required by Section 4903.09, Revised Code. Specific findings of fact distinct from the opinion would best fulfill the purpose and requirements of the law. However, in the present case, the opinion incorporates or contains findings on all essential points. We do not consider the deviation in format to be so substantial as to warrant reversal.

The real controversy concerns the scope of operations by the irregular-route carrier under the statutes, commission regulations, and the conditions of Schipper's certificate. It is true, as Schipper's contends, that the determination of a 'regular route' operation is a question of fact for the commission. Section 4921.02, Revised Code. In the present case, there is no real dispute over the significant facts. Under those circumstances the reasonableness of the commission's determination depends on the law involved.

Braddock has made 20 assignments of error. Essentially, these are that the commission erred in not finding on the facts a violation of (1) statutory requirements under Chapter 4921, Revised Code, (2) the commission's administrative order No. 125 and, in particular, paragraph 14 thereof, and (3) the conditions contained in Schipper's certificate.

In the field of motor transport common carriers, the general policy of the federal Interstate Commerce Commission and that implicit in the Ohio commission order here differ. The federal position is well emphasized in Brady Transfer & Storage Co. (ICC), 47 M.C.C., 23. See, also, Brady Transfer & Storage Co. v. United States, D.C., 80 F.Supp. 110. The approach in the Brady case rests on the preservation of distinctions between regular and irregular service, with strict regulation of competition between the two classes of carriers thus created. Detailed criteria have been developed to determine the nature of the service provided by a carrier's operation.

The Ohio commission order here contemplates a far broader and more flexible policy both with respect to the nature of the service to be rendered under 'irregular' certification and the degree of competition...