Bradford v. Cole

• Decision Date: 31 July 1923
• Docket Number: Case Number: 14485
• Parties: BRADFORD et al. v. COLE et al.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1923 OK 571

217 P. 470

95 Okla. 35

BRADFORD et al. v. COLE et al.

Case Number: 14485

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: July 31, 1923

Syllabus

¶0 Statutes -- Special Acts -- Unconstitutionality--Creation of Consolidated School District.

Chapter 229, Session Laws 1923, creating a consolidated school district for white pupils comprising a district formed out of territory existing in independent school districts Nos. 36, 55, and 56, Okmulgee county, is a special law and regulates the affairs of the school districts in a manner other than that provided by general laws of the state and is violative of subdivision (b), sec. 46, art. 5, of the Constitution, which prohibits the Legislature from passing any special law "regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards, or school districts. * * *"

Error from District Court, Okmulgee County; James Hepburn, Judge.

Action in the nature of quo warranto by R. B. Bradford and others against John Cole and others, officers of Consolidated School District No. 9, Okmulgee County. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs bring error. Reversed and remanded with directions.

Charles A. Dickson and E. M. Carter, for plaintiffs in error.

Wellington L. Merwine, for defendants in error.

COCHRAN, J.

¶1 This action, instituted in the district court of Okmulgee county, was in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding against the defendants, who were officers of consolidated school district No. 9, Okmulgee county, Okla., and involves the constitutionality of House Bill No. 463, passed by the Legislature of 1923. The act was passed for the purpose of creating a consolidated school district for white pupils to comprise a district formed out of territory existing in school districts Nos. 55, 36, and 56, Okmulgee county. Okla. The petition of the plaintiffs alleged that the act of the Legislature was unconstitutional and in violation of subsections b and q. of section 46, art. 5, of the Oklahoma Constitution. A demurrer was sustained to the petition, and the plaintiffs have appealed to this court.

¶2 Article 5, section 46, of the Constitution, so far as material to the consideration of the questions here involved, provides:

"The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law authorizing:

"(b) Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards, or school districts. * **

"(q) Regulating the management of public schools, the building or repairing of school houses, and the raising of money for such purposes."

¶3 The defendants contend that the act under consideration does not regulate the affairs of the school district or regulate the management of public schools, but simply creates a new district out of three districts existing at the time of its passage and provides that the districts so organized shall be managed and conducted according to existing general laws of the state of Oklahoma, and, hence, the act is not in violation of the foregoing constitutional provisions.

¶4 It is conceded that the act in controversy is a special law and that the provisions of the Constitution for the enactment of special laws was complied with, and the only question is as to whether this act comes within one of the classes mentioned in article 5, sec. 46, of the Constitution, prohibiting the passage of special laws. The answer to this question depends upon the construction given to the phrases "regulating the affairs of school districts" and "regulating the management of public schools." It has been held that similar provisions should receive a broad construction instead of a narrow or technical construction, and with the idea of carrying out the intention of the makers of the Constitution. In Hall v. Bell County (Tex. Civ. App.) 138 S.W. 178, the court had under consideration the constitutional provisions prohibiting the passage of special laws "regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards, or school districts," and in the opinion the following language is used.

"The word 'regulating,' as used in the constitutional provisions, should not be given a narrow or technical signification, and (held) that the act establishing the office of county auditor was an act regulating county affairs within such section, and hence the act amending the same by exempting Bell county was a special or local law regulating county affairs, and was therefore unconstitutional."

¶5 This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Texas in the case of Bell County v. Hall, 105 Tex. 558, 153 S.W. 121, and the following language was used:

"In relieving Bell county from the operation of the general law, this act, in effect, changed the administration of its affairs in every particular provided by the general law, and thus by indirection regulated its affairs as effectually as though it had directly and affirmatively prescribed a different method for their management."

¶6 In Territory v. Gutierrez (N. M.) 12 N.M. 254, 78 P. 139, the constitutional provisions under consideration prohibited the passage of a special law regulating the affairs of counties, and in discussing the meaning of the word "affairs" the court said:

"A Constitution is not to receive a technical construction, like a common-law instrument or statute. It is to be interpreted so as to carry out the great principles of government, not to defeat them. Commonwealth v. Clark, 7 Watts & Serg. 127. * * * When it speaks of 'affairs' of a county, it means such affairs as affect the people of that county."

¶7 At that time the act in controversy was passed, the general laws of the state prescribed a method by which separate school districts could be consolidated. It also prescribed how common school districts, independent districts, and consolidated school districts should be managed, and further provided for the maintenance of separate schools for the benefit of whites or negroes, depending upon which was in the minority in each school district, and provided a method for raising revenue to pay the expenses of such separate schools Under the provisions of this act, school districts were consolidated in a manner not prescribed by the general law. Under the existing law, these school districts were permitted to operate under the laws applicable to independent school districts until such time as the voters of the districts should authorize a consolidation in the manner provided by statute. The law applicable to the management of independent school districts is in many respects different from the law applicable to consolidated school districts. The act in controversy not only abolished existing school districts and created a new district, but in effect changed the administration of the affairs of the territory embraced in the new district by making applicable the...