Bradford v. Oklahoma ex rel. Woods

• Decision Date: 07 September 1894
• Parties: WILLIAM BRADFORD v. THE TERRITORY OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel., J. H. WOODS, County Attorney
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1894 OK 11

37 P. 1061

2 Okla. 228

WILLIAM BRADFORD v. THE TERRITORY OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel., J. H. WOODS, County Attorney

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: September 7, 1894

SYLLABUS

¶0 1. Under the Statutes of 1890, art. 34, chap 70, information in the nature of quo warranto in the name of the territory, on the relation of the county attorney, is the proper proceeding to remove a county clerk from office for maladministration in office.

2. It is a violation of law for a county clerk to issue a liquor license to an applicant until the full amount of the annual fee has been paid to the county treasurer, and a clerk who does such act is guilty of wilful maladministration in office and may be removed for such disregard of duty.

3. Our laws furnish three concurrent remedies for removal of public officers for the causes prescribed in chap. 61, Stat. 1890, viz.: information in the nature of quo warranto, accusation by the grand jury, and complaint by the board of county commissioners, or some other person, in his own name, and either remedy may be adopted.

4. The acts done by a county officer to warrant his removal from office need not be such as would subject him to a criminal prosecution, but any acts done knowingly in violation of his statutory duties are suf- ficient to constitute such maladministration as will forfeit his right to said office.

5. A large discretion is vested in the trial judge in determining the qualifications and competency of jurors, and unless an abuse of such discretion is shown, an appellate court will nor disturb his action.

6. It is not error to sustain a challenge to a juror who has formed an opinion, based upon rumors or newspaper reports, when he answers that, notwithstanding such previously formed opinion, he will render a fair and impartial verdict. In such cases the court passes judicially upon his qualifications, and must be satisfied, from his answer, his conduct, actions and demeanor, that the juror will be fair and impartial, and will not be influenced by any motives except a desire to do exact justice.

Error from Oklahoma County.

C. R. Reddick for plaintiff in error.

C. A. Galbraith, Attorney General, for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BURFORD, J.:

¶1 This was a proceeding by information, in the nature of quo warranto, to remove the plaintiff in error from the office of county clerk, of Oklahoma county, for willful maladministration in office.

¶2 The cause was before this court once before, (1, Ok. 366,) and the substance of the information is set out in the former opinion.

¶3 The plaintiff, in error was tried by jury a second time and convicted, and judgment rendered ousting him from said office.

¶4 The first error assigned is the action of the judge of the trial court in sustaining the challenge of the relator to certain jurors for cause. The jurors testified, on their voir dire, that they had formed opinions as to the merits of the cause, based upon hearsay and newspaper reports, but that, notwithstanding such opinion, they could give the defendant a fair and impartial trial. The court excused the jurors named and directed other jurors to be selected to take their places.

¶5 It is contended that these jurors were not disqualified under § 5622, Criminal Procedure, Stat. 1890. It is provided by said statutes that--

"No person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded upon rumor, statements in public journals or common notoriety, provided it appears to the court upon his declaration, under oath or otherwise, that he can, or will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matters to be submitted to him."

¶6 "Under this section the court must be satisfied that the juror will act fairly and impartially, and in passing upon this question he must act judicially on the facts before him, and the conduct and appearance of the juror; his manner and apparent candor or impartially are all to be considered by the court together with his actions in determining his fitness as a juror. It is the duty of the trial court, in the selection of jurors for the trial of a cause, civil or criminal, to see that jurors are obtained who will act fairly and impartially between the litigants; who will not be influenced or biased by previously formed opinions, or actuated by motives other than a desire to render exact justice to both parties. A very large discretion is vested in the court in determining the competency and qualifications of jurors, and its action should never be disturbed by an appellate court, unless an abuse of such discretion is clearly apparent. We find nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court abused the discretion vested in it in empaneling the jury. And while it would not have been error, under the statutes cited, to have retained the jurors, as appears from their answers, the presumptions are in favor of the correctness of the act of the trial court, and no error is manifest in the record. In any event, the statute cited from criminal procedure can not be held as controlling, yet the rule there stated is the proper one, now accepted by most all the courts of the highest resort, in cases either civil or criminal.

¶7 The second assignment of error complains of the action of the trial court in refusing to permit the de- fendant, Bradford, to prove, on the trial, that he had paid to the treasurer of Oklahoma county, after the commencement of this action, the monies received by him from the sale of liquor licenses.

¶8 If there was any error in rejecting this testimony, it was cured by afterwards permitting the defendant to testify fully as to said payments.

¶9 The third assignment of error presents the same question. The only other objection insisted upon by counsel for Bradford is that the information was improperly brought, and that it does not state facts sufficient to entitle the relator to have the office of county clerk declared vacant.

¶10 The...