Bradley v. Nooth
| Decision Date | 27 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:16-cv-1377-PK |
| Parties | RONALD E. BRADLEY, Plaintiff, v. MARK NOOTH, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
United States Magistrate Judge Paul Papak issued Findings and Recommendation in this case on December 12, 2017. ECF 58. Judge Papak recommended that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied and Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted.
Under the Federal Magistrates Act ("Act"), the Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party files objections to a magistrate's findings and recommendations, "the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
For those portions of a magistrate's findings and recommendations to which neither party has objected, the Act does not prescribe any standard of review. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 152 (1985) (); United States. v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (). Although in the absence of objections no review is required, the Act "does not preclude further review by the district judge[] sua sponte . . . under a de novo or any other standard." Thomas, 474 U.S. at 154. Indeed, the Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) recommend that "[w]hen no timely objection is filed," the Court review the magistrate's recommendations for "clear error on the face of the record."
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, timely filed an objection (ECF 61). Plaintiff objects to all of the findings and conclusions in the Findings and Recommendations. Accordingly, the Court reviews the pending motions de novo.
Plaintiff Ronald E. Bradley originally brought pro se a claim against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that Defendants violated Plaintiff's due process rights. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his personal property without proper process by considering Plaintiff's move from Snake River Correctional Institution ("SRCI") to county jail after Plaintiff had obtained a partial remand from the appeal of his original criminal conviction to be a "transfer" instead of a "transport." As a result, after Plaintiff left SRCI in January 2013, his property was disposed of under Oregon Administrative Rule 291-117-0110(6) (the "Transfer Rule") instead of Rule 291-117-0120(6) (the "Transport Rule"). Plaintiff's property was shipped to his mother's residence and when Plaintiff was moved back to SRCI in December 2013, he no longer had access to his property. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants acted with disregard ininterpreting and applying the Oregon Administrative Rules for handling personal property with respect to inmate transfers and transports.
Plaintiff further alleged that upon his return to SRCI, he filed grievances relating to his property. He then filed a small claims action in state court. Although the state court judge ruled in favor of SRCI, the state court judge noted that the Transport Rule (under which property is stored) had been poorly written.
On July 28, 2016, the Court sua sponte dismissed Plaintiff's claims. ECF 6. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims for two reasons. First, because Plaintiff had already unsuccessfully adjudicated his loss of personal property in an Oregon small claims action, Plaintiff could not challenge in federal court the unfavorable decision by the small claims court. Second, the Court found that because the Oregon Tort Claims Act provides an adequate postdeprivation process and remedy, the alleged lack of predeprivation process was not actionable under Section 1983.
On August 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a). ECF 8. Plaintiff again noted that the small claims judge had commented that the rule was poorly written. Plaintiff questioned the adequacy of the postdeprivation remedy provided by the Oregon Administrative Rules. Construing Plaintiff's motion liberally, the Court interpreted the motion to clarify the claim Plaintiff intended to allege in his complaint. Based on this construction, the Court understood Plaintiff to be alleging that Defendants followed their usual administrative practice in disposing of Plaintiff's property without predeprivation process and that Plaintiff sought injunctive relief to require that Defendants' administrative process for disposing of inmate property when "transferring" or "transporting" inmates comply with due process requirements. The Court granted Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, finding that as so clarified, Plaintiff was alleging that the dispositionof Plaintiff's property was not a "random and unauthorized" deprivation of property such that postdeprivation process would suffice but was instead alleging deprivation of property from an administrative process that did not provide adequate process. Under this type of alleged conduct, postdeprivation remedies could not save an otherwise unconstitutional act. See Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985) (); see also Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 738 (9th Cir. 2001) ( ).
The Court further held that although the availability of a postdeprivation remedy may not be dispositive of Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief regarding the alleged unconstitutional administrative process, Plaintiff would have standing to bring such a claim only if he could demonstrate a realistic threat of repeated future injury. The Court noted that it appears that the only way to demonstrate such a threat in this case would be for Plaintiff to allege that he is likely to win another appeal and again be transferred to county jail, which the Court found to be unlikely. Nonetheless, because it was not absolutely clear that Plaintiff could not allege sufficient facts to establish standing, the Court allowed Plaintiff to replead this claim.
With respect to Plaintiff's claim for money damages, however, the Court reaffirmed its previous holding that this claim was fully and finally litigated in small claims court and that Plaintiff was thus precluded from adjudicating that claim in federal court. The Court thus declined to reconsider its dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for money damages with prejudice.
Plaintiff then filed his First Amended Complaint. In this complaint, similar to Plaintiff's original complaint, it is not clear that Plaintiff is alleging an administrative process that violates inmates' constitutional rights. Plaintiff's claim for relief alleged in his amended complaint is that the named defendants acted with disregard to the proper interpretation and application of the administrative procedures adopted in relation to the disposition of inmate property. This mirrors what Plaintiff had alleged in his original complaint, which is the claim the Court had originally interpreted as a claim for a random and unauthorized deprivation of property rather than a claim of a constitutionally-deficient administrative process.
Plaintiff added allegations, however, relating to how he is facing repeated threat of future injury. Plaintiff alleges that he filed another appeal, the second appeal was granted, he will thus be "going back to Washington County jail" for further court proceedings, and his personal property will again have to be disposed of in some manner. Plaintiff alleges that he therefore faces a threat of repeated harm that is not conjectural or hypothetical.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff lacks standing; that he fails to state a claim because there is an adequate postdeprivation remedy; that even if Plaintiff does challenge Oregon's administrative system, the Oregon Administrative Rules at issue are constitutional and comport with due process; that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants in their personal capacity because injunctive and declaratory relief cannot be sought against them in that capacity; and that Defendants are protected by qualified immunity whensued in their official capacity. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on his due process claim.
The U.S. Constitution confers limited authority on the federal courts to hear only active cases or controversies brought with standing. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546-47 (2016); Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013). Standing "limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong." Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547.
To have standing, a plaintiff must have a "personal interest . . . at the commencement of the litigation." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). The constitutionally required...
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