Bradley v. The Industrial Commission of Arizona
Decision Date | 21 February 1938 |
Docket Number | Civil 3931 |
Citation | 51 Ariz. 291,76 P.2d 745 |
Parties | JAMES L. BRADLEY, Petitioner, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, L. C. HOLMES, J. NEY MILES, and SAM PROCTOR, as Members of Said the Industrial Commission of Arizona, and W. J. TURBEVILLE, Applicant-Employee, Respondents |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL by Certiorari from an award of The Industrial Commission of Arizona. Award set aside.
Messrs Baker & Whitney and Mr. Lawrence L. Howe, for Petitioner.
Mr. Don C. Babbitt, Mr. Howard A. Twitty and Mr. Burt H. Clingan, for Respondents.
W. J Turbeville, hereinafter called petitioner, made application to The Industrial Commission of Arizona, hereinafter called the commission, for compensation for an injury which he claimed arose out of and in the due course of his employment by James L. Bradley, hereinafter called the employer. The commission made an award in favor of petitioner, and, after rehearing, affirmed such award, and the employer brought the matter before us for review.
There is no dispute as to the employment, the accident, and the injury, but it is contended that the following finding of the commission:
is not sustained by the evidence, for the reason that it appears affirmatively that petitioner had before the accident elected to reject the provisions of the Compensation Law. Section 1430, Revised Code 1928, reads, in part, as follows:
The evidence shows conclusively and, indeed, it is not disputed that petitioner did sign a notice in duplicate of the form set forth in section 1430, supra, and that the duplicate was in due time filed with the commission. Petitioner contends, in substance, however, that he did not know what he was signing when he executed the election to reject and that he, therefore, is not bound thereby. We have held that the commission is not bound by many of the ordinary rules of evidence in determining whether an award should or should not be made. Blankenship v. Industrial Com; 34 Ariz. 2, 267 P. 203; Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Industrial Com; 34 Ariz. 175, 269 P. 77; Johnson v. T.B. Stewart Const. Co., 37 Ariz. 250, 293 P. 20. On the other hand, when the commission makes an award, it is acting judicially and is, therefore, bound to follow the general principles of law. Doby v. Miami Trust Co., 39 Ariz. 228, 5 P.2d 187; Edens v. L.E. Dixon Const. Co., 42 Ariz. 519, 27 P.2d 1107. We think one of these principles when applied to an attempt to defeat an election to reject the Compensation Law, made as provided in section 1430, supra, is that the party electing may not set aside his election on the ground that he did not understand the effect of the written instrument unless he brings himself within the usual rule of law as to the showing necessary to set aside a written contract on the ground that the party did not understand its terms.
It is universally held that, when the parties to a contract have reduced it to writing, one of them may not defeat it by showing by parol evidence that he did not understand what the contract meant, except on the ground of mutual mistake, fraud, or misrepresentation, and the modern doctrine is that the rule, strictly speaking, is one of substantive law rather than of evidence. 22 C.J. 1075, and cases cited. There is no contention that there was a mutual mistake of fact, and the question is whether petitioner was induced to execute the election by any legal fraud or misrepresentation. In so determining we must, of course, take the evidence as strongly as possible in favor of the finding of the commission which necessarily implies that the waiver was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, and we therefore consider only the evidence of petitioner himself as to the circumstances under which the election was executed. Shortly before he went to work for Bradley in the occupation in which he was injured, an insurance agent named Vernon came to see him. The material testimony in regard to what happened between the agent and petitioner is stated by the latter as follows:
On cross-examination petitioner testified as follows:
Summarizing this evidence, which is all that petitioner said on the vital point, it appears that he was told that Bradley was taking out some form of insurance to protect petitioner; that the agent asked some of the usual questions in regard to insurance, and filled in the insurance application, and then handed several papers to petitioner to sign, the application being on top; that, after that was signed, it was lifted up and petitioner signed the other papers. It is true petitioner thinks he signed his name only twice, but the written documents on file show that he actually executed the application for insurance and a waiver of compensation and a duplicate thereof, which was later filed with the commission. No statement was made by the agent in regard to what he...
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