Bradley v. Tweedy (In re Bradley's Estate)

• Decision Date: 13 January 1925
• Citation: 201 N.W. 973,185 Wis. 393
• Parties: IN RE BRADLEY'S ESTATE. BRADLEY v. TWEEDY.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

185 Wis. 393

201 N.W. 973

IN RE BRADLEY'S ESTATE.

BRADLEY

v.TWEEDY.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Jan. 13, 1925.

Appeal from Milwaukee County Court; M. S. Sheridan, Judge.

In the matter of the estate of James W. Bradley, deceased. From a judgment finding Edna B. Tweedy to be deceased's sole heir at law, William T. Bradley appeals. Affirmed.Quarles, Spence & Quarles, of Milwaukee (Joseph V. Quarles, of Milwaukee, of counsel), for appellant.

Miller, Mack & Fairchild, of Milwaukee, for respondent.

OWEN, J.

James W. Bradley departed this life February 21, 1924, intestate, leaving an estate in excess of $4,000,000. He never married, and at the time of his death his parents and his brothers, William H. and Edward Bradley, were dead, William H. Bradley leaving an adopted son, William T. Bradley, the appellant, and Edward Bradley leaving a surviving daughter, Edna B. Tweedy, respondent herein.

Edna B. Tweedy applied to the county court of Milwaukee county for administration of the estate of said James W. Bradley, praying that letters of administration issue to the First Wisconsin Trust Company and Arthur W. Fairchild. Thereupon the appellant, William T. Bradley, objected to the appointmentof Arthur W. Fairchild as one of the administrators, and made application to the county court to take proofs of heirship, and for an order finding him next of kin to said James W. Bradley, deceased. Upon said hearing the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and adjudged Edna B. Tweedy to be the sole heir at law of said James W. Bradley, deceased, and that the status of appellant as adopted son of William H. Bradley did not constitute him next of kin or an heir at law of said James W. Bradley, deceased, and issued letters of administration to the First Wisconsin Trust Company and Arthur W. Fairchild. From this judgment William T. Bradley brings this appeal.

Reduced to its lowest terms, the question is whether William T. Bradley is an heir at law of the deceased, James W. Bradley, by reason of his adoption as a son by William H. Bradley. It is the contention of appellant that this relation results from the provisions of section 4024, Stats., which provides that:

“A child so adopted shall be deemed, for the purposes of inheritance and succession by such child, custody of the person and right to obedience by such parents by adoption, and all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation of parents and children the same to all intents and purposes as if the child had been born in lawful wedlock of such parents by adoption, excepting that such child shall not be capable of taking property expressly limited to the heirs of the body of such parents.”

[1] From time immemorial it has been held by English-speaking peoples that the property of intestate deceased persons should descend to kindred of the blood. This is not a conclusion arrived at by application of principles of logic, but it is a tenet of justice, intuitively and generally recognized, and crystalized into forms of law by common consent. It formed the basis for the principles of descent obtaining at common law, and finds expression in the statutes of descent enacted in the various states of the Union. It goes without saying that any statute which interferes with that principle, or interrupts the natural course of descent of property, should be strictly construed, not only because it contravenes the common law, but because it is repugnant to fixed notions of natural justice, and this is especially true in this state, where it is held that the right to inherit property is a natural right which the Legislature cannot destroy. Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N. W. 627, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 121, 9 Ann. Cas. 711. This spirit pervaded the opinion of this court in Hole v. Robbins, 53 Wis. 514, 10 N. W. 617, where it was held that the natural, and not the adoptive, parents of an adopted son inherited his property upon his decease, and the opinion of this court in Lichter v. Thiers, 139 Wis. 481, 121 N. W. 153, plainly indicates a similar disposition on the part of the court as then constituted, although we do not think that case is decisive of the question here presented, as contended by the respondent.

This court has held that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institution, and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption. Parsons v. Parsons, 101 Wis. 76, 77 N. W. 147, 70 Am. St. Rep. 894;In re Bearby (Wis.) 200 N. W. 686. But it has never been held by this court, nor is it the prevailing judicial view of the courts of this country, that an adoption statute should be liberally construed to divert the descent of property, left by those who are not parties to the adoption proceedings, from its natural course of descent.

[2][3] There are many reasons why an adoption statute should be strictly construed to enforce the duties and obligations voluntarily assumed by adoptive parents, and to protect the adopted child in those rights and privileges which the law intends to secure to him as the result of the adoption. These reasons, however, do not apply when the rights of those who were not parties to the adoption proceedings are involved. The status resulting from adoption proceedings is not a natural one. It is a civil or contractual status. One may have the right to assume the status of a father to a stranger of the blood, but he has no moral right to impose upon his brother the status of an uncle to his adopted son. As was said in Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483, 24 A. 948, 17 L. R. A. 439, 30 Am. St. Rep. 370:

“By adoption, the adopters can make for themselves an heir, but they cannot thus make one for their kindred.”

In Merritt v. Morton, 143 Ky. 133, 136 S. W. 133, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 139, it was said:

“The act of the foster parents in adopting the child is a contract into which they entered with those having the lawful custody of the child, an agreement personal to themselves, and while they have a perfect right to bind or obligate themselves to make the child their heir, they are powerless to extend this right on his part to inherit from others. All inheritance laws are based or built upon natural ties of blood relationship, whereas an adopted child's right to inherit rests upon a contract, and hence only those parties to the contract are bound by it.”

And in construing the adoption statute of Michigan the court of that state said:

“We see nothing in it to lead to the belief that it was the legislative intention to permit one to adopt heirs for third persons.” Van Derlyn v. Mack, 137 Mich. 146, 100 N. W. 278, 66 L. R. A. 437, 109 Am. St. Rep. 669, 4 Ann. Cas. 879.

Of course what was said by these courts was said with reference to the statutory provisions on the subject of adoption of their respective states. These authorities do not go to the extent of denying to the Legislature the power of prescribing a course of descent which will take property of deceased persons out of the current of their blood. That is a question that was not before any of the courts quoted, a question which is not here, and upon which we very carefully refrain from expressing any opinion, in view of our decision in Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N. W. 627, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 121, 9 Ann. Cas. 711. We are now emphasizing the fact that to accomplish such purpose the Legislature should use explicit and unmistakable language. The consequences which would result from such a law are very well illustrated by this very situation. The respondent herein is related by ties of blood to the deceased. The appellant is not related to him in any manner, neither by ties of blood nor by contractual relations. If his contention is to be maintained, he, a stranger to the blood of the deceased, bearing to him not even the duty of kindred regard, will divide with the respondent his estate. Furthermore, but for the existence of the respondent, he would succeed to deceased's entire estate, thus diverting it entirely from his blood relatives, and cutting off deceased's cousins, and all his other blood relatives, from any participation therein. This result is entirely repugnant to the notions of natural justice which are embraced as by common consent by the Anglo Saxon race.

Text-writers generally lay down the rule that under statutes of adoption which declare the adopted child to have all the rights, including that of inheritance of a child born in lawful wedlock, the adopted child is not constituted an heir of the collateral kindred of the adoptive parents. 1 R. C. L. p. 621; 1 Corpus Juris, p. 401; Spencer on Law of Domestic Relations, 422; 3 Thompson on Real Property, pp. 398, 399; 1 Woerner, American Law of Administration, p. 204. This has been held in many cases, among which we cite the following: Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S. W. 585, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 117, 118 Am. St. Rep. 672, 9 Ann. Cas. 775;Batcheller-Durkee v. Batcheller, 39 R. I. 45, 97 A. 378, L. R. A. 1916E, 545;Van Derlyn v. Mack, 137 Mich. 146, 100 N. W. 278, 66 L. R. A. 437, 109 Am. St. Rep. 669, 4 Ann. Cas. 879;Helms v. Elliott, 89 Tenn. 446, 14 S. W. 930, 10 L. R. A. 535;Moore v. Moore, 35 Vt. 98. This list of citations might be greatly extended, but to no good purpose. We commend the student of the subject to Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S. W. 585, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 117, 118 Am. St. Rep. 672, 9 Ann. Cas. 775, and Batcheller-Durkee v. Batcheller, 39 R. I. 45, 97 A. 378, L. R. A. 1916E, 545, for a philosophical discussion of the subject, as well as for very satisfactory reviews of the authorities of this country relating thereto.

The industry of appellant's counsel has called to our attention but three jurisdictions holding to the contrary: In re Cadwell's Estate, 26 Wyo. 412, 186 P. 499;Shick v. Howe, 137 Iowa, 249, ...