Helms v. Elliott

• Decision Date: 16 December 1890
• Citation: 14 S.W. 930
• Parties: HELMS <I>et al.</I> v. ELLIOTT <I>et al.</I>
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

14 S.W. 930

HELMS et al. v. ELLIOTT et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

December 16, 1890.

Appeal from chancery court, Davidson county; ANDREW ALLISON, Chancellor.

J. P. Helms and J. S. Pilcher, for complainants. A. N. Grisham and C. D. Berry, for defendants.

CALDWELL, J.

In 1856, Louie Lewis, by proper proceeding in the county court of Davidson county, adopted Anderson Cheatham as his child, and had his name changed to Anderson Lewis. Louie Lewis died in 1863, leaving one daughter, Sallie Carter, a grandson, Lewis Jones, the only child of a deceased daughter, and Anderson Lewis, the adopted son, as his only heirs at law. In 1873, the grandson, Lewis Jones, died intestate, without child, brother, or sister, or descendant of either; without wife, father, or mother; and owning certain personal property. When he died, his aunt, Sallie Carter, and his adopted uncle, Anderson Lewis, were living. The question for our determination is, are these two persons entitled to participate equally in the distribution of Lewis Jones' estate, or does his aunt take it to the exclusion of his adopted uncle?

No such thing as "adoption" was known to the common law. It is purely a creation of statute. Louie Lewis adopted Anderson Cheatham under the act of 1851-52, c. 338, § 2, which is as follows: "That the county or circuit court shall have concurrent jurisdiction and power to authorize and empower any person or persons to adopt any child or children as their own, upon application by petition or motion, and the adoption and the names of the parties and the terms of the adoption shall be entered upon the records of the court, and the court shall have discretion to refuse the prayers of the petition. Such act shall confer upon such child or children the rights of a child or children, as if they were born the child or children of such parent, and capable of inheriting or succeeding to the personal or real estate of the parent, as heir or next of kin, but shall confer no rights upon the person making the adoption to inherit or succeed to the personal or real estate of the child adopted, nor give him any interest or right in the estate of such child." The substance of this section was carried into the Code at sections 3643-3645. As between the adopting parent and the adopted child the statute declares in the plainest terms that the adopted child shall, by the act of adoption, assume all the rights of a child born to such parent. The adopted child becomes entitled to the same protection and support as if born the child of the adopting parent, and is given the capacity of inheriting or succeeding to the estate of the adopting parent as heir or next of kin. The adopting parent assumes the same parental obligation to the adopted child as if such child were born to such parent, and the adopted child is clothed with the same rights in the estate of the adopting parent as an heir or next of kin. This is the full measure of the benefits conferred upon the adopted child. No claims are given upon any one except the adopting parent; no property rights are conferred except in the estate of such parent.

It is contended that the legal status of the adopted child is the same as that of the child born in lawful wedlock, and that, as a consequence, the same rights of heir and next of kin exist in the one case as in the other, not only as to the parent, but as to all other persons. This position is sound in part only. So far as the parental obligation and the estate of the adopting parent are concerned, it is well taken, but beyond that it is not tenable. As to the estates of other persons than the adopting parent, the law of adoption fixes no rights in the adopted child. It is only as to the adopting parent that the adopted child is made "heir or next of kin" by the statute. By...