Bradshaw v. Halpin

• Decision Date: 17 March 1904
• Citation: 79 S.W. 685,180 Mo. 666
• Parties: BRADSHAW v. HALPIN et al., Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

79 S.W. 685

180 Mo. 666

BRADSHAW v. HALPIN et al., Appellants

Supreme Court of Missouri, First Division

March 17, 1904

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. D. D. Fisher Judge.

Modified and affirmed.

John B Dempsey and Daniel Dillon for appellants.

(1) Appellant, the Halpin Real Estate Company, claims that the evidence shows that James Halpin, at the time he conveyed the lot in question to the Halpin Real Estate Company, on January 2, 1900, was indebted to that company in a sum in excess of $ 1,250, the price at which he sold and conveyed the lot to that company, and that this being so the trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of plaintiff. Shelley v Bothe, 73 Mo. 74; Bangs Milling Co. v. Burnes, 152 Mo. 376; Bank v. Russey, 74 Mo.App. 656. (2) The Halpin Real Estate Company also claims that the evidence shows that there is no equity in plaintiff's claim; that she is asking a court of equity to decree that which is clearly inequitable, and that for this reason the trial court erred in not dismissing her petition. And in this connection this appellant invokes the rule that he who seeks equity must do equity. Wilson v. Railroad, 120 Mo. 57; Kline v. Vogel, 90 Mo. 239. (3) So far as relates to appellant, Margaret E. Halpin, the decree of the circuit court is clearly erroneous even if the conveyance of James Halpin to the Halpin Real Estate Company be set aside as fraudulent as to his creditors. James Halpin was the owner of the land and Margaret Halpin was his wife and had a dower interest in the lot of ground. If the deed of James Halpin to this lot be set aside, then the dower interest of his wife, Margaret E. Halpin, revives. Yet the decree in this case divests her of all title and vests it in plaintiff. Bohannon v. Combs, 97 Mo. 448; Bealy v. Blake, 153 Mo. 672.

L. Frank Ottofy for respondent.

(1) The evidence shows that the conveyance by James Halpin to the Halpin Real Estate Company was made with the intent to defraud his creditor, Mary Devlin. He executed a voluntary conveyance of all the property he had so that nothing could be reached on execution, and this conveyance is void. Lionberger v. Baker, 88 Mo. 453; Forster v. Planing Mill Co., 16 Mo.App. 154. (2) The purchaser at the execution sale may maintain the action to set aside the conveyance. The plaintiff here stands in the shoes of the judgment creditor and is entitled to a decree vesting the title in her. Bobb v. Woodward, 50 Mo. 95; Ryland v. Callison, 54 Mo. 514; Zoll v. Soper, 75 Mo. 460; Beam v. Bennett, 51 Mich. 151; Boyer v. Tucker, 70 Mo. 458; Lionberger v. Baker, 88 Mo. 455; Garrett v. Wagner, 125 Mo. 463; Knoop v. Kelsey, 121 Mo. 649. (3) The conveyance to the real estate company was without consideration. Knowledge of the fraudulent intent by the trinity: James Halpin the individual, James Halpin, president and treasurer of the real estate company, and James Halpin, president and treasurer of the manufacturing company, and his wife, Margaret Halpin, is so complete as to leave no room for conjecture on that point. The realty company, therefore, had full notice of the fraud and participated in it. In equity slight evidence of notice would suffice. Indeed, the conveyance is fraudulent in law. Roan v. Winn, 93 Mo. 511; Ins. Co. v. Smith, 117 Mo. 292; Bucks v. Moore, 36 Mo.App. 534; Nat. Tube Works Co. v. Machine Co., 118 Mo. 375; Walsh v. Ketchum, 84 Mo. 431; Patton v. Casey, 57 Mo. 119; Potter v. McDonald, 31 Mo. 69. (4) The fact that plaintiff may have paid an inadequate consideration for the property is no defense to this action. Rinehart v. Long, 95 Mo. 401; Boyer v. Tucker, 70 Mo. 457. (5) Where a deed is set aside for fraud, the right of the wife is not revived where it is charged and it appears that she participated in the fraud. George v. Williams, 26 Mo. 190; Stevenson v. Edwards, 98 Mo. 622; Thompson v. Cohen, 127 Mo. 215; Wells v. Estes, 154 Mo. 298; Bealey v. Blake, 153 Mo. 673. (6) In reviewing the action of the trial court on questions of fact in an equitable proceeding this court will defer to the result of its findings thereon. Taylor v. Crockett, 123 Mo. 300; Dunivan v. Dunivan, 157 Mo. 157.

OPINION

BRACE, P. J.

On the 3d day of January, 1900, there was pending in the St. Louis City Circuit Court a suit wherein Mary Devlin was plaintiff and the defendant James Halpin was a defendant, about to come on for trial. And on the same day the said James Halpin by his quitclaim deed, in which his wife and codefendant herein, Margaret E. Halpin, joined, by them duly executed, acknowledged and filed for record, for the recited consideration of one dollar, conveyed lot number 24, Chamberlain Park, in city block numbered 3812, in the city of St. Louis to the defendant, The Halpin Real Estate Company. Afterwards in due course said suit came on for trial, and the said Mary Devlin, on the 10th of January, 1900, obtained judgment therein against said James Halpin for the sum of two thousand dollars, upon which execution was issued on the 10th day of April, 1900, and levied on said real estate, and in pursuance of a sale made under said execution, the plaintiff herein, Mary E. Bradshaw, became the purchaser thereof, and received a sheriff's deed therefor, and afterwards at the October term, 1900, of said court, instituted this suit against the said James Halpin, Margaret E. Halpin and the Halpin Real Estate Company, charging in her petition that said conveyance was voluntary, without consideration, and made for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding the creditors of the said James Halpin, and praying that the same be set aside, and for naught held and for general relief. The answer of the defendants was a general denial. The court found the issues for the plaintiff, entered a decree in which said deed "is cancelled, set aside and for naught held," and then proceeds:

"And the court doth further find that the plaintiff, Mary Bradshaw, is now the owner in fee simple of the said real estate above described, and it is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court that the title of the property hereinbefore described is divested out of the defendants and vested in the plaintiff. And the court doth further find that the said Mary Bradshaw is entitled to the immediate possession of the said real estate above described, and it is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court that she be placed in possession thereof, and it is further ordered that the sheriff of the city of St. Louis shall put the plaintiff in full possession of said real estate. And it is further ordered and adjudged by the court that the defendants pay the costs of this proceeding and that execution issue to carry into effect the terms of this decree."

From the decree the defendants appeal.

1. That the defendant James Halpin, besides the real estate in question, had no other property, real or personal, subject to execution, out of which the debt of Mrs. Devlin could have been made was conceded, and the right of plaintiff to have the deed in question set aside is manifest, unless the defense set up by James Halpin and his wife in their evidence on the trial was sustained. That defense in substance was that although the consideration recited in the deed was merely nominal there was in fact a real and valuable consideration...