Bradshaw v. Yates

• Decision Date: 31 October 1877
• Citation: 67 Mo. 221
• Parties: BRADSHAW, Appellant v. YATES.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

67 Mo. 221

BRADSHAW, Appellant

v.YATES.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1877.

Appeal from Lewis Circuit Court.--HON. E. V. WILSON, Judge.

Glover & Shepley for appellant.

1. A deed is deemed absolutely void if made during the existence of a confidential relation; and the relation of parent and child existed in this case, at the execution of the deed, and continued for sometime after, and up to the marriage of the plaintiff. If the relation of parent and child had ceased, still the deed must be held void, unless it is shown that the influence of the relation had ceased, and this cannot be done while both step-father and mother are proved to have solicited and urged the making of the deed, entreating her, as a dutiful child, to make it. Wright v. Proud, 13 Vesey, Jr. 137; Dawson v. Massey, 1 Ball & Beatty 229; Lake v. Raney, 33 Barb. 68, 49; Lee v. Dill, 11 Abb. Pr. R. 219; Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav. 558, 551; Maitland v. Irving, 15 Simon 437; Gale v. Wells, 12 Barb. 85; Garvin v. Williams, 44 Mo. 470; Cadwallader v. West, 48 Mo. 483.

2. The defense of acquiescence or lapse of time has no place till after the perfect freedom and independence of the grantor. Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Vesey, 292; Taylor v. Taylor, 8 How. 183; Hylton v. Hylton, 2 Vesey, Sr. 547; Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Vesey, Jr. 273; Bury v. Openheim, 26 Beav. 598; Chambers v. Crabbe, 34 Beav. 459; Wright v.Vanderplank, 8 DeGex, McN. & G. 146; Goddard v. Carlisle, 9 Price 169; Sercombe v. Saunders, 34 Beav. 382; Poston v. Gillespie, 5 Jones Eq. 264; Berdoe v. Dawson, 34 Beav. 603; Miller v. McIntyre, 6 Peters 61, Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 168, 152, Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 Cal. 540; Weaver v. Froman, 6 J. J. Marsh. 214; Keeton v. Keeton, 20 Mo. 530.

3. Mrs. Yates held a particular estate for life as tenant in dower, and until her death, there was no adverse possession, and the statute of limitations could not begin to run. Honner v. Morton, 3 Russ. Ch. 65, Rabsuhl v. Lack, 35 Mo. 316; Gray v. Givens, 26 Mo. 291; Salmon v. Davis, 29 Mo. 176; Reaume v. Chambers, 22 Mo. 36.

4. Immediately upon plaintiff's marriage, she fell under the control of her husband, and has never been a free woman for a moment. Aylward v. Kearney, 2 Ball & Beatty 463; Gouland v. DeFaria, 17 Vesey, Jr. 25, 20; Sharp v. Leach, 31 Beav. 503; Salmon v. Cutts, 4 DeGex & Smales 132.

5. When a deed is impeached for fraud, the grantee must prove he paid the consideration mentioned in it. Clarkson v. Hanway, 2 P. Williams 203; Walt v. Grove, 2 Sch. & Lef. 501; Tribble v. Oldham, 5 J. J. Marsh. 144; Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves., Sr. 628.

H. S. Lipscomb and J. G. Blair for respondent.

1. Plaintiff comprehended her rights and all the facts involved, and acted freely and of her own accord. Defendant has shown that he did not create her intention to convey, and that the deed was not the result of undue influence, but that his dealing with her was fair and frank. The court below, with all the witnesses before it, and judging the matter sworn to, and of the manner and deportment of the witnesses, has, by its judgment, found in favor of the defendant, and its finding should not be disturbed. Sharpe v. McPike, 62 Mo. 300; Biggerstaff v. Hoyt, 62 Mo. 484; Ames v. Gilmore, 59 Mo. 548-9.

2. For nearly ten years plaintiffs have acquiesced in the transfer, and it is now too late to assail it. Morse v. Royal, 12 Vesey, Jr. Ch. 378.

3. Plaintiffs, both of full age and with perfect knowledge of their claim as now pretended, stood by for nearly ten years and silently witnessed the improvements as they were made upon the land by defendant. The dower-estate of Mrs. Yates did not close their mouths, nor were the courts closed against a bill to set aside the deed complained of. They are estopped from claiming now. Collins v. Rogers, 63 Mo. 515; Landrum v. Union Bank, 63 Mo. 56; Bigelow on Estoppel, pp. 488, 490, 500, 503; 2 Story Eq., §§ 694-5; Petit v. Shepherd, 5 Paige 493; Morse v. Royal, 12 Vesey, Jr. Chy. 378; 1 Story Eq., Secs. 385, 388, 389; 2 Story Eq., Secs. 1540, 1541; Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wallace 617; Hartman v. Kendall, 4 Ind. 403; Wallace v. Lewis, 4 Har. (Del.) 75; Wheaton v. East, 5 Yerg. 41; Rice v. Dewey, 54 Barb. 470; Cresinger v. Welch, 15 Ohio 156; Hermann on Estoppel, 409, 10, 11, and 415, 478, 494; Moreman v. Talbot, 55 Mo. 392. It was the duty of plaintiffs to speak long ago. Silence in this case until after improvements made is a fraud. The fact that Mrs. Bradshaw is a married woman will not aid her. Femes covert and infants are prevented by estoppel from profiting by their own wrong or fraud. Hermann on Estop. 477-8; Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Vesey, Jun. 174; Fulton v. Moore, 25 Penn. 468; Drake v. Glover, 30 Ala. 382.

NORTON, J.

This is a proceeding in equity, commenced in the circuit court of Lewis county, on the 26th day of March, 1873, for the purpose of setting aside a deed made by plaintiff, Elizabeth Bradshaw, in April, 1863, conveying to defendant certain land therein described. It is substantially alleged in the petition that William Barclay died in April, 1848, leaving a widow and three children, of whom plaintiff, Elizabeth, was one, and possessed, besides personal estate, of three hundred and ten acres of land; that Sarah Barclay, the widow, lived in the mansion house on said land till 1849, when she intermarried with the defendant, who, with his four children, removed to said mansion house, and there, with the said Sarah and her children, made up the household; that, at the time of her mother's marriage with defendant, plaintiff was about nine years old; that defendant, in 1852, was appointed her guardian, and acted as such till 1864, when he made a final settlement with her. It is further alleged that in 1859 partition of the real estate was made by virtue of an order of the Lewis county circuit court, in which 105 acres of the land was set apart to plaintiff, and 100 acres assigned and admeasured to her mother as dower; that she was enjoined by her mother to treat and regard defendant as her father, and that, by virtue of his relation as father and guardian, she trusted defendant implicitly, and relied solely upon him to protect and control her pecuniary interests absolutely; that soon after said dower was assigned, defendant represented to plaintiff that in right and justice her mother was entitled to an absolute instead of a life estate in the land assigned her, and that the commissioners would have so allotted it to her but for the objection of Mr. Sublett, who had married Sarah, the sister of plaintiff; that he was justly entitled to said one hundred acres in fee; that he had applied to said Sublett and Sarah to do him justice and convey to him said land, which they had refused to do, and appealed to plaintiff not to treat him in like manner, but to convey her interest to him as an act of justice and right. It is also alleged that by reason of such appeals and the repeated and continued importunities of defendant, plaintiff, while yet a minor, was induced to promise defendant that she would convey to him all her interest in said land; that relying on the representations of defendant that her mother had been wronged by the commissioners, and that she ought in justice to make him a deed, she promised to do so when she attained her majority; that these importunities were from time to time continued till finally, about the time of defendant's final settlement with her as guardian, and while living with defendant, as a member of his family, and under the influence acquired by defendant over her, and relying upon his representations that what he claimed was rightful, she was induced to execute the deed conveying to defendant her interest in said dower land; that although four hundred dollars was named in said deed as the consideration, no part of it was paid or to be paid, and that the same was procured by fraud, undue influence and misrepresentations of defendant.

The defendant's answer is as follows: “The defendant, for answer, admits the making of the deed, but denies that the same was obtained by him from said Elizabeth by fraud, misrepresentations or undue influence exercised by this defendant over said Elizabeth; that said deed was made by said Elizabeth long after her arrival to the years of her majority, of her own free will and accord, for a legal and valid consideration.” It is further alleged that plaintiff acquiesced in said deed till the suit was brought, and that defendant in the meantime, with the knowledge of plaintiff, and without objection from her, made lasting and valuable improvements on said land, and that she ought, therefore, to be estopped. The cause was tried by the court and judgment rendered for defendant, from which the plaintiffs have appealed to this court.

1. SETTING ASIDE A DEED FOR UNDUE INFLUENCE.

The main questions presented by the record are the following; 1st. Was the deed in controversy procured by the undue influence of defendant? 2nd If so, has plaintiff lost her right to the relief she seeks by delay in instituting her suit, and, if not, should the first question be determined in the affirmative, what is the relief which should be accorded to her under the pleadings and evidence? We think it is admitted by the pleadings that defendant, at the time the deed was executed, sustained the double relation of father and guardian to plaintiff, the relation of father being assumed in 1849, and that of guardian in 1852; that defendant had thus acquired the complete confidence of plaintiff, and represented to her while in her minority, that the commissioners, in making partition of the estate of her deceased father, had committed a wrong in assigning a life, instead of a fee simple, estate to her mother in the one hundred acres of land as dower, that he, in justice, was entitled to said one hundred acres, and appealed to plaintiff to make him a deed in fee of her interest therein as an act of justice and right; that by reason of said...