Bradt v Sebek

• Decision Date: 13 January 2000
• Citation: 14 S.W.3d 756
• Parties: <!--14 S.W.3d 756 (Tex.App-Houston 2000) L.T. BRADT, Appellant v. JUDY SEBEK, EARLE LILLY, PIRO & LILLY, P.C., DEPELCHIN CHILDREN'S CENTER, BAYLOR COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, ERNEST KENDRICK, MICHAEL D. COX, JEAN GUEZ, BARBARA TAYLOR, LUISA MARIA ACEVEDO LOHNER, ANN M. HODGES and JOEL A. NASS, Appellees NO. 01-96-00943-CV In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 756

14 S.W.3d 756 (Tex.App-Houston[1st Dist.] 2000)

L.T. BRADT, Appellant v. JUDY SEBEK, EARLE LILLY, PIRO & LILLY, P.C., DEPELCHIN CHILDREN'S CENTER, BAYLOR COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, ERNEST KENDRICK, MICHAEL D. COX, JEAN GUEZ, BARBARA TAYLOR, LUISA MARIA ACEVEDO LOHNER, ANN M. HODGES and JOEL A. NASS, Appellees

NO. 01-96-00943-CV

In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas

January 13, 2000.

Rehearing Overruled April 7, 2000.

On Appeal from the 234th District Court Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 90-53676

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Panel consists of Justices Cohen, Nuchia, and Duggan. ^*

O P I N I O N

Lee Duggan, Jr., Justice

Appellant, L.T. "Butch" Bradt, appeals a Rule 13 sanction order and its levy of a $100,000 fine, asserting six points of error. We affirm.

I. Background

This appeal is the culmination of litigation originally filed in federal district court in 1989 by Mark Metzger against his former wife, her attorney, and various agencies and individuals (collectively, the "defendants"). The suit asserted various theories of state liability, as well as federal claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") (18 U.S.C.A. 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp. 1999)) and a civil rights statute. The federal district court dismissed Metzger's federal claims and abstained from exercising jurisdiction over his pendent state law claims. Metzger refiled his claims in state court.¹ In 1992, following a month of trial and a directed verdict in favor of the defendants, the trial court assessed sanctions of $994,000 plus interest against Metzger and each of his attorneys. See Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 50 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). Appellant was one of Metzger's attorneys.

On appeal, this Court affirmed the directed verdict and concluded that the defendants had proved their right to sanctions against Metzger, but that the trial court had awarded an excessive amount of sanctions. Id. at 48, 53. We also reversed and remanded the award of sanctions against appellant because his motion to recuse the trial judge, the Honorable David West, had been filed timely. Id. at 49-50. On remand, after Judge West voluntarily recused himself, the Honorable Scott Brister held a hearing, in accordance with our instructions, to determine (1) the amount of sanctions to be awarded against Metzger, (2) whether appellant violated Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13, and if so, (3) the appropriate amount of sanctions to be assessed against him. Following the hearing, Judge Brister issued an April 8, 1996 written sanction order ("Sanction Order"), determining that appellant had violated Rule 13 and ordering appellant and Metzger each to pay $100,000 to the defendants (appellees in this appeal). Metzger did not appeal the Sanctions Order.

In appealing from the Sanctions Order, appellant raises six points of error.

II. Standard of Review

This Court reviews a trial court's Rule 13 sanction order under an abuse of discretion standard. Laub v. Pesikoff, 979 S.W.2d 686, 693 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). Our test for abuse of discretion is deferential to the trial court-whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). Therefore, "[i]t is not necessarily an abuse of a trial court's discretion if under the same facts we would decide the matter differently, or if the court committed a mere error in judgment." Tarrant County v. Chancey, 942 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no writ). Moreover, the trial court's discretion is limited only by the requirement that its order be just and that the sanction imposed be directly related to the harm done by the sanctioned conduct. Ray v. Beene, 721 S.W.2d 876, 879 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

III. Discussion

A. Point No. 1: Whether the trial court used the wrong burden of proof in determining whether to impose a punitive fine against appellant.

Appellant argues in his first point of error that Judge Brister abused his discretion when he failed to apply a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in his Rule 13 hearing. He argues that, although Judge Brister specifically declined to hold him liable for criminal contempt, the proceedings against him "were in the nature of criminal contempt proceedings since he was being tried (and punished) for past behavior."

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 provides:

The signatures of attorneys or parties constitute a certificate by them that they have read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of their knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry the instrument is not groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment. Attorneys or parties who shall bring a fictitious suit as an experiment to get an opinion of the court, or who shall file any fictitious pleading in a cause for such a purpose, or shall make statements in pleading which they know to be groundless and false, for the purpose of securing a delay of the trial of the cause, shall be held guilty of a contempt. If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, after notice and hearing, shall impose an appropriate sanction available under Rule 215-2b, upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both.

Courts shall presume that pleadings, motions, and other papers are filed in good faith. No sanctions under this rule may be imposed except for good cause, the particulars of which must be stated in the sanction order. "Groundless" for purposes of this rule means no basis in law or fact and not warranted by good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. A general denial does not constitute a violation of this rule. The amount requested for damages does not constitute a violation of this rule.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 13 (emphasis added). According to appellant, the underscored language of the first paragraph's second sentence, "shall be held guilty of a contempt," indicates that Rule 13 proceedings are always quasi-criminal contempt proceedings imposing criminal punishment for past behavior and, therefore, requiring criminal law constitutional standards and protections. He further points out that Rule 215-2b also authorizes contempt, among other sanctions. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 215-2b.

Appellees respond that appellant's $100,000 fine was compensatory in nature and not a criminal punishment for past behavior, that Judge Brister specifically limited the sanction hearing to potential civil sanctions against appellant, and that he declined to conduct a contempt proceeding.

Well settled principles guide the interpretation of Rule 13. Texas courts apply the same rules of construction to rules of procedure as to statutes. In re VanDeWater, 966 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.); Burrhus v. M & S Supply, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). When a rule of procedure is clear, unambiguous, and specific, we construe its language according to its literal meaning. Murphy v. Friendswood Dev. Co., 965 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (interpreting Rule 13). We avoid constructions giving rise to constitutional infirmities. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. 311.021(1) (Vernon 1997). Finally, we note that rule interpretation is "a pure question of law over which the judge has no discretion." Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 437 (Tex. 1997).

Applying these standards, it is clear that a Rule 13 sanction hearing need not involve a finding of contempt. The rule's first sentence generally addresses responsibility for instruments that are groundless and brought either in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. Rule 13's second sentence addresses particularly egregious actions involving written pleadings, actions that rulemakers have determined must be dealt with as contemptuous conduct-(1) filing fictitious suits or pleadings to experiment or obtain court opinions or (2) making knowingly groundless and false pleadings in order to secure trial delays.

Rule 13's third sentence provides for "an appropriate sanction" under Rule 215-2b. Because contempt has already been mandated for all instances of conduct described in the second sentence, the sanctions "available under Rule 215-2b" apply to the remaining proscribed conduct, namely, that set out in Rule 13's first sentence.

Reading sentences one and three together, a party who files a groundless pleading in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment is subject to a range of punishments under 215-2b, one of which is a finding of contempt. Thus, the trial court can choose among a range of sanctions.

Here, Judge Brister explicitly declined to consider a contempt sanction, as he might have done under Rule 215-2b. Neither did he find, under the proscribed conduct of Rule 13's second sentence, that Metzger or appellant filed a fictitious suit or fictitious pleadings "as an experiment to get an opinion of the court" or knowingly made false statements in pleadings "for the purpose of securing a delay of the trial of the cause." Instead, Judge Brister found more generally under Rule 13's first sentence that Metzger and appellant filed groundless pleadings in bad faith, and chose from the discretionary range of punishments available under 215-2b (excluding a possible contempt sanction, which he refused to consider). Because Judge Brister did not make the findings envisioned in Rule 13's second sentence, he was not required to hold appellant in contempt. Rather than decide now whether a finding of contempt under Rule 13 would require a criminal standard of review and implicate the constitutional or procedural rights...