Brady v. State, 53569

• Decision Date: 19 January 1983
• Docket Number: No. 53569,53569
• Citation: 425 So.2d 1347
• Parties: James Douglas BRADY v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 1347

425 So.2d 1347

James Douglas BRADY v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 53569.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Jan. 19, 1983.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 16, 1983.

McGee & Bogen and Edward J. Bogen, Jr., Leland, for appellant.

Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Carolyn B. Mills, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Before WALKER, BOWLING and DAN M. LEE, JJ.

DAN M. LEE, Justice, for the Court:

This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Washington County wherein James Douglas Brady, appellant, was indicted and tried upon a charge of murder for the August 29, 1980, shooting of William Lucas. Brady was convicted of manslaughter and thereafter sentenced to serve a term of eighteen years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections. We affirm.

Appellant and his wife, Cynthia Brady, were living in Greenville. Approximately one week before the shooting, appellant's wife left him with their three-year-old daughter, Tomeka. Mrs. Brady did not inform appellant that she was leaving him or where she was going.

While Mrs. Brady was staying at the home of Cathy Howard, a friend with whom she worked, appellant learned of her whereabouts and called her throughout the week. Appellant asked his wife to return home; however, she refused.

A meeting was arranged between appellant and his wife at the Elks Club in Greenville on the night of August 28, 1980. There, appellant continued to tell his wife of his desire for her to come home to no avail. Appellant had been and continued drinking, also claiming he had taken sleeping pills and smoked dope before the night was over.

When Mrs. Brady returned to the home of Mrs. Howard at approximately 2:45 a.m., appellant followed her there and forced his way into the house. Mrs. Howard was awakened by a discussion between appellant and his wife, whereupon she asked appellant to leave, which he did. Brady returned to Mrs. Howard's home shortly thereafter. He forced his way into the house and immediately began firing shots from a pistol. Inside the house at the time of the shooting were Mrs. Brady, her daughter, Mrs. Howard, her two children, William Lucas and Herman Sanders, Mrs. Howard's stepfather. Appellant shot and killed both Lucas and Sanders. Mrs. Howard was wounded.

Appellant took his wife and child to Louisiana where he subsequently attempted to commit suicide. He was taken into custody after his wife notified the police in Delhi, Louisiana.

Appellant did not deny that he shot and killed Lucas nor did he contend that Lucas was armed or threatened him in any manner. Appellant rather relied upon the sole defense of insanity at the time the offense was committed.

The jury found appellant guilty of manslaughter. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and the state's failure to bring him to trial within 270 days of arraignment.

I. Was the verdict of the jury against the overwhelming weight of the evidence?

Appellant contends that the overwhelming proof offered at trial through the testimony of his wife, two clinical psychologists and a psychiatrist indicates that at the time of the commission of the offense appellant was psychotic and did not know the difference between right and wrong. A psychiatrist testified for the state that appellant did know right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense.

We find appellant's argument unpersuasive. The evidence surrounding his mental condition at the time the offense was committed was conflicting. It is well settled that the issue of sanity or insanity is for determination by the jury. Cole v. State, 405 So.2d 910 (Miss.1981).

Juries and trial judges are not bound to accept the testimony of expert witnesses but may accept or reject parts of that testimony. Matthews v. State, 394 So.2d 304 (Miss.1981). See also Lias v. State, 362 So.2d 198 (Miss.1978); Pounders v. State, 335 So.2d 904 (Miss.1976); and Herron v. State, 287 So.2d 759 (Miss.1974). In Sadler v. State, 407 So.2d 95 (Miss.1981), we stated:

Among the alleged errors assigned is that the trial court should have sustained Sadler's motion for a new trial on the ground that the jury verdict was not supported by sufficient credible evidence.

Considering the evidence, as we must, in the light most favorable to the state and accepting as true the evidence supporting or tending to support the verdict, with all inferences supportive of the verdict that reasonably may be drawn therefrom, we find no merit in this contention. Glass v. State, 278 So.2d 384 (Miss.1973). In Spikes v. State, 302 So.2d 250 (Miss.1974), this Court said:

On appeal, in this situation, in passing upon the sufficiency of evidence to support a verdict, this Court must accept as true the evidence which supports the verdict. Murphree v. State, 228 So.2d 599 (Miss.1969). .

The resolution of such conflicts as there were in the evidence in this case, was peculiarly for the jury. In Hankins v. State, 288 So.2d 866 (Miss.1974), it was said:

In Evans v. State, 159 Miss. 561, 132 So. 563 (1931), we stated:

We invite the attention of the bar to the fact that we do not reverse criminal cases where there is a straight issue of fact, or a conflict in the facts; juries are impaneled for the very purpose of passing upon such questions of disputed fact, and we do not intend to invade the province and prerogative of the jury. (159 Miss. at 566, 132 So. at 564) (407 So.2d at 97)

There is no merit in appellant's contention that the verdict of the jury was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

II. Did the trial court err in overruling appellant's motion for dismissal pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-17-1 (Supp.1982)?

Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-17-1 (Supp.1982) provides:

Unless good cause be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has been arraigned.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for dismissal because the state failed to bring him to trial within 270 days of his arraignment. The record discloses that 272 days elapsed between appellant's arraignment and trial. Therefore, this Court is faced with the question of whether good cause was shown for the two-day delay in bringing appellant to trial. The sequence of events with regard to this claim is as follows:

(1) On September 24, 1980, prior to his arraignment, appellant filed a motion for mental examination. On that same day an order was entered directing that he be examined by a competent psychiatrist and/or psychologist. The order further provided that a copy of the diagnosis insofar as the competency of appellant was concerned should be delivered to the court and attorney for the appellant with an opinion as to whether appellant could assist his attorney, whether he understood the charges against him and whether he was insane at the time of the alleged commission of the offense.

(2) On November 24, 1980, appellant was arraigned, at which time he entered a plea of not guilty.

(3) On May 14, 1981, the state filed its motion for psychiatric examination of appellant pursuant to Rule 4.08 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. In support of its motion, the state offered to show that it had been notified that appellant intended to rely upon a defense of insanity at the time of the alleged crime. Pursuant to said motion, an order was entered to transport appellant to the Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield for examination and evaluation as to appellant's mental ability to commit the criminal act with which he was charged, whether any insanity still existed and whether appellant was mentally competent to stand trial and rationally able to assist his attorney in his defense.

The order further provided that if it was determined that appellant was suffering from a mental disease or condition from which past or present insanity resulted, or was incompetent to stand trial, he was ordered committed to the Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield for the purpose of treatment and further evaluation until such time as the court was notified that appellant was cured of his insanity, restored to reason and competent to stand trial. The cause was ordered continued for good cause shown until the examination ordered was completed and the court notified.

(4) On June 5, 1981, a letter dated June 2, 1981, from Dr. Robert S. McKinley, staff psychiatrist at the Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield, was filed in the cause. The substance of the letter revealed the findings of the staff at Whitfield that appellant was without psychosis, responsible for his actions at the time of the alleged crime and competent to stand trial.

(5) On the second Monday in July, the July court term began which ran for twenty-four days thereafter.

(6) On August 10, 1981, appellant filed a motion for production of documentary and physical evidence for inspection and copying and a motion for special venire.

(7) On August 20, 1981, appellant filed a motion for subpoena duces tecum as well as his motion to dismiss for failure of the state to comply with section 99-17-1.

(8) On August 24, 1981, appellant's motion to dismiss was overruled. The trial judge assigned no reason for the denial of said motion.

(9) The cause proceeded to trial on August 24 and concluded on August 25, 1981, with appellant being found guilty of manslaughter. ¹

A review of the foregoing events reveals that the trial court's order dated September 24, 1980, was never complied with by the appellant in that a copy of his diagnosis after psychiatric examination was never delivered to the court.

On May 14, 1981, the state filed its motion for psychiatric examination after being notified by appellant that he intended to rely on the defense of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the offense. An examination was ordered and the...