Braman Cadillac, Inc. v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, State of Fla.

• Decision Date: 25 July 1991
• Docket Number: Nos. 90-718,90-908,s. 90-718
• Citation: 584 So.2d 1047
• Parties: BRAMAN CADILLAC, INC., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, STATE OF FLORIDA, and WWW Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Williamson Pontiac-Cadillac-Mazda and General Motors Corporation/Cadillac Motor Car Division, Appellees. BRAMAN CADILLAC, INC., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, STATE OF FLORIDA, and University Cadillac, Inc., Pembroke Pines, Florida and General Motors Corporation/Cadillac Motor Car Division, Appellees. 584 So.2d 1047, 16 Fla. L. Week. D1955
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1047

584 So.2d 1047

BRAMAN CADILLAC, INC., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, STATE OF

FLORIDA, and WWW Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Williamson

Pontiac-Cadillac-Mazda and General Motors

Corporation/Cadillac Motor Car Division, Appellees.

BRAMAN CADILLAC, INC., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, STATE OF

FLORIDA, and University Cadillac, Inc., Pembroke Pines,

Florida and General Motors Corporation/Cadillac Motor Car

Division, Appellees.

Nos. 90-718, 90-908.

584 So.2d 1047, 16 Fla. L. Week. D1955

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

July 25, 1991.

Parker D. Thomson and R. Marcus Cobourn of Thomson, Muraro, Bohrer & Razook, P.A., Miami, for appellant.

Enoch Whitney, Gen. Counsel, and Michael J. Alderman, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, Tallahassee, for appellee Dept. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles.

Michael A. Fogarty and Linda Julin McNamara of Glenn, Rasmussen, Fogarty, Merryday & Russo, Tampa, for appellee WWW Enterprises, Inc. in Case No. 90-718.

Edward W. Risko, Office of Gen. Counsel, Gen. Motors Corp., Detroit, Mich., Vasilis C. Katsafanas and Dean Bunch of Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Cabaniss, Burke & Wechsler, Orlando, for appellee Gen. Motors Corp.

NIMMONS, Judge.

Braman Cadillac, Inc. (Braman), challenges two final administrative orders from the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department) dismissing its petitions for formal proceedings due to its lack of standing. Braman asserts that it is entitled to standing under Sections 320.642, 320.699, 320.6992 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. For purposes of this appeal, we have consolidated review of the Department's denial of Braman's petitions against WWW Enterprises, Inc. in Case No. 90-718 and against University Cadillac, Inc. in Case No. 90-908. ¹ We affirm.

Appellant Braman Cadillac operates a General Motors franchise dealership in Dade County. It initially filed a petition seeking a formal hearing pursuant to Section 320.699(1)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1988) and Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes to protest WWW Enterprises' application for a new or additional Cadillac automobile dealership in Homestead, Florida. In response, WWW Enterprises argued that the Department should dismiss Braman's petition because Braman had failed to allege any violations of Section 320.60-320.70 Florida Statutes. ² Braman amended its petition, alleging that WWW Enterprises, the dealer seeking the additional dealership, had not met its burden of showing that Cadillac dealerships were inadequately represented in the local market area and thus failed to qualify for a Department license. Braman moved to strike WWW's motion to dismiss on the grounds that WWW is not a party to the proceedings and the manufacturer or distributor of Cadillac Motor Division should be appearing under Section 320.642 "as the licensee is the party which has the burden of proof in an administrative hearing to establish the need for a new or expanded dealership by showing inadequate representation in the area." GM subsequently entered the proceedings, adopting WWW's motion to dismiss, arguing that WWW is a proper party under Sections 320.64 and 320.27, Florida Statutes.

General Motors Corporation (GM) also argued that Section 320.699(1)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1988) did not set forth grounds for standing independent of those set forth in Section 320.642(3)(b), Florida Statutes.

Section 320.699, in pertinent part, states:

320.699 Administrative hearings and adjudications; procedure.--

(1) A motor vehicle dealer, or person with entitlements to or in a motor vehicle dealer, who is directly and adversely affected by the action or conduct of an applicant or licensee which is alleged to be in violation of any provision of ss. 320.60-320.70, may seek a declaration and adjudication of its rights with respect to the alleged action or conduct of the applicant or licensee by:

(a) Filing with the department a request for a proceeding and an administrative hearing which conforms substantially with the requirements of s. 120.57; or

(b) Filing with the department a written objection or notice of protest pursuant to s. 320.642.

(2) If a written objection or notice of protest is filed with the department under paragraph (1)(b), a hearing shall be held within 180 days of the date of filing of the first objection or notice of protest, unless the time is extended by the hearing officer for good cause shown. If a hearing is not scheduled within said time, any party may request such hearing which shall be held forthwith by the hearing officer.

A hearing was held on the motion to strike, which Braman acknowledged was moot after GM joined WWW Enterprises in the proceedings. In his order on Braman's motion to strike, the hearing officer stated in part that Section 320.699 did not provide independent standing grounds beyond those expressed in Section 320.642. Braman requested another hearing, asserting that it met the standing requirements set forth under Section 320.642(3)(b). It asserted that WWW Enterprises, Inc. and the existing Kendall-based Williamson Cadillac dealership share common ownership, such that the existing Williamson dealership and WWW Enterprises are essentially a single entity. ³ Braman thus argues that since it is located within the geographical and sales parameters of Section 320.642(3)(b) with respect to the existing Kendall-based Williamson dealership, Braman has standing to protest the proposed Homestead-based Williamson dealership.

Section 320.642(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), states:

(b) If the proposed additional or relocated motor vehicle dealer is to be located in a county with a population of more than 300,000 according to the most recent data of the United States Census Bureau or the data of the Bureau of Economic and Business Research of the University of Florida:

1. Any existing motor vehicle dealer or dealers of the same line-make have a licensed franchise location within a radius of 12.5 miles of the location of the proposed additional or relocated motor vehicle dealer; or

2. Any existing motor vehicle dealer or dealers of the same line-make can establish that during any 12-month period of the 36-month period preceding the filing of the licensee's application for the proposed dealership, such dealer or its predecessor made 25 percent of its retail sales of new motor vehicles to persons whose registered household addresses were located within a radius of 12.5 miles of the location of the proposed additional or relocated motor vehicle dealer; provided such existing dealer is located in the same county or any county continguous to the county where the additional or relocated dealer is proposed to be located.

In his recommended order, the hearing officer recommended dismissal of Braman's petition. The hearing officer found that "nothing in the statute [Section 320.642(3)(b) ] authorizes or requires an analysis of the shareholders of the proposed additional dealership, so that the protesting dealer can claim standing, based on [its proximity to] the location of or the sales made by some third dealership, such as Williamson Cadillac." The hearing officer further held that Braman did not meet the standing criteria of Section 320.642(3)(b). Braman asserted various exceptions which were denied. The Department adopted the recommended order and agreed with the hearing officer's denial of Braman's exceptions.

Braman's primary argument is that the Department erred in construing Section 320.642(3)(b) to restrict standing. It therefore asserts that the Department's construction of the statute is impermissible since Braman qualifies under Section 320.642(3)(b), standing criteria with respect to the existing Kendall-based Williamson dealership, which through WWW Enterprises has essentially created a corporate alter ego in the proposed Homestead-based Williamson dealership.

Appellees argue that under a plain interpretation of the above section, Braman fails to meet the standing criteria because Braman is neither located within 12.5 miles of the location of the proposed additional motor vehicle dealer nor has made 25% of its retail sales of new motor vehicles to persons whose registered household addresses were located within a radius of 12.5 miles of the location of the proposed motor vehicle dealership during any 12 months of the last 36 months, as required under Section 320.642(3).

We find that the Department's holding that Braman does not qualify under the Section 320.642 standing requirements is correct. First, a plain interpretation of the statute clearly shows that Braman is not located within any of the parameters necessary to confer standing upon it. The Section 320.642(3)(b) standing test clearly circumscribes the criteria which protesting parties must meet to contest the issuance of a new or additional dealership license. Braman cannot meet these requirements, and we will not construe this section to...