Brandeis v. Atkins

• Decision Date: 20 January 1910
• Citation: 90 N.E. 861,204 Mass. 471
• Parties: BRANDEIS v. ATKINS et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

204 Mass. 471

90 N.E. 861

BRANDEIS v. ATKINS et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 20, 1910

COUNSEL

Edward F. McClennen and Austin T. Wright, for appellant.

William A. Pew, Jr., and Carleton H. Parsons, for appellee Martha A Atkins.

OPINION

RUGG J.

This is a petition for instructions as to the disposition to be made of a fund held under the terms of an agreement of compromise entered into for the purpose of ending a contest as to the allowance of the will of one Williams, and approved in 1889 by the Supreme Judicial Court under Rev. Laws, c. 148, § 15. The testator, and for aught that appears the parties to the compromise, were residents of this commonwealth. The agreement, so far as now material, provided that a certain fund should be set apart for the benefit of Marjorie M Atkins, then a minor and not a party to the agreement, a granddaughter of the testator, and upon her death before the termination of the trust by lapse of time, 'be paid to her heirs at law freed from the trust.' In 1904 or 1905 Marjorie M. Atkins removed from Massachusetts, which had been her domicile theretofore, and which continued to be the domicile of her mother, the daughter of the testator, and acquired and retained a domicile in the state of New York where she died in 1908. Under the law of the state of New York, her father, Edward Atkins, a resident of Michigan, is her sole heir at law, while under the law of this commonwealth the father and mother would be her heirs. The question is whether the law of this commonwealth or that of New York shall govern in determining the persons entitled to the fund as her heirs at law.

The agreement for compromise did not become a part of the will. Although the practice is to insert a clause in the decree to the effect that the estate shall be administered in accordance with the agreement for compromise established thereby, yet the rights of the parties growing out of the agreement rest upon it and the decree confirming it, and are not testamentary rights. Blount v. Wheeler, 199 Mass. 330-339, 85 N.E. 477, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1036; Hastings v. Nesmith, 188 Mass. 190, 74 N.E. 323; Abbott v. Gaskins, 181 Mass. 501, 63 N.E. 933.

If the question arose as to the interpretation of precisely the same language used in the will of a Massachusetts testator, the determination of the heirs at law would be according to Massachusetts law. Lincoln v. Perry, 149 Mass. 368, 21 N.E. 671, 4 L. R. A. 215; Adams v. Adams, 154 Mass. 290-292, 28 N.E. 260, 13 L. R. A. 275; Proctor v. Clark, 154 Mass. 45-48, 27 N.E. 673, 12 L. R. A. 721. The same principle in this regard apperas to prevail in other jurisdictions. In re Fergusson's Will, [1902] 1 Ch. 483; Matter of Devoe, 171 N.Y. 281, 63 N.E. 1102, 57 L. R. A. 536; Brown v. Ransey, 74 Ga. 210. It would be unfortunate if one standard of construction should be adopted touching the meaning of so common a phrase as 'heirs at law' occurring in wills and another as to the same phrase occurring in an instrument, which although contractual in origin is testamentary in effect and is by decree of court made a direction to the executor, administrator or trustee by which he is to be guided in the administration of his trust.

The reasoning upon which the rule as to the interpretation of these words in wills is founded applies equally to such a contract as that before us. The instrument was drafted and executed in this commonwealth by its residents in regard to the proof of the will of one of its deceased citizens offered for allowance in our courts, and provided for the appointment of a trustee to administer a fund for the benefit of a minor domiciled here. All parties to it were probably more familiar with the law of Massachusetts than of any other state, and presumably meant, in using the words 'heirs at law,' those persons who would answer...