Brandon v. State
Citation | 599 S.W.2d 567 |
Decision Date | 25 April 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 59348,59348 |
Parties | Thelette BRANDON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas |
This is an appeal from a conviction for capital murder. The punishment is death.
The appellant makes no contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict on the trial on the merits. The appellant while in a bus station in Waco stabbed and killed a man. As the appellant was fleeing from the scene of the stabbing Sgt. Roger Barrett, a Waco police officer, attempted to stop the appellant. In the struggle which resulted the appellant stabbed Barrett and shot him with the officer's own revolver. Barrett died as a result of the injuries inflicted by the appellant. The appellant was convicted for killing Barrett, who it was alleged appellant knew was a peace officer acting in the lawful discharge of his duties. The appellant's sole defense on the trial on the merits was insanity.
Before the trial on the merits appellant's counsel filed a motion alleging that the appellant was not competent to stand trial. The motion was supported by the report of a psychiatrist which stated that appellant was not presently competent to stand trial. The motion was granted; a jury was selected to hear the competency issue only, and both the appellant and the State offered extensive testimony and evidence concerning the appellant's competency. The jury in resolving the issue found the appellant competent to stand trial.
The record on appeal includes all of the competency proceedings. This Court has recently held that it will review the proceedings on competency when such matter is raised in an appeal from the judgment after the trial on the merits. Jackson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 685 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977). Appellant asserts that in the competency proceedings he was denied his constitutional right to due process of law, and therefore there was not a lawful determination that he was competent to stand trial before he was forced to trial on the merits. Specifically the appellant complains of improper jury argument by the prosecutor, and also asserts that he used all of his peremptory strikes and was then forced to accept an objectionable juror after it had been necessary to use a peremptory strike on a prejudiced juror who should have been excused for cause. The appellant also complains that the trial court improperly restricted voir dire examination of the jury panel and misstated the law in instructing the jury.
We first discuss appellant's contention that the prosecutor made misstatements of law and other prejudicial comments during jury argument at the competency trial.
In his closing argument at appellant's competency trial the prosecutor made the following statement to the jury:
Appellant objected to the comment; his objection was sustained, and the jury was instructed to disregard the comment.
The following discussion then took place:
Later in his closing argument the prosecutor made reference to the previous testimony of William Upshaw, a McLennan County Jail inmate, concerning a conversation which Upshaw had with appellant while in jail:
Still later the prosecutor stated:
Appellant urges that the comment that he would be set free if found incompetent, combined with the other comments, "infected the whole decision-making process" of the hearing and "irreparably tainted" the determination of his competency to stand trial.
The State's sole response to appellant's contention is that appellant's ground of error is multifarious and not subject to review because it "presents a jumble of items of both argument and testimony, to some of which objection was made, and in other cases, not." Appellant refers to more than one comment by the prosecutor, but his ground of error is intelligibly written, and his arguments can be clearly understood. Art. 40.09, Sec. 9, V.A.C.C.P.
We agree with appellant that these statements made before the competency jury, taken as a whole, were highly prejudicial and misleading.
The prosecutor's comment that appellant would go free if found incompetent was a clear misstatement of the law. Nowhere does Art. 46.02, V.A.C.C.P., which deals with incompetency to stand trial, provide that upon a finding of incompetency the defendant must be released, as the prosecutor implied in his comment. A defendant can only be discharged by order of the trial court, and the court always has the alternative to order commitment proceedings. Nor is it necessarily true that appellant would never be tried for the offense. There is not statute of limitations on murder, and the prosecuting attorney must be notified before a defendant's release from civil commitment, if the prosecuting attorney has properly notified the head of the committing facility. Thus the State has the opportunity to prosecute the defendant again. This comment was harmful to appellant because it implied to the jurors that if they found appellant incompetent he would never go to trial and would inevitably be released. The prosecuting attorney made further improper remarks by personally "promising" the jurors such a result, and by remarking that if found incompetent appellant would eventually be sent to the Austin State Hospital, from which patients routinely "walk away."
The argument here is similar to that made in Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1973). There, in "rhetoric reminiscent of a television drama," the prosecutor stated:
The Court in Bruce strongly condemned the prosecutor's argument, declaring that:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
McIntire v. State
...Jackson v. State, relied on by appellant in arguing for a new trial on original submission. See n. 17, ante.2 Compare Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) wherein, upon finding that a retrospective hearing to determine defendant's competency to stand trial was feasible, this C......
-
Crawford v. State
...for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact."2 See White v. State, 610 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.Cr.App.); Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567 (Tex.Cr.App.); Russell v. State, 598 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.Cr.App.); Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.Cr.App.); Burks v. State, 583 S.W.2d 38......
-
Lackey v. State
...1978. A record in that proceeding shall be prepared and transmitted to this Court for further disposition. See Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). It is so DALLY, J., concurs in the result. TOM G. DAVIS, Judge, concurring. While I cannot join that portion of the opinion whic......
-
Hernandez v. State
...that Knapp's exclusion was consistent with Witherspoon. Compare Russell v. State, 598 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); O'Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107 The appellant next directs our attent......
-
Jury Selection and Voir Dire
...the juror’s responses and has no knowledge of their accuracy. Gonzales v. State, 3 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) . A defendant is entitled to a reversal where a juror has withheld information if two criteria are met: (1) the omiss......
-
Jury Selection and Voir Dire
...the juror’s responses and has no knowledge of their accuracy. Gonzales v. State, 3 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) . A defendant is entitled to a reversal where a juror has withheld information if two criteria are met: (1) the omiss......
-
Jury Selection and Voir Dire
...the juror’s responses and has no knowledge of their accuracy. Gonzales v. State, 3 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Crim. App. A defendant is entitled to a reversal where a juror has withheld information if two criteria are met: (1) the omission is m......
-
Jury Selection and Voir Dire
...the juror’s responses and has no knowledge of their accuracy. Gonzales v. State, 3 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) . A defendant is entitled to a reversal where a juror has withheld information if two criteria are met: (1) the omiss......