Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 16 March 1977
• Docket Number: No. 52875,52875
• Citation: 548 S.W.2d 685
• Parties: Charles Wayne JACKSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 685

548 S.W.2d 685

Charles Wayne JACKSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 52875.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 16, 1977.

Rehearing Denied April 13, 1977.

Jack O. Herrington and Jim D. Lovett, on appeal, Clarksville, for appellant.

Pat F. Beadle, County Atty., Clarksville, Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., David S. McAngus, Asst. State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

DAVIS, Commissioner.

Appeal is taken from a conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Punishment was assessed by the jury at ten years.

Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. The record reflects that on December 26, 1974, appellant and his wife were arguing in the presence of others. Appellant pulled a pistol from his pocket, two shots were fired, and Christine Rosser, appellant's sister, was killed and appellant's wife was wounded. The murder of Rosser is the gravamen of this prosecution.

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of a jury in a pretrial hearing that appellant was competent to stand trial.

This Court has consistently held that no appeal lies from a judgment rendered in a preliminary trial on the issue of competency to stand trial. See Knight v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 538 S.W.2d 101; Hassler v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 473 S.W.2d 513; Vardas v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 518 S.W.2d 826; Kalinec v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 500 S.W.2d 146, and cases there cited. A careful reading of the leading authorities generally relied upon as the historical basis of such position reveals that such cases did not address the question here presented. See Darnell v. State, 24 Tex.App. 6, 5 S.W. 522; Millikin v. Jeffrey, 108 Tex.Cr.R. 84, 299 S.W. 435; Holland v. State, 52 Tex.Cr.R. 160, 105 S.W. 812; Ex parte Morris, 96 Tex.Cr.R. 256, 257 S.W. 894; DeSilva v. State, 98 Tex.Cr.R. 499, 267 S.W. 271; Boehme v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 358, 264 S.W.2d 118; Ex parte Hodges, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 433, 314 S.W.2d 581. These cases dealt with appeals from sanity hearings conducted after a conviction or related to direct appeals from preliminary hearings on competency.

In Griffin v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 29 S.W.2d 349, this Court held that the Court of Criminal Appeals does not have jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from a preliminary hearing finding an accused sane at the time of trial, but left open the question of whether the matter might be brought up on appeal from the case-in-chief:

"The question of whether or not the proceeding above was ancillary to the murder case and its issues of law might therefore be brought up with the main case is not here presented. We pass only on the right to appeal directly from a finding that he was mentally competent to conduct a rational defense."

In Hardin v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 283, 248 S.W.2d 487, this Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to review a direct appeal from a finding of insanity at a preliminary hearing because the accused had not been found guilty of anything and no punishment had been assessed, and therefore the case was not a "criminal case" within the meaning of Art. 5, Sec. 5, of the Texas Constitution, which defines the jurisdiction of this Court.

This Court, for the first time, passed on the issue of whether the competency hearing could be reviewed, if brought up on appeal with the trial on its merits, in Pena v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 406, 320 S.W.2d 355. In Pena, supra, it was stated:

"The preliminary trial on the insanity issues was not the trial now before this Court for review, but another separate trial, not strictly criminal in nature, from which no appeal lies. . . . To agree that he may complain upon appeal from a conviction of procedural errors at the preliminary trial on the insanity issues would be to say that an appeal does lie from the judgment in the preliminary trial, but is postponed until after a conviction upon the trial on the issue of guilt or innocence.

"We hold that appellant may not here complain of the refusal of his requested charges at the insanity trial."

Our research of authorities from other jurisdictions reveals no other state which has denied an appeal from a competency hearing when such issue is raised on appeal from the main proceeding. See 16 A.L.R.3d 714; People v. Fields, 62 Cal.2d 538, 42 Cal.Rptr. 833, 399 P.2d 369, 16 A.L.R.3d 708, cert. den. 382 U.S. 858, 86 S.Ct. 113, 15 L.Ed.2d 95; People v. Francabandera, 33 N.Y.2d 429, 354 N.Y.S.2d 609, 310 N.E.2d 292; State v. Burrows, 250 La. 658, 198 So.2d 393; Desho v. State, 237 Ind. 308, 145 N.E.2d 429; Kilgore v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 826, 222 S.W.2d 600; Alexander v. State, 71 Okl.Cr. 47, 107 P.2d 811. It appears that in the preceding jurisdictions there is no question that an accused can appeal from a competency hearing if he brings up the matter with the appeal on the trial on its merits. The more difficult question raised in these opinions from other jurisdictions is whether a direct appeal lies from a preliminary hearing on competency.

It is well settled that a conviction of an accused person while he is incompetent violates due process. See Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961, 76 S.Ct. 440, 100 L.Ed. 835 (1956); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Perryman v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 494 S.W.2d 542. Due process requires a separate hearing to determine competency to stand trial, Pate v. Robinson, supra, and Texas law requires a jury trial on such issue. See Townsend v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 427 S.W.2d 55; Cavender v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 515 S.W.2d 277; Article 46.02, V.A.C.C.P.

Although the Constitution of the United States does not guarantee a right to appellate review, Griffin v. People of the State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, Article 44.02, V.A.C.C.P. states that "A defendant in any criminal action has the right of appeal under the rules hereinafter prescribed." The Constitution of the State of Texas recites that this Court ". . . shall have appellate jurisdiction coextensive with the limits of the state in all criminal cases of whatever grade. . . ." See Vernon's Texas Const.Ann., Art. 5, Sec. 5. A hearing on competency is not a criminal action as such in that a determination of guilt or innocence is not made, but it is quasi-criminal in a sense that a finding of competency is a necessary prerequisite to subjecting the accused to a criminal trial for the offense charged. We find that a preliminary hearing to determine competency is ancillary to the main criminal proceeding.

We note that this Court reviews pretrial hearings had on motions to suppress evidence involving searches, seizures, and confessions and motions to quash an indictment when raised ancillary to the trial on the merits. It follows, and we so hold, that this Court should review a pretrial hearing on competency when such matter is raised in an appeal from the trial on its merits.

To the extent that Knight v. State, supra; Hassler v. State, supra; Vardas v. State, supra; Pena v. State, supra; Kalinec v. State, supra, and any other cases are in conflict, they are overruled. ¹

The record reflects that the pretrial hearing on competency to stand trial was had on March 24, 1975, and the trial on the merits was had on June 2, 1975.

At the competency hearing, Dr. John Holbrook, a psychiatrist, testified that he was appointed by the court to conduct a psychiatric examination of appellant. Holbrook testified that, in his opinion, appellant was not competent to stand trial, that appellant did not have a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings, and that appellant was highly suggestible. Holbrook related that appellant could not remember the facts of the event for which he was charged. Holbrook explained that because such event was abnormal appellant could not understand it, and thus could not remember it. Holbrook testified that a polygraph examination was administered to appellant to determine if he was feigning loss of memory, and appellant passed the exam. Holbrook stated that appellant's loss of memory was permanent and hospitalization would not benefit him.

Holbrook further testified that appellant was normal in that he reacted to conversation and responded to it, and that appellant had no mental disorder. He further related that appellant understood what was going on at trial, that he was capable of talking to his attorney about the proceedings and capable of talking about fact situations other than the one he was charged with. Holbrook stated that appellant knew it was murder to kill someone and that he thought that appellant "knows when he's charged with the offense of murder."

One of appellant's court-appointed counsel, Jack Herrington, testified that he had spoken with appellant on twenty-five or thirty occasions and that appellant was constantly changing the facts of his story. Herrington did not believe appellant was faking his condition, but did think appellant would understand what would happen if one shoots another with a gun.

The State offered no evidence at the competency hearing and the jury found appellant competent to stand trial.

In our role as an appellate court, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. Jordan v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 506 S.W.2d 217; Northcutt v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 478 S.W.2d 935.

The question before us is whether an accused's loss of memory regarding the facts of the event for which he is charged, standing alone, renders him incompetent to stand trial as a matter of law. We find the question to be one of first impression for this Court, but find that there is a growing body of outside authority addressed to the question here presented. We find no case yet reported which has held that the inability to recall the event charged because of amnesia constitutes mental incapacity to stand trial. See Amnesia: A Case Study...