Brantley v. Surles

Citation404 So.2d 1013
Decision Date27 May 1981
Docket NumberNo. 52614,52614
PartiesMrs. Tobie BRANTLEY v. M. F. SURLES, Superintendent of Education, Montgomery County, Elmo Branch; Thomas Woods; Richard Morman; E. C. Henson, M. D.; J. W. Card, Members of theBoard, Montgomery County Board of Education, Montgomery County, Mississippi.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

Charles L. Lewis, Jr., Deramus, Lewis & Tucker, Louisville, for appellant.

John L. Low, IV, Watkins & Eager, Jackson, for appellees.

Before ROBERTSON, P. J., and SUGG and HAWKINS, JJ.

HAWKINS, Justice, for the Court:

Mrs. Tobie Brantley has perfected this appeal from a decree of the Chancery Court of Montgomery County sustaining a demurrer to her bill of complaint or petition against the Superintendent of Education and Board of Education of Montgomery County for reinstatement to her position as manager of the Kilmichael Elementary School cafeteria, from which she was discharged in September, 1976, as well as other relief. This is the second time this case has been before this Court. We affirm.

In 1976, and for several years prior thereto the appellant Mrs. Brantley was employed by the Montgomery County School District as manager of the Kilmichael Elementary School cafeteria.

The minutes of the Montgomery County Board of Education of August 2, 1976, reflect a meeting held, with her present, concerning her son attending a private school while she was employed in the Kilmichael Elementary School, and a decision made to dismiss her for this reason.

By letter of August 26, 1976, from the County Superintendent of Education M. F. Surles, she was informed the board would meet September 13, 1976, to discuss her case. (The letter states the meeting will be held July 13, 1976, but this obviously meant September 13, 1976, the date the meeting was actually held). On September 13, 1976, the board met with Mrs. Brantley again attending, and on September 14, 1976, the county superintendent again wrote her, informing her the board had reluctantly made its decision regarding her employment, and indicating no cause other than her son's attending a private school. Again, on September 20, 1976, the county superintendent wrote her reiterating what had transpired, and informing her the termination date of her employment was September 17, 1976.

Pursuant to her request a hearing was conducted by the board on November 1, 1976, in which testimony was taken and transcribed pertaining to the reasons for her discharge, as well as her job performance. At the conclusion of the hearing, the board made the following findings of fact:

"FINDING OF FACT

"That Mrs. Tobie Brantley had been lunchroom supervisor of the Kilmichael Elementary School cafeteria for a period of at least four years. That she is not a person protected by the provisions of the Public School Fair Dismissal Act-Section 37-9-101, et seq. of the Mississippi Code of 1972.

"That the Superintendent of Education has the right to discharge an employee such as Mrs. Tobie Brantley for any reason not prohibited by law, and not for the sole reason that her child attends another school system.

"The evidence revealed to the Board that many complaints were received by Mr. Surles, Superintendent of Education concerning the atmosphere, friendliness and general welcome of students and staff in the cafeteria. The evidence further reveals that the portions were smaller than at other schools, and in the opinion of some observers, the food was not prepared in a palatable manner. It was further shown that Mrs. Brantley had called one of the Board members, J. W. Card, a liar. The son-in-law of Mrs. Brantley criticized the school system over its racial makeup. The Board further finds that the attitude of Mrs. Brantley in an integrated school system which is approximately 65% Black, and which system is under a Federal Court order and control, jeopardizes the harmony and peaceful relations in the system.

"The Board further finds that Mrs. Brantley had removed one of her children from the Montgomery County School System and enrolled the child in a private segregated academy.

"The Board further finds that Mrs. Brantley has no protected right to continued employment, has no tenure, and is not entitled to continued employment indefinitely. The Superintendent of Education has the right to discharge an employee such as Mrs. Brantley for no reason. A mere public employee is not entitled to a hold on employment simply as a result of long term service in the system.

"It is clear to the Board that Mrs. Brantley has not been discharged for the single reason that an eligible child does not attend the school system in which she is employed in violation of Section 37-9-59, Mississippi Code of 1972."

The Board thereupon entered an order finally discharging Mrs. Brantley. She filed a bill of complaint or petition in the Chancery Court of Montgomery County on December 3, 1976, against the county superintendent and county board of education, petitioning therein for her reinstatement and back pay to date of reinstatement as manager of the cafeteria. Along with their answer, the board and superintendent filed a demurrer and motion to dismiss, alleging the chancery court had no original jurisdiction because Mrs. Brantley's sole remedy by way of appeal was to the State Board of Education pursuant to Section 37-9-59 of the Mississippi Code of 1972.

The chancery court overruled the demurrer and motion to dismiss, holding the court had jurisdiction under the bill of complaint alleging Mrs. Brantley was deprived of a "valuable right," which was a "property right under her contract." The court further found Mrs. Brantley was entitled to the protection afforded professional personnel as required by Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-101 through § 37-9-113 (Supp.1975), the Public School Fair Dismissal Act of 1974, Laws 1974, Chap. 577, § 1, et sequitur (repealed 1/9/77 by Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-101 through § 37-9-113 (Supp.1977)), and that Mrs. Brantley did not have to perfect an appeal to the State Board of Education, but could appeal directly to the chancery court.

The chancellor then reviewed the record made of the hearing before the Montgomery County Board of Education on November 1, 1976, and ruled there was no substantial evidence supporting any other reason for her discharge than her son's attending a private school. The court thereupon rendered an opinion and a decree for reinstatement of Mrs. Brantley.

The final decree of the chancery court was rendered September 8, 1977, and an appeal was perfected to this Court by the county superintendent and county board of education, in "M. F. Surles, Superintendent of Education, et al., v. Mrs. Tobie Brantley," Number 50,681. On October 11, 1978, in an unpublished opinion, 363 So.2d 94, we reversed and rendered the decree of the chancery court, holding therein the original demurrer of the appellants should have been sustained in that Mrs. Brantley was not an "employee" as defined under Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-101 through § 37-9-113 (Supp.1975), the Public School Fair Dismissal Act of 1974, Laws 1974, Chap. 577, § 1, et sequitur (repealed 1/9/77 by Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-101 through § 37-9-113 (Supp.1977)), and had no right of direct appeal to the chancery court of Montgomery County and further that she had no "property right" in her job. The decree of the chancery court was thereupon reversed, and the November 1, 1976, order of the Montgomery County Board of Education reinstated.

On May 8, 1979, Mrs. Brantley again filed a petition in the Chancery Court of Montgomery County against the same officials, in cause number 65-05-79, entitled "Petition for Review, Reinstatement, Back Pay, Damages, Injunctions and Other Relief." In this petition she alleged the same facts as in the initial petition filed in 1976. General and special demurrers were filed by the defendants, assigning (1) the cause of action was barred by § 15-1-29 of the Code of 1972; (2) the cause of action was merged into the judgment rendered by this Court in Cause No. 50,681, and (3) the Chancery Court of Montgomery County was without jurisdiction to hear the cause. The demurrer was sustained on all three grounds by the chancellor, and from a decree dated March 21, 1980, finally dismissing the petition with prejudice, this appeal was perfected by Mrs. Brantley.

While it is our opinion the right result was reached in our prior decision, we do feel obligated to address the legal questions posed by the provisions of Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-59 (Supp.1974), Laws 1974, Chap. 459, and Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-1.

Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-59 (Supp.1974), (Laws of 1974, Chap. 459) is a statute setting forth grounds for which a superintendent, principal or teacher of a school may be discharged, the procedure therefor, and appeals which may be taken therefrom. 1

The final paragraph of this statute reads as follows:

"The governing authorities of every school district in this state are hereby prohibited from denying employment or reemployment to any person as a superintendent, principal or teacher, as defined in Section 37-19-1, or as a noninstructional personnel, as defined in Section 37-19-1, for the single reason that any eligible child of such person does not attend the school system in which such superintendent, principal, teacher, or noninstructional personnel is employed."

Mississippi Code Annotated § 37-9-1 (1972) gives the following definition of school personnel:

"For the purposes of this chapter the terms 'superintendent,' 'principal' and 'teacher' shall have such meaning as are ascribed to them under the provisions of Section 37-19-1. The term 'noninstructional personnel' shall include all employees of school districts other than superintendents, principals, teachers, and school bus drivers."

Another statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-101 through § 37-9-113 (Supp.1975), the Public School Fair Dismissal Act of 1974, Laws 1974, Chap. 577, § 1, et sequitur (r...

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