Brawley v. The State of Tex.
| Decision Date | 14 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-CV-2256-N (BH) |
| Parties | MICHELLE LOUISE BRAWLEY, and PRESTON SMITH Plaintiffs, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the plaintiffs' claims against the State of Texas should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and their remaining claims should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
This civil rights lawsuit by Michelle Louise Brawley (Wife) and her husband, Preston Smith (Husband) (collectively Plaintiffs) arises from their encounter with Dallas Police Department (DPD) officers, which led to the arrest of one or both of them.
Plaintiffs allege that during Wife's appearance at the Frank Crowley Courts Building on August 23, 2021, unidentified district attorneys refused to “provide their Oath of Office on the Record” and conspired with a bailiff to racially profile Wife and to neglect her civil rights. (doc. 3 at 3.)[2] Wife was “charged with three false charges” and her bond was set at $5,000. (See id.) She and Husband went to EZ Out Bail Bonds (Bond Company) to obtain the bail money. (See id. at 4.) Husband was forced to leave the establishment “for passing out a few of his business cards all while waiting for his wife to walk out.” (See id.) Both Wife and the Bond Company manager (Manager) called the police. (See id.)
One or both Plaintiffs were then arrested by several DPD officers (Officers), and Plaintiffs claim they “suffered injuries and damages due to the illegal arrest.” (Id.) Officers allegedly conspired “with no oath” against Plaintiffs and deprived them “of their unalienable rights of marriage to pursue happiness and nationality.” (Id. at 5.) By arresting him or his wife, they also allegedly interfered with Husband's right to travel. (doc. 17 at 5-7.) Plaintiffs claim that the alleged constitutional violations were the result of policies enacted or countenanced by the City of Dallas (City) including its failure to properly train its officers and to require that they take an oath of office. (See doc. 14 at 2; doc. 17 at 2.)
Plaintiffs seek monetary and injunctive relief against the State of Texas, City, Officers, Bond Company, its former owner (Owner), and Manager, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal criminal statutes and regulations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Texas Penal Code, the Texas Hate Crimes Act, and general state tort law. (See doc. 3; doc. 14; doc. 17.)
Because Plaintiffs are proceeding in forma pauperis, their complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) provides for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Plaintiffs sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). It “afford[s] redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as constitutional norms.” Id. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005).
A. The State of Texas
Plaintiffs sue the State of Texas for monetary damages based on alleged constitutional violations. (See doc. 3 at 5.)
The Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Under the Eleventh Amendment, “[a]bsent waiver, neither a State nor agencies acting under its control may ‘be subject to suit in federal court.'” P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (quoting Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 480 (1987)); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). “This withdrawal of jurisdiction effectively confers an immunity from suit.” Id. at 144. Therefore, “an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.” Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663. This immunity applies to both federal and state law claims brought in federal court. See Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2013) (); Robertson v. McShan, No. 05-20055, 2005 WL 2673516, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 20, 2005) (per curium) ( that Eleventh Amendment immunity divests federal courts of jurisdiction to hear federal and state law claims).
Further, although Congress has the power to abrogate immunity through the Eleventh Amendment, Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-76 (2000), and the State may waive its immunity by consenting to suit, AT&T Commc'ns v. BellSouth Telecommns. Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2001), the State of Texas has not waived its immunity here by consenting to suit, nor has Congress abrogated the Eleventh Amendment by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Hines v. Miss. Dep't of Corr. No. 00-60143, 2000 WL 1741624, at *3 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2000) (per curiam).
The Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims for monetary damages against the State of Texas, and those claims should be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Voisin's Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1986).[3]B. Claims Against Bond Company, Owner, and Manager
Plaintiffs also sue Bond Company, Owner, and Manager. (doc. 3 at 4; doc. 14 at 2-3; doc. 17 at 3-4.)[4] Plaintiffs concede that these defendants are not state actors for purposes of § 1983. (See doc. 14 at 5; doc. 17 at 4.)
A private party may be acting “under color of state law” and be held liable under § 1983 in certain circumstances, however. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1989). In Priester v. Lowndes Cty., 354 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 829 (2004), the Fifth Circuit explained that “[f]or a private citizen...to be held liable under section 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the citizen conspired with or acted in concert with state actors.” Id. at 420 (citing Mylett v. Jeane, 879 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)). A plaintiff must allege: (1) an agreement between the private and public defendants to commit an illegal act and (2) a deprivation of constitutional rights. Id.; see also Avdeef v. Royal Bank of Scotland, P.L.C., 616 Fed.Appx. 665, 676 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Allegations on this issue that are merely conclusory, without reference to specific facts, will not suffice. Id. (citing Brinkman v. Johnston, 793 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)).
Here, Plaintiffs make no allegations that would support any finding of an agreement between Bond Company, Owner, or Manager and a state actor. Because they fail to plausibly allege that these defendants acted under color of state law, their § 1983 claims against them should be dismissed.
C. Officers
Plaintiffs appear to sue Officers for an “illegal arrest”and detention, failing to intervene, violating their oaths, and interfering with their right to travel and associate as a family. (See doc. 3 at 3-4; doc. 14 at 5-8; doc. 17 at 4-7.)
The Constitution “contemplates searches and seizures based ‘upon probable cause.'” United States v. Bass, 996 F.3d 729, 737 (5th Cir. 2021) ). “The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from false arrests-that is, arrests unsupported by probable cause.” Defrates v. Podany, 789 Fed.Appx. 427, 431 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 204 (5th Cir. 2009)). Further, “[a] constitutional claim for false arrest, which [Plaintiffs] bring[] through the vehicle of § 1983, ‘requires a showing of no probable cause.'” Arizmendi v. Gabbert, 919 F.3d 891, 897 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Club Retro, 568 F.3d at 204).
“The United States Supreme Court has defined probable cause as the ‘facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.'” Piazza v Mayne, 217 F.3d 239, 245-46 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)). “The facts must be known to the officer at the time of the arrest” and “must be particularized to the arrestee.” Club Retro, 568 F.3d at 204 (citations omitted). A court “will find that probable cause existed if the officer was aware of facts justifying a reasonable belief that an...
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