Bray v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.

• Decision Date: 19 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. 3:13-cv-1561 (SRU),3:13-cv-1561 (SRU)
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: DEBRA BRAY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. INGERSOLL-RAND CO., et al., Defendants.

DEBRA BRAY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. INGERSOLL-RAND CO., et al., Defendants.

No. 3:13-cv-1561 (SRU)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

February 19, 2015

RULING AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Debra Bray, executrix of the estate of Edgar St. Jean, and Marilyn St. Jean (collectively, "the plaintiffs") brought this action in Connecticut Superior Court asserting claims for product liability, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-572m, et seq., loss of consortium (Marilyn St. Jean, only), and punitive damages.¹ Notice of Removal, Ex. A (Complaint), Ex. C (doc. 1-1). Defendant Crane Company ("Crane") timely removed the case to federal court under the federal officer and military contractor defenses, 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Notice of Removal ¶¶ 6-7, 10. At the close of discovery, defendants Aurora Pumps ("Aurora") (doc. 132), BW/IP, Inc. ("BW/IP") (doc. 138), Carrier Corporation ("Carrier") (doc. 133), Crane (doc. 130), Nash Engineering Company ("Nash") (doc. 130), Warren Pumps ("Warren") (doc. 135), and Weir Valves and Controls USA, Inc. ("Weir") (doc. 131), (collectively, "the defendants") filed motions for summary judgment, principally asserting that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their evidentiary burden on all claims.

Based on the record and all pleadings, the plaintiffs have failed to meet their evidentiary burden on all of their claims. The defendants' motions for summary judgment are GRANTED.

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record demonstrates that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) (plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must construe the facts of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970); see also Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d. 520, 523 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965 (1992) (court is required to "resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party"). When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported by documentary and testimonial evidence, however, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must present sufficient probative evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995).

"Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir. 1992). If the nonmoving party submits evidence that is "merely colorable," or is not "significantly probative," summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion forsummary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.

Id. at 247-48. To present a "genuine" issue of material fact, there must be contradictory evidence "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. at 248.

If the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof at trial, then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. In such a situation, "there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 322-23; accord Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (movant's burden satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of nonmoving party's claim). In short, if there is no genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment may enter. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

II. Background

The decedent, Edgar St. Jean, served in the military from 1953 to December 1956. Crane Mot. Summ. J. Br., Ex. B, at 8 (Pls.' Response to Standard Interrogs.) (doc. 127-2). He then joined Electric Boat Corporation ("Electric Boat"), a division of General Dynamics Corporation, as an outside machinist and later, as a general foreman, from approximately 1956 to April 1980. Notice of Removal, Ex. A ¶ 2; St. Jean Aff. ¶ 3-4. His worksite was located in Groton, Connecticut, where St. Jean worked on new construction and the overhauling of nuclearsubmarines for the U.S. Navy. Notice of Removal, Ex. A ¶ 2; Crane Local R. 56(a)1 Statement ¶ 2 (doc. 127); Pls.' Opp'n Br., Ex. 4 (Electric Boat Records) (doc. 162-4). The plaintiffs allege that the defendants manufactured² products used in Electric Boat's shipbuilding and repair business, and that St. Jean was exposed to when using or installing those products. Notice of Removal, Ex. A ¶¶ 2, 5-13. On May 19, 2013, St. Jean died of mesothelioma and asbestosis, which the plaintiffs allege was caused by St. Jean's exposure to and inhalation of asbestos fibers throughout his military and shipbuilding career. Id.; Pls.' Opp'n Br., Ex. 7 (Letter from Dr. Laura S. Welch (dated Oct. 8, 2014)) (doc. 151-7); St. Jean. Aff. ¶ 5; Pls.' Opp'n Br., Ex. 10 (Death Certificate) (doc. 162-10).

At the close of discovery, the defendants filed their motions for summary judgment. Those motions raise the same grounds for summary judgment; the defendants argue that the plaintiffs have failed to meet their evidentiary burden with respect to their product liability and loss of consortium claims.

In support of their opposition to the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the plaintiffs offered the following evidence: a brief affidavit by the decedent, executed two days before his death; a list of ships upon which St. Jean worked, Crane's Mot. Summ. J. Br., Ex. B, at 9-10 (doc. 127-2); an affidavit by the plaintiffs' proffered expert witness, Captain R. Bruce Woodruff, Pls.' Opp'n Br., Ex. 4 (doc. 151-4); the deposition testimony of Charles Knapp, id., Ex. 2 (doc. 151-2); the deposition testimony of Timothy Mullane, id., Ex. 3 (doc. 151-3); and the deposition testimony of Robert Choate, id., Ex. 4 (doc. 155-4). As discussed below, that evidence is insufficient to meet the plaintiffs' evidentiary burden on all claims.

III. Discussion

A. Choice of Law

Several defendants have argued that federal maritime common law, not Connecticut state law, should govern the plaintiffs' claims. Aurora Mot. Summ. J. Br. 12-14 (doc. 132-1); Crane Mot. Summ. J. Br. 3-8 (doc. 126); Warren Mot. Summ. J. Br. 3-5 (doc. 135-1). Others have argued that the plaintiffs' exclusive avenue for recovery is the Connecticut Product Liability Act ("CPLA"), Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-572m, et seq. BW/IP Mot. Summ. J. Br. 8 (doc. 138); Carrier Mot. Summ. J. Br. 4-5 (doc. 133-2); Nash Mot. Summ. J. Br. 4-5 (doc. 130); Weir Mot. Summ. J. Br. 8-9 (doc. 131).

A party seeking to invoke federal maritime jurisdiction over a tort claim must establish that the activity giving rise to the alleged harm satisfies two criteria—the "location" and "nexus" tests. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 532-34 (1995). The location test requires that the invoking party demonstrate that the injury occurred on navigable waters or was caused by a vessel on navigable waters. Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 249, 267-68 (1972). The nexus test requires that the harm suffered have a potentially disruptive effect on maritime commerce and that the general character of the allegedly tortious activity bears "a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 367 (1990); E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986); Tandon v. Captain's Cove Marina of Bridgeport, 752 F.3d 239, 247-48 (2d Cir. 2014). If maritime jurisdiction applies and if there is no federal statute that addresses the harm suffered, then a district court applies general maritime law to determine redress. E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 864; see also Kermarec v. Campagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-32 (1959) (discussing the development of federal common law in maritime cases).

I need not decide whether this case is governed by Connecticut's product liability statute or whether it falls within the ambit of general maritime law. As discussed below, the plaintiffs have failed to meet their evidentiary burden under either standard.

B. Product Liability

1. Standards

a. The Connecticut Product Liability Act

Under Connecticut law, a product liability claim includes all injures caused by the defective manufacture, construction, design, preparation, installation, or packaging of any product. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572m(b). The CPLA is the exclusive remedy for any product defect action brought under Connecticut law, and it includes all actions related to the defect itself and to defects related to placing a product "into the stream of commerce." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572n(a); Allard v. Liberty Oil Equip. Co., 253 Conn. 787, 806 (2000); Wagner v. Clark Equip. Co., 243 Conn. 168, 195 (1997); ...