Breech v. Alabama Power Co.

Decision Date15 April 1997
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 96-0339-RV-M.
Citation962 F.Supp. 1447
PartiesAlan BREECH, Plaintiff, v. ALABAMA POWER COMPANY and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, System Council U-19, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

Michael S. McNair, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff.

T. Dwight Sloan, Birmingham, AL, Charles Y. Boyd, Gina Coggin, Gadsden, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

VOLLMER, District Judge.

Presently before the court are defendants' motions for summary judgment (Docs. 11 and 12) with attached exhibits. Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. 16) in opposition to the motion; supporting exhibits are attached. Thereafter, defendant Alabama Power Company ("APC") filed a reply brief (Doe.18). The court has carefully reviewed the law and considered the arguments of the parties. For the reasons set forth below, it is the decision of the court that defendants' motions for summary judgment are due to be granted.

This action was brought by plaintiff Alan Breech ("Breech") against his former employer, APC, and the union of which he was a member during his employment with APC, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, System Council U-19 ("Union"). Breech brings this suit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (as amended), and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a,1 to redress alleged instances of religious discrimination by APC and the Union. APC employed Breech in various positions from January, 1977 until July, 1991 when he was terminated in response to four unexcused absences. Breech has been a practicing member of the Worldwide Church of God since the Fall of 1990; he maintains that he did not attend work on these four occasions because it was contrary to his religious beliefs. One tenant of Breech's faith is that he cannot work from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday. The four unexcused absences occurred on days where his scheduled shift overlapped with this period of sabbath.

Breech asserts two causes of action in his complaint: (1) that he was illegally discharged on the basis of his religion and (2) that he was illegally discharged in retaliation for assisting another employee with an EEOC claim by submitting an affidavit with the EEOC on behalf of the employee. Breech seeks declaratory relief, an injunction against defendants' conduct, reinstatement to his position or equivalent front salary and benefits, back salary and benefits, compensatory and punitive damages, and an award of costs and attorney's fees.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Jurisdiction

Plaintiff's prayers for relief are based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. Therefore, the court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

B. Venue

Venue is appropriate in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

C. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See also Adickes v. S.H. Kress, Inc., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). All evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alphin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 940 F.2d 1497, 1500 (11th Cir.1991); Langston v. ACT, 890 F.2d 380, 383 (11th Cir.1989). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the function of the court is not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is an issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 242-43, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2507, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The standard for awarding summary judgment is the same as that for a directed verdict: "the trial judge must grant [the motion] if, under governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d 445, 447 (11th Cir.1996). To avoid an adverse ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "the nonmoving party must provide more than a mere scintilla of evidence." Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1526 (11th Cir.1997). "[T]here must be a substantial conflict in evidence to support a jury question." Id. (quoting Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir.1989)).

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

The facts pertinent to the resolution of defendants' motions for summary judgment are generally undisputed. Where there is any discrepancy in the record, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmovant.2

APC's Barry Steam Plant, where Breech was employed at the time of his discharge, is a fossil fuel electric power generating plant located in Mobile County, Alabama. Arbitration Transcript at 107 (attached to Doc. 12) (hereinafter "Tr.") at 46. The Barry Steam Plant's operational schedule requires it to be available for the production of electricity 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. Tr. at 54. Breech began his employment with APC in January, 1977 as a Utility Man and progressed through various bargaining unit positions, including Assistant Plant Control Operator, until he became a Plant Control Operator in May, 1982. He remained a Plant Control Operator, a part of the Operations Department, until he was terminated on July 24, 1991. Tr. at 48, 208-10. The Superintendent of Operations was Shelby Walker; he was responsible for the daily workings of the Operations Department. Tr. at 50.

A Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") exists between APC and various locals of the Union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. Memorandum of Agreement Between Alabama Power Company and Certain Local Unions of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (hereinafter "Jt. Ex. 1")3. Plaintiff is a member of the Union. Employees at Barry Steam Plant are scheduled on shifts to allow the plant to remain continuously operational. APC and the Union have agreed, pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding, that each year the bargaining unit employees may select the type of shift schedule they wish to work in the following year. Tr. at 55; APC Ex. 3.

At all times material to Breech's employment, the bargaining unit employees within the Operations Department of Barry Steam Plant elected to work a rotating shift with fixed off days. Tr. at 56. A rotating shift with fixed off days means that while the shifts will rotate — e.g., day, night, evening — the employees will observe the same off days each week. Tr. at 58. The employees, on the basis of seniority, select the particular shift schedule they desire, with the most senior employee selecting first. Tr. at 58-59, 270. APC cannot override or change an employee's shift selection. Tr. at 59.

For the year 1990, Breech selected a schedule that gave him Thursday and Friday as his off days; in 1991, Breech selected a schedule that gave him Wednesday and Thursday as his off days. Tr. at 60; APC Ex. 4. None of the Plant Control Operators who were scheduled with Fridays and Saturdays as their off days were willing to swap schedules with Breech. Tr. at 269. APC disciplines and discharges employees for their failure to work their regularly scheduled shifts. Tr. at 79.

Breech was not a member of the Worldwide Church of God the entire time he worked for APC, and the first time he mentioned his interest in the Worldwide Church of God to a representative of APC was in the Spring of 1989. Tr. at 213-14. Breech did not join the Worldwide Church of God in the spring of 1989, nor was he observing any of the tenets of the church at that time. Tr. at 236-38. He began attending the Worldwide Church of God in the Fall of 1990; he also became a member of the church at this time. Tr. at 236.

The first time APC became aware that Breech did not intend to work as scheduled was following Breech's failure to report for his November 24, 1990 scheduled shift. Tr. at 152. Breech met with Shelby Walker on November 26, 1990, at which time Breech informed Walker that he was no longer going to work between sundown Friday and sundown Saturday in observance of his religious beliefs. Tr. at 154, 239-240; APC Ex. 6 at Z.

Once APC was apprised of Breech's religious beliefs, it began a series of meetings and discussions with Breech in an effort to accommodate his religious beliefs. The first such meeting occurred on December 7, 1990, and present were Breech, Lindsey Knodel (a Union Job Steward), John Tuggle (a Shift Supervisor), and Shelby Walker. Tr. at 241; APC Ex. 6 at W. Breech agrees that Walker's memorandum contained on Page W of Company Exhibit 6 fairly and accurately sets forth what was discussed on that occasion. Tr. at 241.

As a result of the December 7th meeting, APC accommodated Breech by allowing him to make shift swaps which would result in the doubling of shifts. Tr. at 243. The doubling of shifts was not allowed in the Operations Department in 1989, 1990, or 1991 except for Breech. Tr. at 244. APC also accommodated Breech by allowing him to take single days of vacation even though if Breech scheduled vacation, APC had to schedule someone else to cover his shift. Tr. at 246. APC Exhibit 10, which Breech agrees is accurate, is a summary of the occasions that APC allowed Breech to utilize shift swaps, allowed Breech to take single days or part days of vacation, and, provided him with other accommodations. Tr. at 267-68.

Breech received a written warning for his failure to report to work on November 24 and was advised that future failure to report to work would be met with increasingly severe discipline. Tr. at 240; APC Ex. 6 at Y. On April 4, 1991, Shelby Walker advised Breech that if he did not work his scheduled shift, APC would consider it a failure to report and would deal with him accordingly. APC Ex. 6 at T.

On May 3, 1991,...

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