Brenner v. City of Casper

• Decision Date: 25 July 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-267,85-267
• Citation: 723 P.2d 558
• Parties: Lynnanne BRENNER, Appellant (Appellant/Defendant), v. CITY OF CASPER, Appellee (Appellee/Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 558

723 P.2d 558

Lynnanne BRENNER, Appellant (Appellant/Defendant), v. CITY OF CASPER, Appellee (Appellee/Plaintiff).

No. 85-267.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

July 25, 1986.

Robert A. Monteith and Donald J. Rissler of Monteith and Associates, Casper, for appellant.

Richard H. Peek, Casper, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

Appellant was convicted in municipal court of driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWUI), a violation of § 24-27 of the Casper city code (as amended July 3, 1984, by Ordinance No. 24-84). Upon entering a plea of not guilty, appellant demanded a jury trial. The court denied the demand, and the case was tried to the court. On August 6, 1985, the court entered its finding of guilty and imposed a $750 fine and a 30-day jail sentence. Appellant appealed her conviction to the district court. She now appeals to this Court from the district court's order affirming her conviction.

We reverse.

Appellant raises the following issues:

"I. DID THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF CASPER ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE APPELLANT, LYNNANNE BRENNER, A TRIAL BY JURY OF THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE AGAINST HER?

"II. IS THE MUNICIPAL COURT[']S REFUSAL TO GRANT THE [DEMAND OF] APPELLANT, LYNNANNE BRENNER, ARBITRARY AND THEREBY VIOLATING THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 7, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 34, OF THE WYOMING CONSTITUTION AND THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION?

"III. WAS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL HEREIN SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE APPELLANT, LYNNANN[E] BRENNER, WAS OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE, OR IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE SAME, WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL TO A [DEGREE] THAT RENDERED HER INCAPABLE OF SAFELY DRIVING A MOTOR VEHICLE?"

We must determine whether appellant was entitled to a jury trial at the municipal court level. As a necessary part of our inquiry, we must also determine whether § 5-6-207, W.S.1977, constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right to trial by jury. ¹

This is not the first time this Court has addressed the question of whether one charged under a city ordinance is entitled to a jury trial in municipal court. In Lapp v. City of Worland, Wyo., 612 P.2d 868 (1980), we held that a defendant who was charged with DWUI under a city ordinance authorizing a jail sentence was entitled to a jury trial in municipal court, regardless of whether a sentence was ultimately imposed. However, the manner in which we arrived at that result has created uncertainty in this area of the law and, in fact, may have led in part to the appeal now before us. In Lapp we acknowledged the existence of § 5-6-207, which provides as follows "Cases in the police court for violations of city ordinances shall be tried and determined by the police justice without the intervention of a jury, and the trial of such cases before such police justice shall be conducted in all respects, not herein otherwise provided for, in like manner as criminal cases before justices of the peace."

Despite the clear language of the statute, we held that under Art. 1, § 9 of the Wyoming Constitution and Rule 5(d), W.R.Cr.P.J.C., the defendant was entitled to a jury trial. Article 1, § 9 provides in relevant part:

"The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases * * *."

When Lapp was decided, Rule 5(d), W.R.Cr.P.J.C., provided:

"Jury in municipal court.--There shall be no right to demand a jury trial in municipal courts unless a jail sentence is to be imposed upon conviction; but in all other respects, except as otherwise provided, the trial shall be conducted in like manner as criminal cases are tried before justices of the peace." ²

Although we did not discuss the inconsistency between Art. 1, § 9 and the statute, we did address the conflicting provisions contained in Rule 5(d) and the statute. We noted that § 5-2-114, W.S.1977, authorizes this Court to establish procedural, but not substantive, rules for Wyoming courts and that the right to a jury trial is considered to be a substantive right. However, we attempted to eliminate that problem by characterizing Rule 5(d) as purely procedural. We said:

" * * * We do not disturb the legislature's right to require a jury trial in misdemeanor cases in municipal prosecutions for ordinance violations. We only move the trial by jury procedurally from the district court to the municipal court. * * * " Lapp v. City of Worland, 612 P.2d at 873.

In a later opinion, Justice Raper provided further clarification of the Lapp decision:

"Lapp v. City of Worland * * * honors the discretion of the legislature that there be trial by jury upon demand as a substantive right but only as a matter of procedure recognized the right of this court to by rule place the jury trial in the trial court where it belongs rather than in the district court sitting as an appellate court. * * * " Goodman v. State, Wyo., 644 P.2d 1240, 1243 (1982) (Raper, Justice, concurring).

Thus, Lapp gave effect to Rule 29, W.R.Cr.P.J.C., which provided that § 5-6-207 was superseded by the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure for Justice Courts.

In characterizing our determination to move the right to jury trial from district court to municipal court as purely procedural and, therefore, within our authority, we avoided the critical question before us--whether a statute which denies the right to a jury trial in municipal court for any violation of a city ordinance, regardless of severity, is constitutional.

It is well established that the legislature may pass any acts which are not expressly or by necessary implication inhibited by the Wyoming Constitution. Budge v. Board of Com'rs of Lincoln County, 29 Wyo. 35, 208 P. 874 (1922). Although we have a duty to give great deference to legislative pronouncements and to uphold their constitutionality where possible, it is equally imperative that we declare them invalid when they transgress the Wyoming Constitution. White v. Fisher, Wyo., 689 P.2d 102 (1984).

As demonstrated above, the Wyoming Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in criminal cases. In accordance with that provision, we recognize, as does the federal judiciary, that the " * * * general grant of jury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental right, essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all defendants. * * * " Duncan v. State of Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-158, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1452, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, reh. denied 392 U.S. 947, 88 S.Ct. 2270, 20 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1968).

Appellant does not disagree. She does not contend that Art. 1, § 9 of the Wyoming Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in all criminal cases regardless of how serious. She openly recognizes "[t]he general rule and the rule adopted by [this Court] that jury trials are not required for petty offenses." She limits her contention instead to whether the offense with which she was charged is "serious" and, therefore, within the protection of the constitutional guarantee.

Appellee similarly limits its claim. The city contends that even if the right to a jury trial exists in municipal court for serious offenses, the conviction before us is valid and constitutional because appellant was sentenced to only 30 days in jail.

Both parties having limited the issue to what constitutes a serious offense subject to constitutional protection, we limit our inquiry accordingly. Accepting the idea that there has always existed a class of minor offenses not subject to the constitutional guarantee, we are left with the task of drawing the line between that class and the class of more serious offenses requiring a jury trial.

The United States Supreme Court has traditionally distinguished the two classes on the basis of the length of the sentence which may be imposed. In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970), the Supreme Court held that an offense punishable by more than six months' imprisonment constitutes a serious offense subject to the constitutional guarantee. Crimes carrying possible penalties up to six months, on the other hand, were deemed to be outside the scope of constitutional protection.

While recognizing the standard utilized by the United States Supreme Court, it is our conclusion that greater protection is afforded by the Wyoming Constitution.

"It is the general rule that where the language of the state and federal constitutions is similar, the interpretation given by the United States Supreme Court to the federal provision will be applied to the state provision. [Citation.] However, the state courts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their own constitutions a greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution * * *." (Emphasis added.) City of Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wash.2d 87, 653 P.2d 618, 623 (1983), citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975).

Keeping these general principles in mind, we hold that a crime punishable by any jail term, regardless of length, is a serious crime subject to the constitutional right to a jury trial. In our view, no offense which carries with it a potential jail sentence can be deemed so minor as to warrant denying the fundamental right to a jury trial.

Section 5-6-207 unconditionally denies the right to a jury trial in all cases in municipal court involving violations of city ordinances without regard to the potential sentences. We, therefore, find it unconstitutional.

Because we find § 5-6-207 unconstitutional and reverse appellant's conviction, we find it unnecessary to consider whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the conviction.

Reversed.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, specially concurring.

I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority. There is no question that Lynnanne Brenner was entitled to have a trial by jury in the municipal court of the City of...