Brewer v. Casey
| Decision Date | 16 October 1907 |
| Citation | 82 N.E. 45,196 Mass. 384 |
| Parties | BREWER v. CASEY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
P.J. Moore, for plaintiff.
Bart Bossidy and Noxon & Eisner, for defendant.
Under Rev. Laws, c. 168, §§ 80, 81, the power conferred upon police, district, and municipal courts to commit a debtor for contempt if he fails to comply with a valid order for the payment of the debt is analogous to that exercised by a court of equity, which may enforce its decrees by imprisonment of the contemner in the common jail. Rev. Laws, c. 166, § 13; Hurley v. Com., 188 Mass. 443, 448, 74 N.E. 677. The only recital relating to the plaintiff's cause of action is that upon his failure to comply with an order of the court made under the statute he was adjudged guilty of contempt and 'committed to prison for the term of 14 days.' But the word 'prison' being sufficiently broad to include all institutions for the detention of persons sentenced to imprisonment, or detained to await their trial, no excess of jurisdiction appears, and obviously the plaintiff has not been wronged. Sturtevant v. Com., 158 Mass. 598, 600, 33 N.E. 648. Upon resort, however, to the instructions under which the case was submitted to the jury, but to which no exceptions were taken, it is manifest that evidence was introduced from which it could have been found, that as justice of a court of limited jurisdiction the defendant exceeded his authority in issuing an order directing the commitment of the plaintiff to the house of correction at hard labor, instead of to the common jail, and having been committed and detained in execution of the sentence he would be entitled to recover damages for a false imprisonment. Piper v. Person, 2 Gray, 120, 61 Am. Dec. 438; Clarke v. May, 1 Gray, 410, 61 Am. Dec. 470. But while fully recognizing and stating this feature of the case, the presiding judge further charged, that previous to the entry of an order committing the debtor for contempt certain preliminary proceedings were necessary under section 81, which not having been taken the order entered was irregular, and the place and conditions of imprisonment therefore became immaterial. An instruction then followed predicated upon evidence presumably before the trial court, although not appearing in the exceptions, that because of the defendant's failure to proceed in conformity with the statute, the police court was without jurisdiction to enforce the decree required by section 80, and the defendant could be held responsible in damages.
To avoid liability upon either ground the defendant relied upon a settlement made with one Wilson, who as clerk of the court issued the warrant of commitment. The validity of this compromise, and if upheld whether it is a bar to the present suit, presents the questions to be decided. It is first contended by the plaintiff that the attorneys whom he originally retained, and who acted for him during the negotiations, were not authorized to make the settlement. In this case where it is again reised by the defendant, as in the cases of New York, N.H. & H. R. Co. v. Martin, 158 Mass. 313, 33 N.E. 578, and Anglo-American Land, Mortgage & Agency Co. v. Dyer, 181 Mass. 593, 64 N.E. 416, 92 Am. St. Rep. 437, we do not find it necessary to determine the question there left open, whether under a general retainer an attorney is authorized without his client's permission to compromise his client's claim either before or after suit has been brought. See, also, Dalton v. West End. St. Ry. Co., 159 Mass. 221, 34 N.E. 261, 38 Am. St. Rep. 410. It was undisputed not only that the money had been received, and retained by the plaintiff's attorney who then was in active management of the litigation, but Wilson was led to understand, and understood, that as finally left the adjustment at least released him from any further liability. If the ample statements concerning the knowledge of the plaintiff, and...
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