Brewer v. State
Decision Date | 22 May 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 54578,54578 |
Parties | Patrick Anthony BREWER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Margaret Good, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Clay County, in which the court adjudicated the appellant guilty of murder in the first degree and followed the jury recommendation in sentencing him to death. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const.
On February 15, 1978, at approximately 7:30 A.M., the body of Mrs. Tsuyako Thomas was discovered on the floor behind the counter in her restaurant. She had been stabbed to death. A knife later identified as belonging to the appellant was found underneath the body. The appellant's cap was also found at the scene. Shoe track impressions taken from an area to the rear of the restaurant showed similarity to the appellant's boots. Traces of blood found on the appellant's boots were of the same blood type as the victim.
On February 18, 1978, police officers arrested the appellant. They advised him of his rights in the standard fashion. The appellant told them that he was present at and witnessed the stabbing and that he knew the attacker but only by first name. He said that he struggled with the assailant briefly, then fled the scene in fear.
After further interrogation, the appellant made statements of an incriminating nature. The interrogation and the statements were tape-recorded. Later that day he was taken before a county court judge for first appearance. The judge advised the appellant of his rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning. Subsequent to the appearance before the judge, the appellant signed a written confession.
Before trial, the appellant moved to suppress both his initial oral incriminating statements and his written confession. At a hearing on the motions, the court heard the tape of appellant's interrogation.
The officers raised the spectre of the electric chair, suggested that they had the power to effect leniency, and suggested to the appellant that he would not be given a fair trial. It was under the influence of these threats and promises that the appellant made an oral confession. The appellant's motion to suppress his oral statements made before his first appearance was granted.
Following the initial interrogation which lasted about two hours, the appellant had his first appearance before a county court judge. He was in the presence of the judge for approximately fifteen minutes. He was advised of his rights. The judge became aware that the appellant had made a statement but he was not informed of the nature of the statement. The judge was not informed of the threats and promises that produced the statement. He did not inform the appellant that the initial statements could not be used against him.
After first appearance, the appellant went back into the custody of the same officers who performed the initial, tape-recorded interrogation. They told him they wanted a written statement of what he had confessed to them earlier. The appellant wrote out a confession and signed it. The written confession was admitted into evidence over the appellant's objection.
The appellant contends, among other matters, that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion to suppress his written confession. He argues that the statement should have been excluded because it was the product of the same clearly established coercive influences that rendered his oral statements inadmissible.
In order for a confession or an incriminating statement of a defendant to be admissible in evidence, it must be shown that the confession or statement was voluntarily made. Coffee v. State, 25 Fla. 501, 6 So. 493 (1889). The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States...
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