Ramirez v. State

• Decision Date: 08 July 1999
• Docket Number: No. 89,377,89,377
• Parties: Nathan Joe RAMIREZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

739 So.2d 568

Nathan Joe RAMIREZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 89,377

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 8, 1999.

Rehearing Denied September 13, 1999.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Robert F. Moeller, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Candance M. Sabella, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon Nathan Ramirez. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the conviction and sentence and remand for a new trial.

Nathan Ramirez and Jonathan Grimshaw were both found guilty, after separate trials, of the first-degree murder of Mildred Boroski. Grimshaw was sentenced to life in prison,¹ and Ramirez, age seventeen, was sentenced to death.

On appeal, Ramirez raises four issues: (1) that the State failed to sustain its burden of showing that his confession was voluntary and taken in compliance with Miranda²; (2) that his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him was violated when a sheriffs detective testified regarding details of Grimshaw's confession implicating Ramirez; (3) that the cold, calculated and premeditated aggravator (CCP) was not supported by the evidence and was inconsistent with a finding of the avoid arrest aggravator; and (4) that the imposition of the death penalty was disproportionate. We turn now to our consideration of these issues.

SUPPRESSION OF THE CONFESSION

Both prior to and during trial, Ramirez moved to suppress his confession. The trial court denied both motions and the confession was introduced as substantive evidence against him. The pertinent facts surrounding the confession follow.

The victim's body was found in an open field not far from her home. Her death was caused by two gunshot wounds to the head. The subsequent investigation revealed that someone had broken into her home and stolen some items of jewelry, her gun, and about $35. There was evidence that the victim had been raped before her death.

Grimshaw, who was the victim's neighbor, soon became a suspect. After several interviews and a final interrogation lasting several hours, Grimshaw confessed his involvement in the crime. Although Grimshaw gave several inconsistent versions of events, he eventually admitted his involvement in the crime, but pointed to Ramirez as the ringleader. In order to convince the police of the truthfulness of his statements regarding Ramirez's involvement, Grimshaw phoned Ramirez from the station while the sheriffs detectives listened in and recorded the call. During the call, Ramirez and Grimshaw discussed the items of physical evidence related to the crime that were in Ramirez's possession and made plans to destroy the victim's automobile to eliminate evidence of the crime.

Ramirez was at home around three o'clock that afternoon when, shortly after the phone call, a sheriffs deputy arrived wearing a badge and carrying a firearm. The deputy asked Ramirez to produce the physical evidence in his possession linked to the murder, including the suspected murder weapon and some of the victim's jewelry. According to the deputy, Ramirez was a "little hesitant at first, [and] denied having the articles." After the deputy informed Ramirez that he knew about the phone conversation with Grimshaw, Ramirez turned over the items that were in the house and accompanied the deputy to retrieve other items. The deputy then asked Ramirez if he would be "willing to come with [him] to the sheriffs office" to speak with a detective. Once transported to the station, Ramirez was placed in a small room and questioned by two other detectives.

The entire interrogation at the station was videotaped and is part of the record on appeal. The videotape reveals that the lead detective began the interrogation by questioning Ramirez about how the items came into his possession. When Ramirez initially claimed that Grimshaw gave him the items, one of the detectives informed Ramirez that:

[R]esources indicate that you may have some involvement in the case.... What I want you to do is I want you to be honest with me. The indication we have is that both you and John [Grimshaw] are involved.... I want you to tell me what happened that night. I know you were there. I wouldn't be here if I didn't know that. You know what I'm saying?

After these statements by the detective, Ramirez admitted breaking into the victim's house the night of the murder.

It was only after this admission that the second detective suggested that Ramirez be informed of his Miranda rights. The detective said:

Why don't you let Nate [Ramirez] know about his rights. I mean, he's already told us about going in the house and whatever. I don't think that's going to change Nate's desire to cooperate with us.

Ramirez then asked if he was "like being placed under arrest?" to which the other detective responded, "No, no, I'm just reading your rights at this time." After the Miranda rights were administered, Ramirez acknowledged what the detective had read by nodding and stating, "I guess that is what I'm here for."

Ramirez eventually admitted his involvement not only in the burglary, but also in the murder. He stated that he was the one who shot the victim, denied any involvement in the rape, and claimed that he was acting at Grimshaw's direction. Only after Ramirez fully confessed to the murder did the detectives belatedly obtain a written waiver of his Miranda rights. When Ramirez was asked to sign the waiver of rights form after he had fully confessed, the lead detective asked him to acknowledge that he had not been promised anything or been threatened before giving his statement. Ramirez's response was that the detective had only promised to be his friend.

Both the United States and Florida Constitutions provide that persons shall not be "compelled" to be witnesses against themselves in any criminal matter. U.S. Const. amend. V; Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. This constitutional guarantee "is fully applicable during a period of custodial interrogation." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-61, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Thus, to be admissible in a criminal trial, the State must prove that the confession was not compelled, but was voluntarily made. See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442-44,

86 S.Ct. 1602; Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 964-65 (Fla.1992).

In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court enunciated a bright-line rule to guard against compulsion and the coercive nature and atmosphere of custodial interrogation, and "assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process." 384 U.S. at 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Miranda requires that police inform suspects that they have the right to remain silent, and that anything they do say can be used against them in court. 384 U.S. at 468-69, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Suspects must also be informed that they have a right to an attorney during questioning, and that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for them without cost. See id. at 467-76, 86 S.Ct. 1602; Traylor, 596 So.2d at 966.

"The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The Miranda court concluded that

without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.

Id. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Therefore, "unless and until [the Miranda] warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against [the defendant]." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The protections enunciated in Miranda have been part of this State's jurisprudence for over a century pursuant to the Florida Constitution. See Traylor, 596 So.2d at 964-66

.³

Ramirez argues that the requirements of Miranda were violated because the warnings were not administered before the interrogation began, rendering his confession to the crime inadmissible. "Interrogation takes place ... when a person is subjected to express questions, or other words or actions, by a state agent, that a reasonable person would conclude are designed to lead to an incriminating response." Traylor, 596 So.2d at 966 n. 17. There is no question in this case that Ramirez was subjected to interrogation and was not initially informed of his Miranda rights. However, the State argues that Miranda warnings were not required because Ramirez was not in custody at the time that he was interrogated at the police station. We disagree.

Custody for purposes of Miranda encompasses not only formal arrest, but any restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest. See Arbelaez v. State, 626 So.2d 169, 175 (Fla.1993)

. A person is in custody if a reasonable person placed in the same position would believe that his or her freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with actual arrest. See Traylor, 596 So.2d at 966 n. 16; Roman v. State, 475 So.2d 1228, 1231 (Fla.1985). "The proper inquiry is not the unarticulated plan of the police, but rather how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have perceived the situation." Davis v. State, 698 So.2d 1182, 1188 (Fla.1997),

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1076, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (1998); see Roman, 475 So.2d at 1231.

The question of whether a suspect is in custody is a mixed question of law and fact. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 106-07, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (...