Bridgeman v. Certa

Decision Date15 June 2021
Docket NumberNo. 1 CA-CV 19-0083,1 CA-CV 19-0083
Citation46 Arizona Cases Digest 20,493 P.3d 898
CourtArizona Court of Appeals
Parties Martyn William BRIDGEMAN, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Honorable Cynthia A. CERTA, et al., Respondents/Appellees.

Mitchell Stein Carey Chapman PC, Phoenix, By Flynn P. Carey, Emma H. Mark, Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix, By Robert E. Prather, Aaron Harder, Counsel for Respondents/Appellees

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

CATTANI, Judge:

¶1 Martyn William Bridgeman appeals the superior court's judgment accepting jurisdiction but denying relief in his special action challenge to a municipal court's denial of his request for a jury trial on a criminal misdemeanor charge.

¶2 Preliminarily, we take this opportunity to clarify our jurisdiction over a direct appeal from such a judgment. The Legislature granted this court appellate jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a "final judgment" entered in a "special proceeding" that is "commenced in a superior court." A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). The special action Bridgeman filed—an original proceeding brought in superior court to challenge a limited jurisdiction court's interlocutory ruling in an ongoing case—is just such a special proceeding commenced in superior court. And because the superior court special action is a separate proceeding distinct from the underlying matter in the municipal court, the superior court's ruling resolving the special action constitutes a final judgment. Accordingly, by the terms of the statute, this court has appellate jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1), not just discretionary special action jurisdiction, to review the superior court's final judgment.

¶3 On the merits, we hold that Bridgeman is entitled to a jury trial. The Arizona Constitution preserves the right to trial by jury for modern offenses derived from jury-eligible pre-statehood common-law offenses. And here, the elements of the misdemeanor charge against Bridgeman for causing death by a moving violation are comparable to the elements of the common-law, jury-eligible felony offense of involuntary manslaughter. Accordingly, we reverse the superior court's contrary ruling.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4 While driving through an intersection, Bridgeman hit a pedestrian in the roadway. The pedestrian later died from her injuries, and the State charged Bridgeman with causing death by a moving violation. See A.R.S. §§ 28-672(A)(8), -794.1 The Phoenix Municipal Court denied Bridgeman's request for a jury trial, and Bridgeman filed a petition for special action in Maricopa County Superior Court challenging that ruling. The superior court accepted jurisdiction but denied relief. Bridgeman timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction.

¶5 Although neither party initially raised this issue, we have an independent duty to determine our jurisdiction over a case before us. See Sorensen v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz. , 191 Ariz. 464, 465, 957 P.2d 1007, 1008 (App. 1997). Our case law has not been clear about the jurisdictional basis for our review of a superior court's decision in a special action challenging a limited jurisdiction court's ruling in an ongoing underlying proceeding—whether we have appellate jurisdiction, or alternatively, whether such a decision may be reviewed only by special action. Compare, e.g. , State v. Chopra , 241 Ariz. 353, 355, ¶¶ 7–8, 387 P.3d 1282, 1284 (App. 2016) (assuming that appellate jurisdiction is appropriate and concluding that A.R.S. § 12-2101 rather than A.R.S. § 13-4032 applies when the State appeals from a superior court special action directed to a criminal case in justice court), State v. Cooperman , 230 Ariz. 245, 248, ¶ 5, 282 P.3d 446, 449 (App. 2012), Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg , 212 Ariz. 182, 184, ¶¶ 4–5, 129 P.3d 471, 473 (App. 2006), and Urs v. Maricopa Cnty. Att'y’s Off. , 201 Ariz. 71, 72, 31 P.3d 845, 846 (App. 2001) (exercising appellate jurisdiction in these circumstances), with, e.g. , State v. Bayardi , 230 Ariz. 195, 197–98, ¶¶ 6–7, 281 P.3d 1063, 1065–66 (App. 2012), State v. Kalauli , 243 Ariz. 521, 523, ¶ 4, 414 P.3d 690, 692 (App. 2018), and Phx. City Prosecutor's Off. v. Nyquist , 243 Ariz. 227, 233 n.2, 404 P.3d 255, 261 n.2 (App. 2017) (accepting special action jurisdiction after characterizing appellate jurisdiction as "unclear").

¶6 Our appellate jurisdiction is defined by statute, and it extends to "all actions and proceedings originating in or permitted by law to be appealed from the superior court." A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1) ; see also Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9 (granting the court of appeals jurisdiction "as provided by law"). And in A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1), the Legislature granted this court appellate jurisdiction over a direct appeal "[f]rom a final judgment entered in ... [a] special proceeding commenced in a superior court." As described below, this type of superior court special action is a "special proceeding" (separate and distinct from the underlying case) "commenced in a superior court" that results in a "final judgment." We thus have statutory appellate jurisdiction to review the superior court's ruling by direct appeal under § 12-2101(A)(1).

¶7 The parties here do not dispute that the superior court special action is a "special proceeding" that was "commenced in a superior court," and we agree. To be sure, under these circumstances, the superior court special action and the underlying case pending in a limited jurisdiction court are in some ways intertwined—the special action seeks an order requiring the limited jurisdiction court to change an interlocutory ruling. Nevertheless, the special action filed in superior court is best seen as a separate, original proceeding, collateral to and distinct from the underlying criminal case pending in limited jurisdiction court.

¶8 This understanding is consistent with how we have described the nature of a special action in the analogous situation of a special action brought in the court of appeals to challenge an interlocutory ruling in a pending superior court case. See Coffee v. Ryan-Touhill , 247 Ariz. 68, 71–72, ¶ 14, 445 P.3d 666, 669–700 (App. 2019). There, we described a special action as "a separate, original proceeding where an appellate court examines the action or inaction of public officials and may issue orders (similar to a common law writ) affecting future proceedings in a case." Id. (citing, as relevant here, Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a), which combines writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition into the "special action" proceeding); see also Bayardi , 230 Ariz. at 201, ¶ 25, 281 P.3d at 1069 (Thompson, J., concurring) (citing cases that "treat[ ] the special action as separate from the [underlying] matter from which it arose"). That principle applies equally here. When the superior court acts as an appellate court, it reviews the limited jurisdiction court's ruling and renders a decision affecting future proceedings in the underlying case. See A.R.S. § 12-124(B) (granting the superior court authority to "issue writs of certiorari to inferior courts" affecting the course of proceedings pending in those courts).

¶9 Moreover, this understanding of a superior court special action as separate from the underlying case is borne out by the procedural rules governing the superior court proceedings. For example, a superior court special action is initiated by filing a complaint—a new pleading, distinct from the operative pleadings in the underlying case, which must be served, along with a summons, pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 4.1 or 4.2. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 4(c), (d). Similarly, the special action rules direct that the superior court's ruling "shall be in the form of a judgment for any civil action," even if the underlying case (as here) is criminal in nature. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 6.

And filing the special action in superior court does not automatically stay the underlying proceeding. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 5. This means the limited jurisdiction court retains jurisdiction and, in general, may proceed with the underlying case while the special action proceeds in parallel, further evidence that the special action functions as an independent proceeding. Cf. Coffee , 247 Ariz. at 72, ¶ 15, 445 P.3d at 700.

¶10 Because a superior court special action of this nature is a separate proceeding commenced in superior court, the superior court's decision resolving the issues raised in the special action is a "final judgment," even as the underlying case remains pending in a limited jurisdiction court. See A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) ; Bayardi , 230 Ariz. at 201, ¶ 25, 281 P.3d at 1069 (Thompson, J., concurring). We recognize the apparent anomaly of a final superior court judgment on what is, in practice, a single interlocutory piece of an ongoing case. But because the special action is a distinct proceeding commenced in superior court, the superior court's ruling resolving all issues the special action presents concludes that independent proceeding. Whatever the resolution—declining jurisdiction, accepting jurisdiction and denying relief, or accepting jurisdiction and granting relief—the superior court's ruling fully disposes of the special action.

¶11 Accordingly, a superior court special action of this nature is an independent "special proceeding commenced in a superior court" resulting in a "final judgment," so it falls squarely within the scope of this court's appellate jurisdiction as defined by the Legislature in A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). See also Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 8(a) (directing that a superior court special action ruling be "reviewed by appeal where there is an equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by that means"). We note that, appellate jurisdiction notwithstanding, the rules authorize speedier avenues of review—accelerated appeal or even special action—if a quicker resolution is...

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