Phx. City Prosecutor's Office v. Nyquist

• Decision Date: 14 September 2017
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 16-0170.,1 CA-CV 16-0170.
• Citation: 404 P.3d 255
• Parties: PHOENIX CITY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Honorable Monyette NYQUIST, Respondent Judge/Appellee, Jamie Hernandez–Alejandro, Real Party in Interest/Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

404 P.3d 255

PHOENIX CITY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.Honorable Monyette NYQUIST, Respondent Judge/Appellee,Jamie Hernandez–Alejandro, Real Party in Interest/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0170.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.

FILED September 14, 2017

The Office of Michael Dew, Phoenix, By Michael Dew, Counsel for Real Party in Interest/Appellant

Phoenix City Prosecutor's Office, Phoenix, By Amy B. Offenberg, Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Patricia A. Orozco¹ joined.

OPINION

HOWE, Judge:

¶ 1 This case presents two questions concerning A.R.S. § 28–672, which creates the class 3 misdemeanor offense of causing a person serious physical injury by committing certain traffic violations. First, does the offense require proof of a culpable mental state? Second, is a person charged with committing that offense entitled to a jury trial? We hold that the offense is a strict liability offense that does not require proof of any culpable mental state. We also hold that a person is not entitled to a jury trial on a charged violation of the statute because the offense has no common law antecedent and is not a sufficiently serious offense to warrant a jury trial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 One night in November 2013, Jamie Hernandez–Alejandro stopped at a stop sign and then proceeded to make a left-hand turn through the intersection. As he crossed the intersection, his car hit a scooter, seriously injuring its driver and passenger. The City of Phoenix charged Hernandez–Alejandro with violating A.R.S. § 28–672(A)(5). Section 28–672(A)(5) states that a person commits the offense of causing serious physical injury or death by a moving violation if the person fails to yield to vehicles that are within an intersection and that act causes serious physical injury or death to another person.

¶ 3 Before the bench trial, Hernandez–Alejandro moved to require the State to prove that he acted "knowingly" under the statute and moved for a jury trial because the offense had a common law antecedent entitling him to one. The municipal court granted the motions and the State sought special action review from the superior court. The superior court reversed the municipal court's orders and held that A.R.S. § 28–672 is a strict liability offense and that an alleged violation of the statute did not warrant a jury trial. Hernandez–Alejandro timely appealed.²

DISCUSSION

1. A.R.S. § 28–672 is a Strict Liability Offense

¶ 4 Hernandez–Alejandro argues that the superior court erred by finding that A.R.S. § 28–672 is a strict liability offense. We review the superior court's interpretation of statutes de novo. See State v. Slayton , 214 Ariz. 511, 513 ¶ 6, 154 P.3d 1057, 1059 (App. 2007). The superior court did not err because violating A.R.S. § 28–672(A)(5) does not necessarily involve a culpable mental state, as manifested by its clear legislative intent.

¶ 5 A person commits the offense of causing serious physical injury or death by a moving violation if the person violates A.R.S. § 28–773, among other statutes, and the violation results in an accident causing serious physical injury or death to another person. A.R.S. § 28–672(A)(5). Section 28–773 states that "[t]he driver of a vehicle shall stop in obedience to a stop sign ... and then proceed with caution yielding to vehicles that are not required to stop and that are within the intersection or are approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard."

¶ 6 Arizona Revised Statutes Section 13–202(B) —which applies to Title 28 offenses, see A.R.S. § 13–102(D) —states that "[i]f a statute defining an offense does not expressly prescribe a culpable mental state that is sufficient for commission of the offense, no culpable mental state is required ... and the offense is one of strict liability unless the proscribed conduct necessarily involves a culpable mental state." The statute here, A.R.S. § 28–672, does not expressly prescribe a culpable mental state. The statute describes acts or results that violate the statute. Section 28–672 lacks any reference to the person's state of mind, such as "intentionally," "knowingly," "recklessly," or "negligently." Moreover, the statute at issue does not necessarily involve a culpable mental state. Merely proceeding without caution and failing to yield to other vehicles in the intersection, which causes an accident that results in an injury, is enough to violate A.R.S. § 28–672(A)(5). Thus, the statute does not necessarily involve a culpable mental state.

¶ 7 Although A.R.S. § 13–202(B) recognizes that a statute may define an offense that does not require proof of a culpable mental state, a strict liability statute is the exception rather than the rule and will be found only when the legislature clearly intends not to require any culpable mental state. State v. Jennings , 150 Ariz. 90, 94, 722 P.2d 258, 262 (1986). To "resolve whether the offenses charged require a particular mental state, we must ascertain the legislature's intent in enacting them," which includes looking to the statute's plain language, context and history, and considering whether the offense is one that historically imposed strict liability. Slayton , 214 Ariz. at 514–15 ¶ 13, 154 P.3d at 1060–61.

¶ 8 As noted above, A.R.S. § 28–672's plain language describes certain acts or results that violate the statute if completed. The statute requires no culpable mental state. See supra ¶ 6. The legislative history also shows that the legislature intended for the statute not to include any culpable mental state requirement. In 2006, the legislature changed A.R.S. § 28–672 from a civil traffic violation to a criminal violation. See 2006 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 297 (H.B. 2208). Concurrently, the legislature added A.R.S. §§ 28–675 and –676, making it a crime to cause death and serious physical injury, respectively, by use of a vehicle when the person is not allowed to operate a motor vehicle. Under both statutes, a person is not allowed to operate a vehicle if the person knows or should have known that their driving privilege is revoked or suspended, see State v. Yazzie , 232 Ariz. 615, 617 ¶ 9, 307 P.3d 1042, 1044 (App. 2013), or the person knowingly obtained a driver's license by some fraudulent act, A.R.S. §§ 28–675(B) and –676(B). Unlike A.R.S. § 28–672 applicable here, both of these statutes have culpable mental states; "knowingly" in the statutes is an express culpable mental state and the driving with a revoked or suspended license is an implied culpable mental state. See Yazzie , 232 Ariz. at 617 ¶ 9, 307 P.3d at 1044 ("[T]he State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knew or should have known of his license suspension, revocation, [or] cancellation[.]"); see also State v. Aro , 188 Ariz. 521, 524, 937 P.2d 711, 714 (App. 1997) ("We presume that the legislature is aware of existing case law when it passes a statute and that, when it retains language upon which appellate decisions are based, it approves the judicial interpretation."). Thus, the statute's legislative history further confirms the legislature's intent to make the statute a strict liability offense.

¶ 9 The statute's context and place in the overall statutory scheme also shows an intent that the statute not require any culpable mental state. "[S]tatutes that are in pari materia —those that relate to the same subject matter or have the same general purpose as one another—should be construed together as though they constitute one law." State v. Gamez , 227 Ariz. 445, 449 ¶ 27, 258 P.3d 263, 267 (App. 2011). Sections 28–672, –675, and –676 relate to the same subject matter and have the same general purpose. All three statutes deal in some form or another with an offense stemming from a civil traffic violation that causes serious physical injury or death. Offenses under A.R.S. §§ 28–675 and –676 are class 4 and 5 felonies, respectively, and are more serious than A.R.S. § 28–672, a class 3 misdemeanor. Requiring a culpable mental state for felonious offenses but not for a misdemeanor offense is consistent with the historical view that "the penalty imposed under a statute is a significant consideration" in analyzing whether the statute should be construed as dispensing with any culpable mental state. See Staples v. United States , 511 U.S. 600, 616, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994).

¶ 10 The penalties for violating A.R.S. § 28–672, a class 3 misdemeanor, are comparatively modest. As a class 3 misdemeanor, the maximum imprisonment term is 30 days. See A.R.S. § 13–707(A)(3). Additionally, a defendant who violates A.R.S. § 28–672 cannot be fined more than $1,000 or be required to pay more than $10,000 in restitution. A.R.S. § 28–672(G), (I). The prosecution must also be dismissed if the victim appears before the court and acknowledges receipt of satisfaction for the injury on payment of the costs incurred. A.R.S. § 28–672(F). Criminal offenses with harsher penalties than the one here have been deemed strict liability offenses. See Slayton , 214 Ariz. at 517 ¶ 24, 154 P.3d at 1063 (holding that a class 2 misdemeanor punishable by up to four months in jail and a $750 fine is a strict liability offense); see also Spitz v. Mun. Court of City of Phx. , 127 Ariz. 405, 407–08, 621 P.2d 911, 913–14 (1980) (holding that a crime punishable by six months in jail and a $300 fine is a strict liability offense).

¶ 11 Section 28–672's plain language, context, and statutory history shows that although the legislature can and has delineated when it will require a culpable mental state—i.e., A.R.S. §§ 28–675 and –676—it has clearly expressed its intention that A.R.S. § 28–672 be a strict liability offense. Thus, the superior court did not err by holding that the State need not prove that Hernandez–Alejandro had a culpable mental state when he committed the misdemeanor.

¶ 12 Hernandez–Alejandro argues that...