Bridges v. Champagne
| Decision Date | 20 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 18-CV-1247 |
| Parties | SHAWN BRIDGES, Petitioner, v. QUALA CHAMPAGNE, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
On February 28, 2013, Shawn Bridges fired as many as 15 rounds from an assault rifle toward a crowd of roughly ten people. (ECF No. 5-1 at 78, 1.) Two undercover officers investigating a prior homicide witnessed the incident and, after a foot pursuit and with the assistance of a police dog, Bridges was arrested. (ECF No. 5-1 at 120-24.) He was charged with first-degree recklessly endangering safety and possession of a firearm by a felon and pled guilty. The court sentenced him on April 10, 2014, to a total term of imprisonment of 11 years (four years of initial confinement on count one, three years of initial confinement on count two, and two years of extended supervision on each count, all to be served consecutively). (ECF No. 17-1.)
Bridges appealed and his appointed attorney filed a no-merit report. (ECF No. 5-1 at 17, 39-54.) Bridges responded to the no merit report. (ECF No. 17-2.) The Wisconsin Court of Appeals agreed that an appeal lacked any merit, allowed counsel to withdraw, and affirmed Bridges's conviction on October 18, 2017. (ECF No. 5-1 at 16-28.)
The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Bridges's petition for review (ECF No. 17-3 at 7-39) on February 13, 2018 (ECF No. 5-1 at 199). Bridges filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 13, 2018. (ECF No. 1.) All parties consented to have this court decide the matter. (ECF Nos. 27, 28.)
A federal court may consider habeas relief for a petitioner in state custody "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §2254(a). Following the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a federal court is permitted to grant relief to a state petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only if the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). This is a "stiffburden." Jean-Paul v. Douma, 809 F.3d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 2015). "The state court's ruling must be 'so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Id. (quoting Carter v. Douma, 796 F.3d 726, 733 (7th Cir. 2015)); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
"Clearly established federal law" refers to a holding "of the United States Supreme Court that existed at the time of the relevant state court adjudication on the merits." Caffey v. Butler, 802 F.3d 884, 894 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). "A decision is 'contrary to' federal law if the state court applied an incorrect rule—i.e., one that 'contradicts the governing law' established by the Supreme Court—or reached an outcome different from the Supreme Court's conclusion in a case with 'materially indistinguishable' facts." Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). A decision involves an unreasonable application of federal law if the state court identified the correct governing principle but applied that principle in a manner with which no reasonable jurist would agree. Id.; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). "A court's application of Supreme Court precedent is reasonable as long as it is 'minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case.'" Williams v. Thurmer, 561 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Schaff v. Snyder, 190 F.3d 513, 523 (7th Cir. 1999)). Thus, a federal court could have the "firm conviction" that a statecourt's decision was incorrect but, provided that error is not objectively unreasonable, nonetheless be required to deny the petitioner relief. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76.
3.1. Plea and Sentencing
Bridges offers a variety of overlapping arguments regarding his plea and sentencing whereby he argues that his plea was involuntary and his attorney ineffective. (ECF No. 1 at 6-7, Claims 1 - 3, 7.) He argues that his trial counsel promised him that he would receive a sentence in the range of three to five years and that the prosecutor would remain silent at the sentencing hearing. (ECF No. 5 at 9, 15-16, 18.) He also argues that his attorney never told him that he would lose the ability to raise certain claims on appeal (ECF No. 5 at 10, 17) or that he could be ordered to serve the sentences consecutively (ECF No. 5 at 22; see also ECF No. 1 at 3).
"It is beyond dispute that a guilty plea must be both knowing and voluntary." Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28 (1992). "The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). This requires the defendant to have "(1) full awareness of the plea's direct consequences; (2) real notice of the true nature of the charge against him; and (3) an understanding of the law in relation to the facts." Jurjens v. Dittman, No. 14-cv-462-jdp, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125841, at *8 (W.D. Wis. July 27, 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)(quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48 (1970); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)). "If the plea is not voluntary and knowing, then it violates due process, and is thus void." United States v. Gilliam, 255 F.3d 428, 433 (7th Cir. 2001).
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). If a defendant was induced to enter a plea by a promise of the prosecutor, the prosecutor must honor that promise. Id. at 262. Thus, "the State 'is not permitted to pull the rug out from under a defendant who has negotiated a plea agreement by taking steps to induce the judge to give a higher sentence.'" Campbell v. Smith, 770 F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Hauptman, 111 F.3d 48, 51 (7th Cir. 1997)). "The issue whether a prosecutor substantially and materially breached a plea agreement is a question of law." Id. at 547 (citing United States v. Kelly, 337 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the well-established two-prong approach set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Hicks v. Hepp, 871 F.3d 513, 525 (7th Cir. 2017). A petitioner must demonstrate both that his attorney's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. Id. at 525-26. The first prong "requires that the petitioner demonstrate that counsel's representationfell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 525. "What is objectively reasonable is determined by the prevailing professional norms." Id. But there is a wide range of permissible conduct, and "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The prejudice prong "requires the petitioner to demonstrate a 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,' the outcome would have been different." Id. at 526 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 127 (2009)).
When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is presented in a habeas petition, the petitioner faces "a high hurdle." Hicks, 871 F.3d at 525. "The Supreme Court has instructed that under these circumstances, [the federal court] must employ a 'doubly deferential' standard, one which 'gives both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.'" Id. (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013)).
"In the context of a guilty plea, a petitioner demonstrates prejudice by 'show[ing] that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" Perrone v. United States, 889 F.3d 898, 908 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Prejudice does not depend upon the petitioner being able to prove that "had he gone to trial, the result of that trial would have been different than the result of the plea bargain." Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Bridges's arguments are contradicted by the transcript of his thorough plea hearing. The parties agreed that the state was free to argue as to the length of any sentence (ECF No. 5-1 at 60) and the court explicitly confirmed this understanding with Bridges (ECF No. 5-1 at 63). In fact, when Bridges's attorney mistakenly objected at the sentencing hearing to the prosecutor recommending the maximum sentence, the court reviewed the transcript of the plea hearing and confirmed that the recommendation was consistent with the plea agreement, at which point Bridges's attorney withdrew his objection and Bridges confirmed his agreement. (ECF No. 15-1 at 141-43.)
At the plea hearing the court explained to Bridges that he could be ordered to serve the sentences concurrently and, thus, faced a cumulative maximum term of twelve-and-a-half years of initial confinement and ten years of extended supervision. (ECF No. 5-1 at 67.) Bridges said he understood. (ECF No. 5-1 at 67...
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