Bridgestone/Firestone North America Tire, LLC v. Naranjo, 2 CA-CV 2003-0009.

• Decision Date: 10 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2 CA-CV 2003-0009.,2 CA-CV 2003-0009.
• Parties: BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE NORTH AMERICA TIRE, L.L.C., a Delaware limited liability company, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Dionicio NARANJO and Martha Montaño, husband and wife; Zulema Naranjo, a minor child; and Lizette Naranjo, a minor child, Defendants/Appellants.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

79 P.3d 1206

206 Ariz. 447

BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE NORTH AMERICA TIRE, L.L.C., a Delaware limited liability company, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Dionicio NARANJO and Martha Montaño, husband and wife; Zulema Naranjo, a minor child; and Lizette Naranjo, a minor child, Defendants/Appellants.

No. -0009.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 2, Department B.

December 10, 2003.

Fennemore Craig, By Timothy Berg, Christopher L. Callahan, and Darcy R. Renfro, Phoenix, for Plaintiff/Appellee.

Law Offices of Richard D. Grand, By Richard D. Grand, Tucson, Copple, Boehm & Murphy, P.C., By Steven D. Copple and Scott E. Boehm, Phoenix, for Defendants/Appellants.

OPINION

PELANDER, Presiding Judge.

¶ 1 In this personal injury and wrongful death action, appellants Dionicio Naranjo, Martha Montaño, and Zulema and Lizette Naranjo (the Naranjos) appeal from the trial court's summary judgment in favor of appellee Bridgestone/Firestone North America Tire, L.L.C. The trial court ruled that the Naranjos' recovery of full, compensatory damages in their prior action against A.P.S. Rent-A-Car & Leasing, Inc. precluded their claims for compensatory and punitive damages against Bridgestone in this separate action arising from the same accident. Based on satisfaction of judgment and collateral estoppel principles as well as public policy grounds, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In reviewing a summary judgment, we generally view the facts and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Link v. Pima County, 193 Ariz. 336, ¶ 12, 972 P.2d 669, ¶ 12 (App.1998). The parties, however, agree that the pertinent facts are not in dispute. Dionicio rented a van from A.P.S. He, his wife Martha, and their children Zulema and Lizette were injured when a tire on the van suddenly failed, causing the van to roll over and crash. Another child, Araceli Naranjo, was killed in the accident. The Naranjos originally sued A.P.S., the company that had rented the van to them, alleging negligence and strict liability in tort. They did not name Bridgestone, the tire's manufacturer, as a defendant in that action and, in fact, opposed A.P.S.'s motion to join Bridgestone as a third-party defendant.

¶ 3 After a seven-day trial, a jury awarded $9,539,838 in compensatory damages to the Naranjos. In response to a special interrogatory, the jury found that seventy percent of the "verdict [was] based upon Plaintiffs' claims of negligence" and thirty percent on their "claims of product liability." The verdict was reduced to a formal judgment. A.P.S. paid the entire damage award, plus interest, and the Naranjos filed a satisfaction of judgment with the court.

¶ 4 While the Naranjos' action against A.P.S. was pending, Bridgestone filed this case against the Naranjos and A.P.S., seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to indemnify A.P.S. for any damages awarded to the Naranjos. In response, the Naranjos filed a counterclaim, alleging claims for negligence and strict product liability against Bridgestone based on the defective tire. The Naranjos requested compensatory and punitive damages. Bridgestone moved to dismiss the counterclaim, arguing the Naranjos had impermissibly split their cause of action. Before the trial court could address that motion, the jury in the original case returned the aforementioned verdict in favor of the Naranjos.

¶ 5 After A.P.S. paid the ensuing judgment, Bridgestone moved for summary judgment on the Naranjos' counterclaim, arguing that collateral estoppel and satisfaction of judgment precluded their claims against Bridgestone. The trial court ultimately ruled that A.P.S.'s satisfaction of the judgment in the first case had discharged Bridgestone from any liability to the Naranjos arising from the same accident. The court granted Bridgestone's motion and entered judgment in its favor on the Naranjos' counterclaim, pursuant to Rules 54(b) and 56(c), Ariz. R. Civ. P., 16 A.R.S., Pt. 2. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

¶ 6 The Naranjos argue the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment based on outdated case law that has effectively been abrogated by A.R.S. § 12-2506.¹ We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Liristis v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 204 Ariz. 140, ¶ 6, 61 P.3d 22, ¶ 6 (App.2002). A motion for summary judgment should be granted if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 802 P.2d 1000 (1990)

. We also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Steer v. Eggleston, 202 Ariz. 523, ¶ 16, 47 P.3d 1161, ¶ 16 (App.2002).

¶ 7 "Under the common law doctrine of joint and several liability, if two or more actors together caused an injury to the victim, each was liable for the full amount of the victim's injuries." Herstam v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 186 Ariz. 110, 114, 919 P.2d 1381, 1385 (App.1996). In 1987, the legislature abolished joint and several liability in Arizona. § 12-2506(A), (D). Pursuant to that statutory change, "[i]n an action for personal injury, property damage or wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for damages is several only and is not joint." § 12-2506(A). Therefore, in Arizona, "each tortfeasor [is] responsible for paying for his or her percentage of fault and no more." Dietz v. Gen. Elec. Co., 169 Ariz. 505, 510, 821 P.2d 166, 171 (1991); see also City of Tucson v. Fahringer, 164 Ariz. 599, 603 n. 9, 795 P.2d 819, 823 n. 9 (1990)

.

I. Satisfaction of judgment

¶ 8 In granting Bridgestone's motion for summary judgment, the trial court relied on the doctrine of satisfaction of judgment, citing State v. Superior Court, 140 Ariz. 365, 681 P.2d 1384 (1984). Under that doctrine, if one joint tortfeasor satisfies a judgment obtained by the plaintiff, all other tortfeasors are discharged from liability, and the plaintiff has no further cause of action. See id. at 366, 681 P.2d at 1385 ("[A] satisfaction of judgment against one tortfeasor extinguishes a cause of action against another tortfeasor for the same harm."); Rager v. Superior Coach Sales & Serv., 110 Ariz. 188, 191, 516 P.2d 324, 327 (1973) ("[A] plaintiff can have but one satisfaction of a joint wrong."); Edmond v. Fairfield Sunrise Village, Inc., 132 Ariz. 142, 142, 644 P.2d 296, 296 (App.1982) ("[T]he satisfaction of judgment against one tortfeasor preclude[s] a subsequent action against another joint tortfeasor arising out of the same accident."); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 388, at 1082 (2001) ("When a defendant fully pays a judgment for all of the plaintiff's damages, the plaintiff's claim is satisfied and he has no further claim for the same injury."). "It is obvious that this rule is equitable in its nature, and that its purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment." W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 48, at 330 (5th ed.1984) (footnote omitted).

¶ 9 Noting that the Naranjos had alleged the same injuries and damages in their separate actions against A.P.S. and Bridgestone, the trial court concluded that the Naranjos had suffered an indivisible injury allegedly caused by those two, joint tortfeasors. The court then determined that, regardless of joint or several liability, once a judgment awarding total damages for an indivisible injury has been satisfied, a plaintiff's cause of action against all other tortfeasors is extinguished. Thus, the trial court ruled, the Naranjos had no cause of action against Bridgestone because they already had recovered their full damages from A.P.S. and had filed a satisfaction of judgment in that case.

¶ 10 The Naranjos contend, as they did below, that the doctrine of satisfaction of judgment only applied in a joint liability context and is now obsolete under Arizona's current system. Therefore, they argue, the trial court erred in relying on that doctrine to bar their counterclaim against Bridgestone. Relying on Sanchez v. City of Tucson, 191 Ariz. 128,953 P.2d 168 (1998), the Naranjos further argue that, in the absence of joint liability, their recovery from A.P.S. does not affect their claims against Bridgestone. That is so, they insist, because "recover[ing] 100% of a verdict and judgment against a tortfeasor whose liability is `several only and is not joint' ... does not make [a] plaintiff whole if there are other remaining tortfeasors." The Naranjos also contend Rule 20(a), Ariz. R. Civ. P., 16 A.R.S., Pt. 1, Arizona's permissive joinder rule, "allows, but does not require, that all defendants be joined together in a single lawsuit."

¶ 11 In sum, the Naranjos essentially argue Arizona law permits them to sue multiple defendants in serial actions for their damages arising from the accident. Contending they "have not been made whole under Sanchez and A.R.S. § 12-2506," the Naranjos seek to "assert independent claims against Bridgestone Firestone for compensatory and punitive damages." They thus demand their "day in court" against Bridgestone.

¶ 12 We conclude that the Naranjos' position is unsound and reject it. In their action against A.P.S., the Naranjos presented evidence on all of their injuries and damages resulting from the accident. They sought special and general damages to compensate them for all claimed losses, including their past and future medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering. The jury determined those damages and returned a verdict in their favor in excess of $9 million.

¶ 13 The Naranjos fail to establish or explain how their damages caused by Bridgestone's alleged fault differ from the damages resulting from A.P.S.'s fault. As the trial court noted, in both their complaint against A.P.S. and their counterclaim against Bridgestone, the Naranjos alleged the same injuries and damages arising from a single accident. That the Naranjos collected "100% of [the] verdict and judgment" from A.P.S. alone does not negate the fact that they have...