Bridgewater v. Adamczyk, No. M2009-01582-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 4/1/2010)
| Decision Date | 01 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. M2009-01582-COA-R3-CV.,M2009-01582-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | MARY JANE BRIDGEWATER, v. ROBERT S. ADAMCZYK ET AL. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Smith County; No. 6776; C. K. Smith, Chancellor.
Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed and Remanded.
Jean Dyer Harrison, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Robert Adamczyk and Tracy Adamczyk.
Betty Lou Taylor, Hartsville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Mary Jane Bridgewater.
Frank G. Clement, Jr., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Patricia J. Cottrell, P.J., M.S., and Andy D. Bennett, J., joined.
This is an appeal from an action to quiet title to thirty acres of property in Smith County. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on her claim to quiet title. The defendants appeal contending, inter alia, that the evidence the plaintiff relied on in support of her motion for summary judgment was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56; therefore, the motion should have been denied. We agree. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.
Mary Jane Bridgewater filed this action against her neighbors, Robert and Tracy Adamczyk, to "quiet title" to thirty acres of property claimed by each party. In her Complaint, Ms. Bridgewater asserts that she is seeking to "reclaim" the thirty acres of property, which has been "wrongfully claimed" by the Adamczyks. The Adamczyks filed an answer and a counter-complaint asserting that they are the true owners of the thirty acres in dispute. The Adamczyks also assert that this is an ejectment action, not an action to quiet title; thus, Ms. Bridgewater must demonstrate that she has both legal title and a right to immediate possession of the disputed property.
This dispute arose after the Adamczyks purchased a tract of land in Smith County from Mike Gibbs and Scotty Green in December of 1998 that adjoins property owned by Ms. Bridgewater. The December 7, 1998 warranty deed stated that Gibbs and Green conveyed approximately 115 acres to the Adamczyks. Gibbs and Green had acquired the property in March of 1998 from Jane Whitley. The March 28, 1998 warranty deed from Ms. Whitley stated that she was conveying approximately "86 acres" to Gibbs and Green. A Deed of Correction was filed by Ms. Whitley on May 22, 1998, to state that the acreage conveyed to Gibbs and Green was 115 acres, more or less.
Ms. Bridgewater claims to be the owner of two separate, adjoining tracts of land comprising approximately 155 acres. It is undisputed that Ms. Bridgewater owns a tract comprised of 130 acres, more or less, that derives from an 1876 deed to Ed Miller.1 What is disputed by the Adamczyks is Ms. Bridgewater's claim to a second and smaller tract of approximately 30 acres that derives from an 1884 deed to Ed Miller.
Ms. Bridgewater's claim to the property in dispute is based on her own Affidavit of Heirship, recorded in 2007, in which she states that she inherited the tract through several generations of intestate succession, a succession that derives from an 1884 deed. The last deed of record in Ms. Bridgewater's chain of title is a handwritten 1884 deed wherein T. J. Bradley and wife, Fannie Bradley, conveyed "35 acres, more or less," to Ed Miller in consideration of the cash payment of $537.50. There are no intervening deeds and no affidavits of heirship other than Ms. Bridgewater's 2007 Affidavit of Heirship.
In 2002, after the Adamczyks claimed ownership of the disputed 30 acres, Ms. Bridgewater filed this action. In the Complaint and in her Affidavit of Heirship, Ms. Bridgewater asserts that she inherited the property in dispute from her mother, Kate Lee Bowman Bridgewater, as her sole heir, who inherited the property from her mother, Mattie Miller Bowman, as her sole heir, who inherited the property as the sole heir of her father, Ed Miller, who acquired the property by deed in 1884.
On July 29, 2002, the Adamczyks filed a counter-complaint asserting that they were the true owners of the property.2 In March of 2004, the Adamczyks filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Seven months later, on October 26, 2004, the trial court issued an order denying the Adamczyks' motion for partial summary judgment. On November 19, 2004, the parties entered an agreed order granting the Adamczyks permission to file a third-party complaint against Mike Gibbs and Scotty Green. The Adamczyks filed the third-party complaint against Gibbs and Green for breach of the covenants, if Ms. Bridgewater was found to be the true owner of the property. Green and Gibbs filed an answer on February 8, 2005 denying any breach.
Thereafter, the Adamczyks filed a motion for summary judgment, based on the contention that this is an ejectment action and on the ground that Ms. Bridgewater had failed to pay property taxes on the property in question for twenty years pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-110. Ms. Bridgewater then filed a motion for summary judgment, based on the assertion that this is an action to quiet title, which was supported by the deposition of Carroll Carman, a land surveyor, and her Affidavit of Heirship. Each party timely filed a response in opposition to the other's motion.
On April 12, 2007, the trial court denied the Adamczyks' motion and granted Ms. Bridgewater's motion for summary judgment finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that Ms. Bridgewater was "the owner of the property in dispute in fee simple absolute because of the 1884 deed from Bradley to Miller who was [Ms. Bridgewater's] predecessor in title." In its order, the trial court stated it based its decision upon the 1884 deed, the Affidavit of Heirship by Ms. Bridgewater, the Affidavit of Gibbs and Green, the deposition of Carroll Carman, and the tax records of Smith County. The trial court also found that the Adamczyks had not carried their burden of proof under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-108 that they or their predecessors in title had paid the property taxes on the property continuously for twenty years, nor had they shown pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-110 that Ms. Bridgewater had not paid taxes on the property for twenty years and, thus, she was barred from bringing the suit, and the court found the Adamczyks had no claim for adverse possession. The court further found that the Adamczyks had actual and constructive notice that the property they purchased did not include the disputed property based on actual notice from Gibbs and Green showing them the property line and constructive notice from the 1884 deed from the Register's Office of Smith County, Tennessee and the deed from Gibbs and Green, which gave the Bridgewater property as their western boundary.3
Following a confusing series of proceedings, Ms. Bridgewater filed a motion for entry of final judgment pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 on October 2, 2008. The Adamczyks filed a timely response as well as a motion to alter or amend the order granting summary judgment and/or a motion for new trial. On February 26, 2009, the trial court denied Ms. Bridgewater's motion for entry of a final judgment and denied the Adamczyks' motion to alter or amend. In the meantime, on January 20, 2009, Gibbs and Green filed a notice for motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied upon a finding that there were genuine issues of material fact.
On April 24, 2009, Ms. Bridgewater filed a motion for the court to grant her possession of the real estate at issue. The trial court granted Ms. Bridgewater's motion for possession of the property in an order entered May 4, 2009. In an agreed amended order entered on June 23, 2009, the trial court ruled that the April 12, 2007 order granting Ms. Bridgewater summary judgment shall be treated as a final judgment although the claim against the third-party defendants was still pending.4 This appeal followed.
The appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Adamczyk, contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Ms. Bridgewater on her claim to quiet title to the disputed property.
In their appellate brief, they present seven issues for our review including the assertions that there are multiple issues of material fact in dispute and that the trial court improperly placed the burden of proof on the Adamczyks.5 We have determined the evidence the plaintiff relied on in support of her motion for summary judgment was not sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion and, therefore, the motion for summary judgment should have been denied without consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the Adamczyks in opposition to the motion.
A trial court's grant of summary judgment enjoys no presumption of correctness on appeal. Draper v. Westerfield, 181 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Tenn. 2005); BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Co. v. Johnson, 100 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tenn. 2003). We review a summary judgment decision as a question of law, Finister v. Humboldt Gen. Hosp., Inc., 970 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tenn. 1998); Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1997), and make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been satisfied, Blair v. West Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tenn. 2004); Staples v. CBL & Assoc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2000).
In her motion for summary judgment, Ms. Bridgewater contends that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the undisputed facts show that the property in dispute was her land. As the moving party, Ms. Bridgewater is entitled to summary judgment "only if the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, admissions and affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 271 S.W.3d 76, 83 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; accord Penley v. Honda Motor Co., ...
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