O'Brien v. Assessor of Town of Mamaroneck
| Decision Date | 29 November 1967 |
| Citation | 285 N.Y.S.2d 843,232 N.E.2d 844,20 N.Y.2d 587 |
| Parties | , 232 N.E.2d 844 In the Matter of Raymond D. O'BRIEN et al., Respondents, v. ASSESSOR OF the TOWN OF MAMARONECK et al., Appellants. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
James J. Johnston, New York City, for Town of Mamaroneck and George P. Forbes, Jr., White Plains, for Village of Larchmont, appellants.
James M. O'Brien and J. Russell Clune, Mineola, for respondents.
In this consolidated proceeding by petitioners pursuant to article 7 of the Real Property Tax Law, Consol.Laws, c. 50--A, to review real estate tax assessments in the Town of Mamaroneck and the Village of Larchmont, two separate questions arise; (a) whether the stipulations by the tax districts in the record as to the State rates of equalization were admissions merely of the actual fact as to the rates without admitting their effect; or whether the stipulations embraced the effect of the rates on the question of inequality; and (b) whether, if the fact and not the effect of the State equalization rates has been stipulated, this alone will sustain automatic application of the rates by the court to the assessments without further proof. The question of overassessment is also in the case. The Appellate Division, 26 A.D.2d 641, 272 N.Y.S.2d 982, reversing the Special Term, found that the stipulation between the parties 'fixed the equalization ratios' and also found the assessments were excessive.
Both the town and the village argue in this court that in the stipulations and admissions made at the trial all they 'intended to do and did do (as the record shows), is to admit what the state ratios happened to be for the years involved'.
This statement is not met frontally by the petitioners who argue in support of their 'proof as to inequality' that they have established this 'by three methods, to wit, the Notices to Admit, the introduction of the prevailing equalization rate into evidence, and the stipulation'.
Although they have not been furnished as part of the record in this court, it seems not to be disputed that notices to admit the ratios of equalization for the years 1961 and 1962 were served by petitioners pursuant to section 716 of the Real Property Tax Law and no 'notice of denial' authorized by this section was served by the two tax districts. Hence, the 'percentage of full value' at which 'other real property' was assessed is deemed admitted for the years 1961--1962. But these consolidated proceedings also embrace other years, 1963 and 1964 for the village, and 1963 for the town, and no notices to admit were served by petitioners for these years. Thus, it became necessary for petitioners, if they were to include all the years in issue, to broaden out the record on the issue of inequality.
They argue in this court a second method of showing inequality was followed 'by introduction of the equalization rate pursuant to the amendment of Section 720, Real Property Tax Law'. The record does not show the 'introduction' of evidence as to any rate, and actual conformity with section 720, the scope of which will be more fully discussed, depends on the nature of the stipulations of the two tax districts. This, in turn, leads to a consideration of the third ground upon which petitioners rest, 'the oft used lawyer's technique of stipulation'. In connection with this petitioners seem to argue within the language of Matter of Wolf v. Assessors of Town of Hanover, 308 N.Y. 416, 419--420, 126 N.E.2d 537, 539--540 that the 'mode of trial' and the 'parties' acquiescence' spelled out a concession by the districts of the effect of the State rates on the issue of inequality.
On the record, as developed, the tax districts argue that 'In the minds of petitioners' attorneys' and also of the Appellate Division there has been 'confusion' as to the effect of what was agreed upon by the parties before the court. To follow this through it is needful to examine closely what was said by counsel.
At the opening hearing before the Referee there was made a part of the record what appears to have been a written stipulation between the parties, since there is no statement by any counsel of what it contained. It set forth that 'for the purpose of this hearing' the village and the town 'admit that the equalization rate applying' in the two tax districts for 1961 and 1962 is 52%.
At the next hearing, the attorney for the petitioners stated on the record that it was stipulated 'for the purpose of this hearing' that the village and town 'admit' that the 'equalization rate as set by the State of New York for the years in question will be admitted (sic), and no proof will be necessary to establish those rates'. The 'years involved' were stated to be 1961, 1962, 1963 and 1964. The equalization rates for those years 'will be supplied at the conclusion of this hearing'.
When the attorney for the petitioners had completed this statement the village attorney made a specific reservation about what was being stipulated. He said that the stipulation was made 'only in respect to what that rate is'. He continued more specifically: 'We do not, in other words, agree that the mere fact that the state has fixed an equalization rate means that it can be applied automatically to any valuation that may be arrived at in this case, not as evidence.'
The attorney for the petitioners noted that if the equalization rate was not admitted 'then we'll have to be put to that proof'. To this statement the attorney for the village again stated expressly: 'I'll not agree that it be accepted.'
The attorney for the petitioners then stated that as to the year 1961, the village had no choice, 'You have admitted it'. The attorney for the village said 'That's right', but he then told the Referee, quoting section 716 of the Real Property Tax Law, that as to the years other than 1961 and 1962 no demand had been made and there had been no such admission.
Petitioners' attorney then returned to a reliance on the original stipulation. He said: . But, as it has been noted, that stipulation expressly related to what the equalization rate was and did not relate to its legal effect in the proceeding.
There was some further discussion as to what the rates actually were for the two years and the village attorney stated: 'I couldn't stipulate as to anything where the Village is concerned which is contrary to law, in my opinion'. Following discussion, some of it off the record, the attorney for the petitioners again stated that 'there is no question on the record the equalization rate for the two prior years has been stipulated to at the prior organization meeting', and the attorney for the village replied, 'Yes, that's conceded'.
Addressing himself then to the attorney for the town, the attorney for the petitioners asked whether the 'equalization rate as set by the state' is admitted by the town 'for the purpose of this proceeding'. The town attorney answered 'For the years 1961 and 1962'. Discussion was apparently then addressed to the original stipulation and the attorney for the town said 'I'll withdraw my objection', this, as far as one can tell, being an objection as to the inclusion of additional years. Then the attorney for the petitioners asked the attorney for the town 'you'll stipulate the state rate?'. To which the town attorney answered 'Right'.
Petitioners' counsel thereupon asked the question whether 'the equalization rate is no longer part of this trial?'. The Referee answered this by saying 'For 1961 and 1962', to which the attorney for the petitioners responded that it included 1963 and 1964 .
The attorney for the village here again entered the discussion. He was very specific as to what he admitted. It is clear that he was admitting a fact as to the rates and not their effect in the proceeding. He said:
The attorney for the petitioners persisted that he wanted it 'specifically stated' that as far as the 'equalization rate' is concerned, it has been established 'unequivocally'. The attorney for the village again noted his reservation. He said:
Up to this point, reading the original stipulation and the long, fencing discussion between counsel as to what was and what was not agreed upon, it must be manifest that neither the town nor the village was accepting more than the simple fact of what the State rates of equalization were for the four years under discussion.
There followed a statement by the attorney for the petitioners which was somewhat different from anything that anyone had been talking about before except what had been said about cost and admission factors under section 716. He said: 'In other words, if I was put to the proof and produced several parcels that would be the rate that would be effective as of this proceeding.' The attorney for the town said 'Right'. Nothing in the record contains or implies any acceptance of this statement by the attorney for the village.
It would be markedly unfair both to the village and its counsel, in view of his explicit and frequently iterated statements that he was agreeing only to the fact of the State equalization rates and in the absence of any express acceptance of what the attorney for the petitioners had said, to impose on the village the consequence of a finding of inequality as to these assessments unless it be held by the court that a finding of inequality in an assessment litigation can be based alone on the State rate of equalization.
And it would be almost equally unfair to impose such a consequence on the town because the town attorney had said 'Right' to the final statement made by...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Daniel C., Matter of
...terms differs obviously and radically from the perception of the adversarial party (see Matter of O'Brien v. Assessor of Town of Mamaroneck, 20 N.Y.2d 587, 285 N.Y.S.2d 843, 232 N.E.2d 844; Matter of Way v. Town of Poughkeepsie, 75 A.D.2d 602, 426 N.Y.S.2d 810), none of the instant litigant......
-
Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors
...review (see L. 1961, ch. 942). The Court of Appeals remained unimpressed, however, and in Matter of O'Brien v. Assessor of Town of Mamaroneck, 20 N.Y.2d 587, 285 N.Y.S.2d 843, 232 N.E.2d 844, rejected a taxpayer's effort to rely exclusively on the equalization rate for his proof. Concluding......
-
Bank of New York v. Amoco Oil Co.
...should not apply the broader interpretation absent a clear manifestation of intent. See Estate of O'Brien v. Town of Mamaroneck, 20 N.Y.2d 587, 594, 285 N.Y.S.2d 843, 848, 232 N.E.2d 844, 847 (1967); Kraker, 100 A.D.2d at 438, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 536. Rather, where contracts are negotiated by c......
-
Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors
...themselves were insufficient to sustain a finding of inequality in a particular assessment (Matter of O'Brien v. Assessor of the Town of Mamaroneck, 20 N.Y.2d 587, 285 N.Y.S.2d 843, 232 N.E.2d 844). The statute (R.P.T.L. § 720) was amended again in 1969, and the Court of Appeals in Guth Rea......