Brigdon v. Covington, 63402
| Decision Date | 12 November 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 63402,63402 |
| Parties | Newton J. BRIGDON, Appellant, v. Oscar B. COVINGTON, Jr., Jack A. Brandrup, and Patricia Hayler, Executor of the Estate of John Hayler, Appellees. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
M. Gene Blackburn, of Murray & Blackburn, P.C., Fort Dodge, for appellant.
H. Richard Smith, of Ahlers, Cooney, Dorweiler, Haynie & Smith, Des Moines, for appellees.
Considered by UHLENHOPP, P.J., and HARRIS, McCORMICK, LARSON and SCHULTZ, JJ.
What is the effect on claims against other tort-feasors when judgment against one of them is satisfied? The trial court held that the satisfaction here barred further claims against the joint tort-feasors. We agree.
The factual background is detailed in our opinion in Brigdon v. Brandrup, 267 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1978). There we affirmed a $250,000 verdict against Brandrup, one of three defendants in this tort action for personal injuries. Verdicts had been directed against plaintiff on his claims against Covington and Hayler, the other two defendants. At 267 N.W.2d 402, we affirmed the trial court for directing the verdict against Covington but reversed for directing a verdict against Hayler.
After the case was remanded for trial of plaintiff's claim against Hayler, attorneys acting on behalf of Brandrup paid the judgment and costs. Plaintiff filed a general satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter Hayler filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the satisfaction discharged him from any further liability. Plaintiff resisted, contending that the issue of discharge, where the claim was for $600,000 and the verdict for less, was one of intent and could not be resolved as a matter of law.
The trial court sustained Hayler's motion for summary judgment. The ruling conceded that the intent of the parties generally governs. Nevertheless, the trial court felt that, once the trier of fact has determined damages for a single injury, and they have been paid, no further cause of action exists. Then, according to the trial court, the intent of the parties becomes irrelevant.
Controlling legal principles begin with the following which we adopt:
The issue of the effect of satisfaction has been complicated by the inability of the courts to agree on the meaning of the term and by the question of its relation to the term, release. As a general rule, all would agree that satisfaction has occurred where the plaintiff has been fully compensated by one or more of the tort-feasors for the harm done to him, and that this compensation may be fixed by a judgment after trial or by agreement between the plaintiff and any number of the wrongdoers. Little difficulty is occasioned by full satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim through execution of a judgment, since clearly here there has been full compensation according to law.
1 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, § 10.1 at 710.
Proceeding from this premise the parties concentrate their arguments on the law of judgments. Both cite our opinion in Wright v. Haskins, 260 N.W.2d 536 (Iowa 1977), where at pp. 541-42 we said:
In our opinion the proposition that a judgment creditor can sue successively different judgment debtors until full satisfaction of the highest judgment is attained is the proper rule to be applied to injured third parties and their rights. This position has the support of the Restatement, Second, Judgments, section 95, Comment f, p. 85, Tentative Draft No. 3, April 15, 1976, where it is said: As expressly stated, the rule does not apply to all instances of contribution and indemnity.
On the basis of Wright v. Haskins, plaintiff asks that he be allowed to proceed against Hayler, at least in an attempt to seek recovery of more than the $250,000 judgment he recovered against Brandrup. Defendant asks that we limit our holding in Wright v. Haskins to "the unusual situation in which a claimant has already reduced his claim to two or more judgments before acknowledging satisfaction of one of the...
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