Briggs v. Collins

• Decision Date: 01 June 1914
• Docket Number: 2
• Parties: BRIGGS v. COLLINS
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

167 S.W. 1114

113 Ark. 190

BRIGGS v. COLLINS

No. 2

Supreme Court of Arkansas

June 1, 1914

Appeal from Polk Circuit Court; Jefferson T. Cowling, Judge affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

J. I Alley, for appellants.

The agency and the fraudulent acts of the subagent being undisputed, appellant is bound thereby, and can not claim protection as an innocent purchaser for value. 161 S.W. 142 75 Ark. 95; 76 Ark. 373; 71 Ark. 295; 57 Ark. 11.

G. C. Hardin, for appellee.

Trask had no authority to settle his individual debt with the property of the insurance company. His agreement with appellants was purely in an individual capacity, and was in no sense binding upon appellee nor upon the insurance company. 54 Ark. 75; 60 Ark. 532; 62 Ark. 348, 88 S.W. 950; 81 Ark. 202; 76 Ark. 328. And appellants were bound to know that Trask had no authority to settle his own debts with property of the company. 28 Ark. 98; 62 Ark. 33. See, also, 53 Ark. 135; Id. 253; 79 Ark. 401-405; Story on Agency, § 77; 64 Tex. 337; 92 N.C. 532; 161 S.W. 142; 101 Ark. 603.

OPINION

MCCULLOCH, C. J.

Plaintiff, W. B. Collins, instituted separate actions before a justice of the peace against defendants, A. C. Briggs and F. H. Daniels, to recover the amount of two negotiable promissory notes executed by the respective defendants to one Trask, and by Trask assigned to plaintiff.

On appeal to the circuit court the two cases were consolidated and tried together, and the court gave a peremptory instruction in favor of the plaintiff against each of the defendants for the amount of the note which he had executed.

Plaintiff was the general agent of an insurance company and maintained his offices at Fort Smith. Trask was soliciting agent, acting under appointment from plaintiff, and procured applications from the two defendants, who resided at Mena, Arkansas, and policies were accordingly issued to them by the company. The defendants executed negotiable promissory notes to Trask for the amounts of their respective premiums, and Trask assigned the notes before maturity to plaintiff, who accepted same and credited Trask with the face value in settlement for premiums collected.

Defendant Daniels testified on the trial of the case that he was engaged in the livery business in Mena; that Trask was indebted to him for a livery bill and agreed to let the first premium go as a credit on said debt. He testified also that he gave the note to Trask upon the representation by the latter "that he wanted it in making a settlement with the company," but would return the same to him within a few days after he had shown it to the company as an evidence of the fact that the policy had been taken in good faith. He testified that there was no other consideration for the note.

Defendant Briggs testified to a similar state of facts with reference to his transaction with Trask and the execution of the note.

Plaintiff testified that the notes were assigned to him by Trask before maturity, and that he gave Trask credit for them in his settlement, advancing to him enough money to cover his commission, and that he made it good to the company. He testified that he knew nothing about the understanding or agreement with defendants concerning the premiums.

The testimony of plaintiff tends very strongly to show that he was an innocent holder of the notes, having paid full value therefor, and there is nothing in the record to contradict him. The only thing that prevents his testimony being treated as undisputed is his direct interest in the result of the transaction. Skillern v. Baker, 82 Ark. 86, 100 S.W. 764.

But aside from that question we are of the opinion that the evidence was undisputed upon other material questions in the case, and that the court was correct in giving a peremptory instruction. The substance of the testimony of each of the defendants was that he took out the policy of...