Briggs v. Finley
Decision Date | 31 March 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 64A05-9307-CV-246,64A05-9307-CV-246 |
Citation | 631 N.E.2d 959 |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Parties | Laverne BRIGGS, et al., Appellant-Petitioners, v. Charles O. FINLEY, et al., Appellee-Defendants. |
David W. Stone, IV, Anderson, Robert L. Lewis, Gary, for appellant.
Thom W. Kramer, Buoscio, Pera, Kramer & Nowak, Merrillville, for appellee.
Appellant-plaintiff Laverne Briggs challenges the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of appellee-defendant Charles O. Finley in his negligence action 1 contending that the trial court erred in granting Finley summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.
The uncontroverted facts relevant to this appeal are that Finley owns and operates a farm located on Highway 35 in LaPorte, Indiana. Finley works in Chicago, Illinois during the week and spends his weekends at his LaPorte farm. On his approximately 200-acre farm Finley has a residence, several barns, buildings, and fields.
In 1988, Finley had five horses, including one Arabian mare which was with foal. He contained the horses in a 600 foot by 150 foot corral. The gate to the corral was secured with a chain and padlock. The corral was connected to an adjacent field and a barn. The field was fenced-in and the fence gate was secured by a bolt and chain lock. The connecting barn's front door opened into the corral to permit free ingress and egress by the horses. The barn's south side door was secured with latches on both sides, and opened into the adjacent fenced-in field. The horses could not jump the fence or open the gates or latches themselves. No horse had ever escaped from the corral-barn-field enclosure.
Finley employed Allen McDaniel, an inmate of the Summitt Farms Work Release Center of the Indiana Department of Corrections, part-time to feed his horses. 2 Finley usually talked to McDaniel from Chicago by telephone daily or every two or three days. However, Finley did not expect McDaniel to answer the telephone each time he called. On or about March 7, 1988, Finley reprimanded McDaniel after catching him asleep during working hours. On March 9, 1988, McDaniel quit without notice, and Finley did not discover this until March 12 or 13.
Sometime before March 11, 1988, the side door to the horse barn was opened and the gate to the fenced-in field adjacent to the corral and barn was unlocked and left open allowing Finley's horses to get loose. There is no evidence who opened the gate. On March 11, 1988, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Briggs was on his way to work when he passed by the Finley farm and collided with Finley's Arabian mare which had wandered out of its enclosure and onto the highway. As a result of the collision, Finley's horse died and Briggs sustained personal injuries and damage to his automobile.
Finley was in Chicago at the time of the collision and did not return to his LaPorte farm until the evening of March 12. Finley did not discover that his horses were not in their enclosure until he saw them running loose on the morning of March 13, 1988. Finley did not learn of Briggs' collision with his Arabian mare until later that day.
On February 9, 1989, Briggs filed a complaint against Finley alleging that he was negligent and careless in one or more of the following respects:
A. Failed to hire and keep on the premises adequate number of capable personnel to properly maintain, contain and control the livestock and particularly the horses of the farm;
B. Failed to properly train and/or instruct the employees and personnel working on the farm;
C. Failed to properly contain, secure and control the livestock and particularly the horses of the farm; and
D. And [was] otherwise negligent so as to allow the livestock and particularly a certain horse to be unsecured, uncontained and uncontrolled.
Record at 13. Finley answered the complaint denying any negligence or liability as a result of the collision and claiming that Briggs' negligence was the sole cause of the accident. On August 13, 1992, Finley filed a summary judgment motion against Briggs asserting that he was not liable to Briggs because he was not negligent in the manner in which he contained his horses and because he had no knowledge that his horses were loose prior to the collision. In opposition to Finley's motion, Briggs argued that summary judgment was precluded because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Finley was liable for Briggs' injuries because "Finley chose the easy way out" and "negligently and carelessly hired [a] cheap, incompetent, and inexperienced" "imprisoned convict" at minimum wage to feed his horses and that this "obviously led to the accident that injured and disfigured [him]" and because Finley did not employ a caretaker during the evening hours to watch over the horses to make certain they did not get loose and run onto the highway. 3 Record at 47-48; 77-78.
After a hearing the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Finley. Briggs appeals now claiming that Finley failed to establish that he had no knowledge of the horses' escape and that he was not negligent in hiring, retaining, and supervising McDaniel.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidentiary matter designated to the trial court shows that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tucher v. Brothers Auto Salvage Yard (1991), Ind.App., 564 N.E.2d 560, 562, trans. denied; Ind.Trial Rule 56(C). In reviewing the propriety of a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we apply the same standards as the trial court and review all the pleadings, depositions, admissions, answers to interrogatories, and any affidavits designated to the trial court in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. The movant bears the burden of proving the propriety of summary judgment, and all rational assertions of fact and reasonable inferences to be resolved therefrom are deemed to be true and are viewed in the nonmovant's favor. Ramon v. Glenroy Constr. Co. (1993), Ind.App., 609 N.E.2d 1123, 1127, trans. denied.
The movant must establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, before the burden shifts to the nonmovant to file affidavits or other materials showing the existence of a genuine issue for resolution by the fact-finder. Callis v. State Auto. Insurance Co. (1991), Ind.App., 579 N.E.2d 129, 131, trans. denied. A genuine issue of material fact exists where facts concerning an issue which would dispose of litigation are in dispute or where the undisputed facts are capable of supporting conflicting inferences on such an issue. Schwartz v. Castleton Christian Church, Inc. (1992), Ind.App., 594 N.E.2d 473, 475, trans. denied.
A defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when he shows that the undisputed material facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff's claim for relief. Moore v. Sitzmark Corp. (1990), Ind.App., 555 N.E.2d 1305, 1307. A court must grant summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Watson Rural Water Co. v. Indiana Cities Water Corp. (1989), Ind.App., 540 N.E.2d 131, 139, trans. denied (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). In this instance, there is no genuine issue of material fact, because a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case renders all other facts immaterial. Id. The movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case to which he bears the burden of proof at trial. Id.
Briggs' action is one for negligence. Summary judgment is ordinarily not appropriate in negligence cases. Lucas v. Dorsey Corp. (1993), Ind.App., 609 N.E.2d 1191, 1198, trans. denied. In order to prevail in a negligence action, Briggs had to establish the three elements for actionable negligence: (1) a duty flowing from Finley to him, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) injury to Briggs resulting from that breach. See Tucher, at 562. Finley acknowledges that as the owner of domestic animals he had a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep his horses confined and not to let them stray out onto a traveled highway. Thus, the questions remaining are whether Finley breached this duty and, if so, whether the breach resulted in Briggs' injury.
Finley contends that summary judgment was proper because the evidentiary materials show that he was not negligent in his choice of confinement or in recapturing his horses after learning they were loose. Briggs counters that summary judgment was improper because Finley failed to establish that he did not have constructive knowledge the horses were loose before the accident or that he did not negligently employ McDaniel to feed his horses.
Briggs first contends that summary judgment was improper because although Finley established that he did not have actual knowledge of the horses' escape, Finley failed to make a prima facie showing that he did not have constructive knowledge through his agent-employee McDaniel. He argues that it was Finley's burden, as the moving party, to establish that he did not have constructive knowledge of the horses' escape.
Both parties devote considerable time addressing Finley's knowledge, or lack thereof, that his horses were loose prior to the March 11, 1988 collision. Yet Briggs did not assert such a claim against Finley in his original complaint. Therefore, Finley was not required to anticipate and...
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