Bright-Jacobs v. Barnhart
| Decision Date | 05 October 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.3:03-CV-029-JMF.,CIV.A.3:03-CV-029-JMF. |
| Citation | 386 F.Supp.2d 1295 |
| Parties | Brenda BRIGHT-JACOBS, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Charles Lee Martin, Office of Charles L. Martin, Decatur, GA, for Plaintiff.
Alonzo H. Long, Office of United States Attorney, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S FINAL ORDER
This is an action to review the determination by the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") that Brenda Bright-Jacobs is not entitled to a period of disability, disability insurance benefits (DIB) and/or supplemental security income (SSI) under §§ 216(i), 223(a), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(a), and 1382.
On December 29, 1993, claimant filed an application for disability benefits, alleging she had been disabled since January 15, 1993, apparently due to back surgery and nerve damage and pain. Tr. 46, 117, 121-126, 139, 149, 481. The claim was denied initially on March 26, 1994, and on reconsideration on July 28, 1994. Tr. 129-30, 137-38. On November 6, 1995, a de novo hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Robert L. O'Steen, who received testimony from the claimant and Vocational Expert (VE) Vivian Hanna. (Tr. 59-116).
In addition to the foregoing, on January 3, 1994, the claimant also filed an application for supplemental security income benefits (SSI), alleging that she had been disabled since January 15, 1993, due to back problems, hiatal hernia. Tr. 139-142, 149. The SSI application was denied initially on March 26, 1994, and on reconsideration, on July 28, 1994. Tr. 143-44, 146-47, 149-51. After the foregoing November 6, 1995 de novo hearing (Tr. 59-116), ALJ O'Steen determined in his June 28, 1996 opinion that since the claimant was able to perform her past jobs, she was not disabled, and not eligible for wage earner's or SSI benefits. Tr. 46-54. The claimant's request for review by the Appeals Council was denied on September 12, 1997. Tr. 3-4. A timely appeal to this Court followed.
The case was docketed as Bright v. Apfel, Civil Action No. 1:97-CV-3509-JEC (NDGa.). On February 24, 1999, Magistrate Judge Gerrilyn G. Brill issued a Report and Recommendation that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed (Tr. 660-678), which Report and Recommendation was, on April 9, 1999, adopted as the District Court's Order. Tr. 642.
On April 4, 2000, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision of April 9, 1999, and remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Specifically, that Court found that the ALJ denied the claimant a full and fair hearing: (1) by failing to consider all of the claimant's impairments, and (2) by failing to specify the weight he attached to the various medical reports. Tr. 630-38, 679-83. See Bright v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 600, 2000 WL 432431 (11th Cir.2000) (per curium) (not published). Thereafter, the District Court remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Tr. 627-629.
On November 18, 2000, the Appeals Council remanded the case to an ALJ for further proceedings. Tr. 636-638.
In the meantime, on October 31, 1997, the claimant filed a second application for SSI benefits, alleging that she was disabled by virtue of disorders of her back — discogenic degenerative, and an affective disorder since April 2, 1994. Tr. 641, 703-06. The application was denied initially on January 28, 1998, and on reconsideration on March 17, 1998. Tr. 641, 646-47, 652-53. As shown hereafter, de novo hearings were held before ALJ James E. Deen, Jr. on January 25, 1999 (Tr. 531-584) and May 14, 2001 (Tr. 535-626) to consider the new application and the remand, and ALJ Deen issued a 49-page partially favorable decision finding that the claimant was disabled and entitled to SSI benefits from September 1, 1997 through October 31, 1999, but not before or after, as she was not disabled before September 1, 1997, and her disability had ceased as of November 1, 1999. Tr. 477-529. In due course, the claimant exhausted her administrative remedies and again appealed the decision to this Court. See Bright-Jacobs v. Barnhart, Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-02 (NDGa.).
As previously noted, the Eleventh Circuit and the District Court remanded the case to the Commissioner, who remanded it to a new ALJ, James E. Deen, Jr. On January 25, 1999, the new ALJ, James E. Deen, held his first hearing on the new application and the remanded decision, and received testimony from the claimant and a new VE, Dr. Phillip Wierson, PhD. Tr. 531-584. He held a second hearing on May 14, 2001, and again heard testimony from the claimant and a third VE, Alice Gardner. Tr. 585-626. Although the claimant's husband was present as an observer at Deen's second hearing, he was not called to testify. Tr. 585.
On October 11, 2002, the ALJ issued his 49-page partially favorable decision, finding that the claimant was disabled from September 1, 1997 until October 31, 1999, but not thereafter. Tr. 477-529.
In due course, the claimant appealed that decision to the Appeals Council, which apparently declined further review.1 Tr. ______. The claimant then appealed the new partially favorable decision to this Court. [Doc. 1].
to benefits before September 1, 1997 because her disability was caused in part by alcoholism; and
The claimant bears the initial burden of proving that he is disabled, which burden is met when he proves that he suffers from a severe impairment that renders him unable to pursue his customary employment. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant can, nevertheless, perform other types of substantial gainful activity. Freeman v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 727 (11th Cir.1982). In determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner is required to consider:
(1) Objective medical facts or clinical findings;
(2) Diagnosis of examining physicians;
(3) Subjective evidence of pain and disability as testified to by the claimant and corroborated by his wife of other members of his family, his neighbors and others who have observed him; and
(4) The claimant's age, education and work history....
DePaepe v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.1972); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233 (11th Cir.1983).
The Commissioner, in reaching his determination, must also follow a sequential evaluation. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (1986). A claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful activity is declared not disabled and the inquiry ceases. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b) (1986). If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner must determine whether he suffers from a severe mental or physical impairment. If the impairment is non-severe, claimant is declared not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c) (1986). If his impairment is severe, it meets the durational requirements, and it equals or exceeds a "listed" impairment, the claimant is considered disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d) (1986). If the severe impairment does not equal or exceed a listed impairment, the Commissioner must then determine the claimant's residual functional capacity (i.e. the degree to which a claimant can function, despite his physical or mental impairment(s)). The Commissioner must then evaluate the physical and mental demands of the claimant's past relevant work, and whether the claimant can meet those demands. If so, there must be a finding of no disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e) (1986); Perez v. Schweiker, 653 F.2d 997 (5th Cir.1981). If the claimant cannot perform his past relevant work, then the Commissioner must decide whether the claimant's impairment(s) prevent him from doing any other substantial gainful activity (SGA). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g) and 416.920(f). In the event the impairment(s) preclude other SGA, a finding of disability is mandated.
It must also be recognized that hearings before the Commissioner (nee the ALJ and the AC) are nonadversarial in nature, and oblige the adjudicator (AC and ALJ) to ensure that the hearing record is complete. Specifically, it is the adjudicator's duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments, both for and against granting benefits. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 147 L.Ed.2d 80, 88 (2000); Welch v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 436, 438 (11th Cir.1988); Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir.1981); Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir.1999); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir.1997). Furthermore, the ALJ must comply with this obligation even if the claimant is represented by counsel. Indeed, this Court's review of the case is generally limited to a consideration of the evidence in the certified record.2 Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d at 1279.
When reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the duty of the Court is not to reweigh the evidence, but rather to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record, and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Smith v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1547, 1549 (11th Cir.1986). Substantial evidence has been defined as "more than a scintilla ... it means such relevant evidence as the reasonable mind might...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rease v. Barnhart, No. 1:04-CV-3239-JMF.
...the SSA ALJ Corps is vastly over-taxed, with scant help, if any, in sight. See Brenda Bright-Jacobs v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, 386 F.Supp.2d 1295 (N.D.Ga., April 15, 2004) (Civ. No. 3:03-CV-029-JMF).56 As a consequence, occasionally ALJs have been known to rely on the evidence that tends to su......
-
Arthur H. v. Saul
...reverse and remand for further proceedings when the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards. Bright-Jacobs v. Barnhart, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1349 (N.D. Ga. 2004). However, a court may also reverse and remand with instructions for the Commissioner to award benefits if "the [Comm......
-
Berke v. Saul
...were real to the claimant constitute reversible error (i.e. a failure to properly evaluate the claimant's credibility).386 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2004). A "somatization disorder," or "somatic symptom disorder" ischaracterized by an extreme focus on physical symptoms — such as pain......
-
Jasmatie R. v. Saul
...reverse and remand for further proceedings when the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards. Bright-Jacobs v. Barnhart, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1349 (N.D. Ga. 2004). However, a court may also reverse and remand with instructions for the Commissioner to award benefits. Davis v. Sha......