Bright Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hillsboro School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 96CA908

• Decision Date: 28 August 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96CA908,96CA908
• Citation: 122 Ohio App.3d 546,702 N.E.2d 449
• Parties: , 130 Ed. Law Rep. 879 BRIGHT LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees, v. CITY OF HILLSBORO SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 546

122 Ohio App.3d 546

702 N.E.2d 449, 130 Ed. Law Rep. 879

BRIGHT LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees, v. CITY OF HILLSBORO SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellants.

No. 96CA908.

Court of Appeals of Ohio Fourth District, Highland County.

Decided Aug. 28, 1997.

Ralph W. Phillips, Highland County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Greenfield, for appellees.

Whalen & Compton Co., L.P.A., R. Brent Minney, G. Frederick Compton, Jr. and Elizabeth Grooms Taylor, Akron, for appellant Board of Education of the City of Hillsboro School District.

Hapner & Hapner and James D. Hapner, Hillsboro, for appellant landowners.

STEPHENSON, Presiding Judge.

This case involves two separate appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Highland County, Ohio, in favor of the Board of Education of the Bright Local School District and the Board of Education of Highland County, plaintiffs below and appellees herein, on their claims against the Board of Education of the City of Hillsboro School District and other individual landowners in Highland County, defendants below and appellants herein. ¹ The Hillsboro School District assigns the following error for our review:

"The trial court committed prejudicial error when it overruled the Hillsboro board's motion for summary judgment, sustained the appellees' motion for summary judgment, and declared null and void the resolution of the Highland County board, adopted on July 22, 1968, transferring a tract of land from the Bright Local School District to the Hillsboro City School District."

Additionally, the landowners have assigned their own assignments of error as follows:

I. "The court below erred in granting plaintiff-appellees' motion for summary judgment."

II. "The court below erred in overruling appellants' motion to dismiss."

The record reveals the following facts pertinent to this appeal. Almost thirty years ago, some residents of the Bright School District circulated petitions and received a sufficient number of signatures to request an interdistrict transfer of land. The Highland County Board of Education then adopted a resolution on July 22, 1968, to transfer nine hundred eighteen acres of territory from the Bright School District to the Hillsboro School District. This territory, however, was not contiguous with any part of the Hillsboro School District as required by Ohio law. Nevertheless, the property was transferred and accepted, and most of the school children who have resided within the territory for the last three decades have attended Hillsboro City Schools.

Appellees commenced the action below on June 1, 1993, alleging that the aforementioned nine hundred eighteen acres were not contiguous with the Hillsboro School District and that their transfer back in 1968 was in violation of state law. They requested that the transfer be held null and void and the disputed territory be declared to be a portion of the Bright School District. Appellants filed answers denying the invalidity of the territorial transfer and raising a number of defenses, including laches and statute of limitations. The landowners also filed counterclaims against appellees requesting that, in the event the transfer was held invalid, appellees be required either to (1) amend the July 22, 1968 resolution in order to add additional territory so as to include the disputed region, or (2) compensate them for the drop in their property values that would ensue after a transfer back into the Bright School District. ²

The parties reached agreement with respect to most of the salient facts of this case and, on July 20, 1994, they filed the following stipulations:

"1. The Board of Education of the Bright Local School District, the Board of Education of the Highland County School District, and the Board of Education of the Hillsboro City School District are the duly constituted and acting boards of education for its respective district.

"* * *

"3. On July 22, 1968, the Highland County Board of Education adopted a resolution providing for the transfer of certain territory consisting of approximately 918 acres from the Bright Local School District to the Hillsboro City School District. * * * "4. The territory transferred by the July 22, 1968 resolution of the Highland County Board of Education was not contiguous with the Hillsboro City School District, and has not been contiguous at any time since that date, as shown by the map of Jackson Township, Highland County. * * *

"5. Most, but not all, of the school-age children who currently reside or at one time resided in the territory have attended the schools of the Hillsboro City School District since the fall of 1968, but at least one child residing in the territory attended the schools of the Bright Local School District until August, 1993."

Based on these stipulations, appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing that the territory transferred was not contiguous with the Hillsboro School District and, thus, the transfer was in violation of state law. It was urged that the 1968 transfer should be declared null and void and the Highland County Auditor ordered to transfer the property back into the Bright School District. The landowners filed a memorandum in opposition, arguing inter alia that the claims of appellees were barred by laches and the statute of limitations. An affidavit by William Cornelius, one of the landowners, stated that "[o]ne of the factors leading to his purchase of [his] property was its location in the Hillsboro School District," that "[s]aid property will loose part of its market value if transferred to Bright Local School District," and that "[t]he property would have been worth less at the time of purchase if it had been located in Bright Local School District." This was corroborated by an affidavit from Lowell D. Chambers, a licensed real estate broker and certified residential appraiser, who attested that "residential properties will appraise higher in Hillsboro City School District than in Bright Local School District." Chambers went on to opine that "[i]f the residential properties in the disputed area * * * are transferred to Bright Local School District there will be a perceived diminution in their value."

The Hillsboro School District also filed its own motion for summary judgment, arguing that the claims of appellees were barred by the doctrines of laches and estoppel. It asserted that appellees could not be permitted to cancel and avoid an action which they themselves had voluntarily undertaken almost thirty years earlier.

On December 29, 1994, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of appellees, finding that the territorial transfer was null and void. It was further determined that the doctrine of laches did not bar appellees from recovery. The lower court found that "[t]here [was] nothing in the factual matter indicating any of the Defendants ha[d] altered their position as a result of the 1968 action." Thus, the court concluded that "laches and estoppel do not apply in this case." An appeal was taken from that judgment and then later dismissed by this court for lack of a final, appealable order. Bright Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v Hillsboro School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (Oct. 27, 1995), Highland App. No. 95CA867, unreported, 1995 WL 635740. ³ The matter was returned to the trial court, where, on June 3, 1996, the remaining counterclaims were resolved in favor of appellees. This appeal followed.

We first consider, out of order, the second assignment of error presented by the landowners. They argue that the lower court erred by not dismissing the action below. On June 29, 1993, before filing their answer, the landowners moved to dismiss the case under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Their argument was that a board of education is not a "person" as defined by R.C. 2721.01 and that only a "person" may sue for declaratory judgment under that statute. Given that neither appellee qualified as a person under this statute, the landowners reasoned, declaratory relief could not be obtained and the action should be dismissed. The lower court was not convinced. On August 19, 1993, it overruled the motion, finding that "Boards of Education do have the right to initiate such actions" under R.C. Chapter 2721. The landowners argue that this was error. We disagree.

R.C. 2721.01 states:

"As used in sections 2721.01 to 2721.15, inclusive, of the Revised Code, 'person' means any person, partnership, joint-stock company, unincorporated association, society, municipal corporation, or other corporation." ⁴

This is a broad definition and, in our opinion, is wide enough to encompass a school district's board of education. Ohio law provides that "[t]he board of education of each school district shall be a body politic and corporate, and, as such, capable of suing and being sued." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 3313.17. The use of the term "corporate" in describing a school board suggests that the board is a corporation, which, as previously set forth, falls within the definition of a "person" for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2721. The landowners counterargue that a board of education is not a "corporation" in the traditional sense of that term. They continue that a board of education must be regarded as a governmental entity that does not come under the statutory definition of a "person" who can commence a declaratory judgment action. We agree with the first part of this argument but reject the latter part.

The Ohio Supreme Court has described a board of education as being only a "quasi corporation" acting for the public as one of the state's ministerial education agencies. Brown v. Monroe Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 68, 70, 49 O.O.2d 347, 348, 253 N.E.2d 767, 768-769, at fn.; Wayman v. Akron City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 248, 249, 34 O.O.2d 473, 473-474, 215 N.E.2d 394,...