Brown v. Board of Education, Monroeville Local School Dist.

• Decision Date: 03 December 1969
• Docket Number: No. 69-107,69-107
• Citation: 20 Ohio St.2d 68,253 N.E.2d 767,49 O.O.2d 347
• Parties: , 49 O.O.2d 347 BROWN et al., Appellants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, MONROEVILLE LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 68

20 Ohio St.2d 68

253 N.E.2d 767, 49 O.O.2d 347

BROWN et al., Appellants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, MONROEVILLE LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.

No. 69-107.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 3, 1969.

Syllabus by the Court

A private litigant, in an action against a board of education of a local school district, can rely upon adverse possession to obtain title to land held in trust by that board for school purposes.

Plaintiffs instituted this action in the Common Pleas Court against the board of education, seeking a declaration that plaintiffs, through adverse possession, are the owners in fee of a certain one-acre parcel of land which had been specifically excepted from the description of land conveyed to plaintiffs.

The cause was submitted to the trial court for decision on a stipulation which provides, so far as pertinent:

That the defendant (and its predecessor boards of education) has been the owner of record in fee of the one acre parcel * * * since 1879.

'* * *

'That the plaintiffs and plaintiffs' predecessors in title, since prior to 1940, have been and still are in possession, occupancy and use of defendant's said one acre parcel.

'That said possession, occupancy and use of the one acre parcel of defendant has been at all times since prior to 1940 and still is open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, exclusive, hostile and adverse.'

By its judgment, the Common Pleas Court made a finding in accordance with that stipulation and decreed that title to the one-acre parcel be forever quieted and confirmed in the plaintiffs against any claim of the defendant board of education or any one claiming under that board.

The judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which based its judgment on the conclusion that the doctrine of adverse possession connon be invoked against a board of education to acquire lands held by the board in trust for school purposes.

The cause is now before this court on appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeals pursuant to allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Hiltz & Wiedemann and Robert A. Wiedemann, Norwalk, for appellants.

Bernard W. Freeman and Ronald H. Freeman, Norwalk, for appellee.

TAFT, Chief Justice.

Both parties agree that the only question to be decided is whether a private litigant, in an action against a board of education of a local school district, can rely upon adverse possession to obtain title to land held in trust by that board for school purposes.

In State ex rel. Board of Edn. v. Gibson (1935), 130 Ohio St. 318, 199 N.E. 185, the syllabus reads:

'1. Immunity attaching to the state does not accrue to the benefit of a board of education of school district.

'2. A board of education or school district, clothed with the capacity to sue and be sued, is thereby rendered amenable to the laws governing litigants, including the plea of the statute of limitations.

'3. Where a statute does not expressly exempt a subordinate political subdivision from its operation, the exemption therefrom does not exist.'

Except possibly for the fact that this action is not one brought by the board of education but is one brought against the board of education, the broad language of that syllabus would seem to require a reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. However, the board of education in the instant case contends that our decision in Board of Edn. v. Volk (1905), 72 Ohio St. 469, 74 N.E. 646 (holding board of education immune from tort liability), and the statement in the opinion in Wayman v. Board of Edn. (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 248, 249, 215 N.E.2d 394, ^* are irreconcilable with the broad statements of the syllabus in the Gibson case.

In the opinion by Day, J., in the Gibson case, it is stated, at page 320, 199 N.E. at p. 186:

'That a state is immune from the operation of the statute of limitations is universally recognized. * * * This immunity is an attribute of sovereignty and can only be waived by express provision to that effect within the statute.'

See also State v. Griftner (1899), 61 Ohio St. 201, 55 N.E. 612; Haynes v. Jones (1915), 91 Ohio St. 197, 110 N.E. 469; Lessee of Cincinnati v. First Presbyterian Church (1838), 8 Ohio 298.

The holding of this court in Board of Edn. v. Volk, supra, 72 Ohio St. 469, 74 N.E. 646, and the statement in our opinion in Wayman v. Board of Edn., supra, 5 Ohio St.2d 248, 249, 215 N.E.2d 394, indicate that board of education is an arm or agency of the state for the promotion of education in the state and is therefore entitled to sovereign immunity. This is entirely inconsistent with the reasoning of Judge Day in his opinion in State Ex rel. Board of Edn. v. Gibson, supra, 130 Ohio St. 318, 199 N.E. 185, where he stated, at page 322, 199 N.E. at p. 187:

'A board of education or school district does not partake of the elements of sovereignty and is not entitled to immunity from the statute of limitations.'

The board of education in the instant case contends that, under our decision in Board of Edn. v. Volk, supra, 72 Ohio St. 469, 74 N.E. 646, and in accordance with the statement in the opinion in Wayman v. Board of Edn., supra, 5 Ohio St.2d 248, 249, 215 N.E.2d 394, it is an arm or agency of the state and should therefore have the state's sovereign immunity from the operation of the statute of limitations.

Decisions of this Court have frequently held or indicated in broad language that the state's sovereign immunity from the operation of the statute of limitations is not available to any subdivision of the state. Thus, in Oxford Tp. v. Columbia (1892), 38 Ohio St. 87, paragraph two of the syllabus reads:

'Trustees of a township holding title to lands granted to them by the general government for school purposes, are not exempt from the operation of the statute of limitations, in an action prosecuted by them to recover possession of the premises.'

See also Lessee of Cincinnati v. First Presbyterian Church, supra, 8 Ohio 298 (holding property dedicated for public use); Williams v. First Presbyterian Society (1853), 1 Ohio St. 478, 510; Cincinnati v. Evans (1855), 5 Ohio St. 594, 602, 603 (property dedicated for streets or public squares); Hartman v. Hunter (1897), 56 Ohio St. 175, 46 N.E. 577 (assessments to construct township ditches). Cf. annotation 55 A.L.R.2d 554.

Except for the statement in State ex rel. Board of Edn. v. Gibson, supra, 130 Ohio St. 318, 199 N.E. 185, it does not appear that this court has said anything about a contention that there should be a different result because the subdivision was an arm or agency of the state or performing a state governmental function, although our official reports indicate that such a contention was made in some of the foregoing cases. (See 8 Ohio 302, and 5 Ohio St. 594, 599, 601.)

Section 3313.17, Revised Code, reads:

'The board of education of each school district shall be a body politic and corporate, and, as such, capable of suing and being sued, contracting and being contracted with, acquiring, holding, possessing, and disposing of real and personal property, and taking and holding in trust for the use and benefit of such district, any grant or devise of land and any donation or bequest of money or other personal property.'

This is substantially the same statute which was in effect when Board of Edn. v. Volk, supra, 72 Ohio St. 469, 74 N.E. 646, was decided. (Section 2676, Revised Statutes.) The holding in that case was, in substance, that...