Briner v. General Motors Corp.
| Decision Date | 12 June 1970 |
| Citation | 461 S.W.2d 99 |
| Parties | Vivian G. BRINER, Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and Universal Chevrolet, Inc., Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Irwin G. Waterman, Allan Weiss, Ben Rosenbaum III, Louisville, for appellant; Morris, Garlove, Waterman & Johnson, Louisville, of counsel.
John A. Fulton, William D. Grubbs, Louisville, for appellee General Motors Corp.; Woodward, Hobson & Fulton, Louisville, of counsel.
James H. Frazee, Herman E. Frick, Louisville, for appellee Universal Chevrolet, Inc.; Frazee & Frick, Louisville, of counsel.
CLAY, Commissioner.
Appellant plaintiff was seriously injured in an automobile accident which she claimed was caused by a defect in the steering mechanism of the automobile which she owned and was driving. This suit was brought against the two appellees, hereinafter designated General and Universal, on the theories of manufacturer's liability and negligent repair. The case was submitted to the jury against General, the manufacturer, under an instruction which is not questioned here, and the jury found for it. Universal, the dealer and seller, was let out on a directed verdict. The plaintiff raises four questions on this appeal, but we find no reversible error because in our opinion plaintiff failed to prove a basis of liability against either defendant.
On June 22, 1963, plaintiff bought a new Chevrolet from Universal. The vehicle operated properly in all respects for about three months. In September she brought the car to Universal complaining that 'it was pulling and galloping and there was vibration in it'. What was then done does not appear important, but apparently the condition was not remedied to her satisfaction. In May 1964 she wrote to General complaining (among other things) of vibration and lack of speed. Later Universal found and corrected a maladjustment of the air pressure in the front tires. It was then discovered that the air conditioning compressor was a cause of vibration and it was replaced. In August 1964 road tests were given the car by employees of Universal and a Chevrolet dealer in Cincinnati, and they were unable to find anything wrong. The last time Universal serviced the car was August 17, 1964, at which time the car had been driven 16,486 miles.
On March 26, 1965, plaintiff had her accident. At that time the car had been driven 25,527 miles. She was driving from Cincinnati to Louisville in the early afternoon on U.S. Highway 42. She testified that she was about two car lengths from an automobile ahead when 'something happened to the car' and it 'started veering to the left'. She tried to pull back to the right and said the wheel would not turn. She said something was dragging underneath and her car would not turn because 'it was locked'. The foot brake was being applied at the time. Her car struck an on-coming automobile.
We will try to sum up our understanding of plaintiff's theory of liability on the part of both defendants. Three months after its purchase her car began to shimmy and vibrate. There was a defective air conditioner which contributed to this vibration. The defendants failed to align the front end and check adjustment of the wheel bearings. The vibration eventually resulted in the freezing of some part of the steering mechanism or a loose wheel bearing caused a breakdown in the linkage of the steering system.
There was no direct proof of the existence of a defective mechanical condition existing at the time of the accident which could have caused it. The only evidence of the physical condition of her car after the accident, which plaintiff challenges as incompetent, was introduced by General. It constituted proof that there was no mechanical breakdown in the steering system. Circumstantially her testimony about how the accident happened tended to prove that there was a mechanical failure of some sort. In support of this theory she introduced the testimony of two experts. In answer to hypothetical questions they in substance testified that abnormal vibration in an automobile, which could be caused by incorrect tire balancing, an improperly mounted air conditioner compressor, misalignment, or a loose or broken bearing, could affect the steering mechanism and could result in the fretting or freezing of a knuckle joint or a bearing.
Plaintiff first contends the trial court erroneously directed a verdict for Universal since there was evidence that on the complaint of vibration it could and should have made additional tests to ascertain the cause. Assuming that Universal failed to make a proper inspection, to establish a case of negligence creating liability the causal relationship between the acts or omissions and the accident must be shown. See McAtee v. Holland Furnace Co., Ky., 252 S.W.2d 427 (1952), and Collins Company v. Rowe, Ky., 428 S.W.2d 194 (1968). To forge the link between Universal's alleged misconduct and the accident, it was incumbent upon plaintiff to prove by evidence of substance that the alleged negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. Here is where the plaintiff's case breaks down.
The unfortunate event happened seven months and 9,000 miles after Universal had last serviced the car. During that period plaintiff did not complain to Universal about the improper operation of her automobile. Three times during that period she had it serviced at another garage but its records did not disclose any complaint about, or discovery of, vibration or any difficulty related to the steering mechanism or the suspension system.
Plaintiff maintains, however, that the causal relationship between Universal's acts or omissions can be established by circumstantial evidence. With this we agree. The difficulty is that the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that there was a discoverable mechanical defect in plaintiff's automobile when last serviced by Universal which caused this accident. Such a possibility exists, but the law requires more than that.
While reasonable inferences are permissible, a jury verdict must be based on something other than speculation, supposition or surmise. Wright v. Hickman, 308 Ky. 634, 215 S.W.2d 553 (1948); Randall v. Shelton, Ky., 293 S.W.2d 559 (1956); Peterman v. Darby, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 747 (1967). It is, of course, often difficult to draw the line between a reasonable inference and speculation. But evidence that will support a reasonable inference must indicate the probable, as distinguished from a possible cause. See Sutton's Adm'r v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 168 Ky. 81, 181...
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