Brink v. Brink

• Decision Date: 02 May 1984
• Citation: 155 Cal.App.3d 218,202 Cal.Rptr. 57
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Bonnie BRINK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Billie BRINK, Defendant and Respondent. A016466.

Page 57

202 Cal.Rptr. 57

155 Cal.App.3d 218

Bonnie BRINK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Billie BRINK, Defendant and Respondent.

A016466.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

May 2, 1984.

Hearing Denied June 27, 1984.

Patricia M. Bourke, Oakland, for plaintiff and appellant.

Thomas J. Sheahan, Richmond, Barbara Goldeen, Lafayette, for defendant and respondent.

KING, Associate Justice.

In this case we hold that when the award of community property of a marital dissolution judgment is vacated in an independent proceeding in equity, the court is acting as a court of equity and is not mandated to follow the provisions of the Family Law Act in dividing the property of the parties.

The marriage of Bonnie and Billie Brink ended with a judgment of dissolution on January 20, 1977, in which the court incorporated the marital settlement agreement of the parties. The agreement provided that Billie would receive as his separate property most of the community property including the equity in the family residence. Additionally, Billie was awarded custody of the minor child of the parties and Bonnie was ordered to pay him child support of $45 a month.

On November 23, 1977, Bonnie filed an independent action in equity to vacate the prior judgment. She alleged that Billie had obtained the judgment through extrinsic fraud and mistake, having told her that she was not entitled to any of the property acquired during the marriage; she requested an equal division of the community property. ¹

At the outset of trial the parties agreed to bifurcate the issues of whether to set aside the marital settlement and the value of the family residence. Following trial the court rendered a memorandum of decision denying Bonnie's request for attorneys' fees and stating that although Bonnie's evidence was "extremely weak and suspect," the action was "a suit in equity, and the Court has concluded that equity in this case requires that the plaintiff receive one half of the net value that existed in the family home and any other community property of the parties as of the date of the original trial." (Emphasis added.) The court's memorandum of decision also stated that if the parties were unable to reach an agreement as to the amount of the net value of the house, the court would hold a later hearing to determine that amount.

In support of the limited award to Bonnie, the court made findings of fact that Billie had "refinanced the family home and made certain valuable improvements to it" in the years since the separation.

The court rendered a judgment somewhat different than its memorandum of decision; it awarded Bonnie a one half interest in the net value of the house to be valued as of the date of the parties' separation (rather than the date of the original trial), and a one half interest in the other community property. The court ordered each party to bear his or her own attorneys' fees. ² Bonnie appeals; we affirm the judgment.

Bonnie contends that the trial court was required to divide all assets equally and, in order to accomplish this, must also have determined the community interest in the house, by valuing it as near as practicable to the time of trial in the present action in accordance with the requirements of the Family Law Act (Civ.Code, §§ 4000, et seq.). She relies on Civil Code section 4800, subdivision (a), which provides that dissolution courts generally must value community assets and liabilities "as near as practicable to the time of trial...." Billie responds that because Bonnie pursued an independent action in equity, Civil Code section 4800 was inapplicable and the court had the power to fashion any appropriate remedy.

The Family Law Act does not make the provisions of Civil Code section 4800 applicable to an independent action in equity to set aside a judgment of dissolution, and it seems clear that section 4800 has no such application. In Civil Code section 4351, the Family Law Act confers jurisdiction to make orders settling property rights--to which the provisions of section 4800 apply--in "proceedings under this part" (that is, in proceedings under the Family Law Act). An independent equitable action for relief from the provisions of a dissolution judgment is not a proceeding under the Family Law Act, but is a common law action of long-standing. In such actions "the nature of the relief available is not restricted to setting aside the former judgment; to the contrary, the court has power to provide any appropriate equitable remedy...." (In re Marriage of Adkins (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 68, 77, 186 Cal.Rptr. 818 (emphasis added); accord, Caldwell v. Taylor (1933) 218 Cal. 471, 475, 23 P.2d 758; 5 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 176, p. 3746.) The restrictions of Civil Code section 4800 are entirely inconsistent with this broad equitable power. (See generally Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 684 fn. 25, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 [Family Law Act not applicable to nonmarital partners, but equitable remedies are available to protect the expectations of the parties].) ³ In fashioning an equitable remedy, the court is not precluded from considering whether the result in the equitable proceeding should be identical to what it would be if the action had been brought under the Family Law Act, but it is not required to apply it. ⁴

Bonnie's choice of pursuing an independent action in equity afforded the court broad equitable powers to fashion an appropriate remedy. Had Bonnie instead made a motion in the existing dissolution action to vacate the judgment (see 6 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 179, p. 3749), proceedings would have continued under the Family Law Act and the court would have been bound by Civil Code section 4800. Thus in In re Marriage of Walters (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 535, 154 Cal.Rptr. 180, the court held that section 4800 required valuation of property as of time of judicial action on a motion to vacate the community property provisions of a dissolution judgment. Bonnie argues that the present case is indistinguishable from In re Marriage of Walters, but she ignores one crucial difference: in Walters, vacation of the judgment was sought by motion in the existing dissolution action, so that despite the equitable powers of the court in ruling on such a motion (see In re Marriage of Adkins, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at p. 77, 186 Cal.Rptr. 818), the restrictions of section 4800 in proceedings under the Family Law Act were still applicable. Bonnie sought relief by an independent action in equity, to which the Family Law Act did not apply.

In short, Civil Code section 4800 was inapplicable to the present proceeding because the action was an independent suit in equity rather than a proceeding under the Family Law Act. The court was not required to award an interest in the residence valued as near as practicable to the time of trial, but was vested with authority to fashion any appropriate equitable remedy.

Bonnie challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support ...