Briscoe v. Jarvis, Civil Action No. 14–505 JEB

• Court: United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
• Writing for the Court: JAMES E. BOASBERG, United States District Judge
• Citation: 77 F.Supp.3d 183
• Parties: Tyrone Briscoe, Petitioner, v. Tamyra Jarvis, Respondent.
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 14–505 JEB
• Decision Date: 09 January 2015

77 F.Supp.3d 183

Tyrone Briscoe, Petitioner
v.
Tamyra Jarvis, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 14–505 JEB

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed January 9, 2015

77 F.Supp.3d 184

Tyrone Briscoe, Coleman, FL, pro se.

Mary Ann Snow, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JAMES E. BOASBERG, United States District Judge

Pro se Petitioner Tyrone Briscoe was convicted of multiple murders and several related crimes in two D.C. Superior Court trials in 1997. Since that time, he has besieged courts with collateral attacks, challenging virtually every aspect of his convictions and sentences. In this, his most recent Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Briscoe alleges prosecutorial misconduct at his trials, and he also raises several issues stemming from one of his criminal appeals. Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over all but one of these claims, and because the remaining challenge is barred by the statute of limitations, the Court will dismiss the Petition.

77 F.Supp.3d 185

I. Background

The background of Briscoe's case is relatively straightforward. In 1997, a jury found him guilty of two counts of armed first-degree murder and two counts of assault with intent to kill (AWIK) while armed. See Opp., Exh. C (Briscoe v. United States, No. 97–1809, slip. op. (D.C. Apr. 25, 2005)) at 1. He was given consecutive indeterminate sentences of thirty years to life for each murder count, and ten to thirty years for each count of AWIK. See id. at 2. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed these convictions on April 25, 2005. See id. at 5.

In a second, unrelated trial in 1997, Briscoe was again convicted of first-degree murder, as well as conspiracy to commit murder, obstruction of justice, and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence. See id., Exh. K (United States' Opposition to Motion to Vacate or Set Aside Convictions) at 3. He was sentenced to thirty years to life for murder, fifteen years to life for obstruction, twenty to sixty months for conspiracy, and five to fifteen years for the firearm offense, all of which terms were to run consecutively to each other. See id. at 4. This conviction, too, was affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals on November 3, 2004. See id., Exh. H (Briscoe v. United States & Proctor v. United States, Nos. 98–284, 02–1411, 98–625, & 03–72, slip. op. (D.C. Nov. 3, 2004)) at 4.

These proceedings, unfortunately, represent only a fraction of the litigation surrounding Briscoe's cases. Since 1998, he has barraged courts, both local and federal, with collateral attacks on his convictions and sentences. To date, he has filed at least half a dozen § 23–110 motions in D.C. Superior Court, the most recent of which was denied in 2013. See id., Exh. A (Docket in 1994–FEL–1478). He brought a § 1983 suit against judges and attorneys involved in his case in another court in this District. See Briscoe v. Wagner, No. 10–710, 2010 WL 1904925 (D.D.C. May 5, 2010). And he has previously brought no fewer than three other petitions for habeas relief in federal court. See Briscoe v. Conners, No. 02–157, slip op. (D.D.C. Sep. 24, 2002); Briscoe v. Rios, No. 07–75, 2007 WL 1577778 (E.D.Ky. May 31, 2007) ; Briscoe v. Withers, No. 12–213, 2012 WL 5198470 (E.D.Ky. Oct. 19, 2012). Petitioner did not prevail in any of these actions.

Notwithstanding these failures, and apparently not one to be easily dissuaded, he enters court once again, seeking yet another Writ of Habeas Corpus. The result, however, will be the same.

II. Analysis

D.C. prisoners, like any others, are entitled to habeas relief if they establish that their “custody [is] in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States....” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). In this Petition, Briscoe raises three issues. First, he claims that prosecutors threatened a witness against him at trial and did not disclose those threats to him as required under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Second, he argues that procedural errors in the D.C. Court of Appeals—namely, the government's failure to timely file a brief in one of his criminal appeals and the court's revocation of his pro se status—require the vacating of one of his convictions. Finally, he asserts that counsel appointed on appeal was inadequate. The Court treats each in turn.

A. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner first alleges that “FBI [and] D.C. police[ ] and prosecutors ... threaten[ed] a witness” against him in his criminal trials, but these threats were never revealed to him. See Pet. at 3. Prosecutors must disclose threats or promises

77 F.Supp.3d 186

made to government witnesses, see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), and their failure to tell him about them, Briscoe claims, tainted his convictions....