Britton v. Dallas Airmotive, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 July 2007
• Docket Number: No. A114337.,A114337.
• Citation: 153 Cal.App.4th 127,62 Cal.Rptr.3d 487
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: John BRITTON et al. Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DALLAS AIRMOTIVE, INC., et al. Defendants and Respondents; XL Specialty Insurance Company, Intervener and Respondent.

62 Cal.Rptr.3d 487

153 Cal.App.4th 127

John BRITTON et al. Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DALLAS AIRMOTIVE, INC., et al. Defendants and Respondents XL Specialty Insurance Company, Intervener and Respondent.

No. A114337.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5.

July 11, 2007.

Certified for Partial Publication.^*

O'Reilly & Danko, Terry O'Reilly, Gary L. Simms, San Mateo, and Stephen J. Purtill for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Dykema Gossett and K. Lynn Finateri, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent Rolls Royce Corporation; Nixon Peabody, Paul E. Stinson, San Francisco, and Raymond Mariani for Defendant and Respondent Dallas Airmotive, Inc.; Coddington, Hicks & Danforth and Richard G. Grotch, Redwood City, for Defendant and Respondent Rocky Mountain Holdings.

GEMELLO, J.

This lawsuit involves a helicopter crash in Idaho. Plaintiffs appeal from a trial court order staying the action in favor of litigation in Idaho on the ground of forum non conveniens. In the published portion of this opinion, we conclude that the motion to stay the action was timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 410.30,¹ even though it was brought a year after most defendants answered the complaint. We affirm the trial court order staying the action.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff John Britton was piloting a helicopter in August 2003 during a firefighting operation near Webb, Idaho. The helicopter engine failed shortly after filling a firefighting bucket, resulting in a "hard landing" which seriously injured Britton and substantially damaged the helicopter.

Plaintiffs are the pilot Britton; his wife Lorinda Britton; Silverhawk Aviation LLC, owner of the helicopter; and David Currie, President of Silverhawk. In December 2004, plaintiffs brought suit in Alameda County Superior Court against Roll Royce Engine Services Oakland, Inc. (Rolls Royce Oakland), which serviced the engine in 1993; Dallas Airmotive, Inc. (Dallas), which serviced the engine in 1998; and Rolls Royce Corporation (Rolls Royce), which, through a predecessor company, manufactured the engine. The insurer of the helicopter, XL Specialty Insurance Company, intervened as a plaintiff.

In January 2005, defendant Rolls Royce Oakland moved under sections 418.10 and 410.30 to stay or dismiss the action on the ground of forum non conveniens. Defendants Dallas and Rolls Royce filed a joinder to the motion. The trial court concluded that Rolls Royce Oakland had not met its burden because it had "submitted little, if any, evidence that Idaho is a suitable place for trial, no evidence showing who will be the most significant witnesses in this action, where they are located, or that Idaho is a more convenient forum for obtaining their testimony. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, [Rolls Royce Oakland] has essentially eschewed all discussion of the public interest factors." The motion was denied without prejudice. At the hearing on the motion, defendants indicated their intent to renew the motion under section 410.30.

Dallas then removed the suit to federal court, and Dallas, Rolls Royce Oakland and Rolls Royce answered the complaint in March 2005. In June 2005, the federal court remanded the action back to the Alameda County Superior Court. (Britton v. Rolls Royce Engine Services (N.D.Cal. 2005) 2005 WL 1562855, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13259.)

Plaintiffs named Rocky Mountain Holdings, LLC (Rocky Mountain) as an additional defendant; Rocky Mountain answered in December 2005.

In February 2006, the trial court granted an unopposed motion for summary judgment filed by Rolls Royce Oakland. The court held that "[t]here is no triable issue of material fact that [Rolls Royce Oakland] had any connection with the engine components that failed at the time of the subject incident because the cause of engine failure did not implicate any engine component connected with [Rolls Royce Oakland]."

In late February 2006, defendant Dallas renewed the motion to stay or dismiss the action on the ground of forum non conveniens and Rolls Royce and Rocky Mountain filed joinders. Another judge of the superior court stayed the action "pending initiation and conclusion of litigation in the Idaho court."

Discussion

I. Timeliness of the Renewed Forum Non Conveniens Motion

Plaintiffs contend that the renewed forum non conveniens motion was untimely under section 418.10. We disagree.

Statutory construction is a question of law we decide de novo. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 11 P.3d 956.) Our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the underlying legislative intent. (§ 1859.) We begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual, ordinary meanings and giving each word and phrase significance. (Curie v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 16 P.3d 166.) "The meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible. [Citation.].... An interpretation that renders related provisions nugatory must be avoided [citation]; each sentence must be read not in isolation but in the light of the statutory scheme [citation]; and if a statute is amenable to two alternative interpretations, the one that leads to the more reasonable result will be followed." (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299.) "If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs." (Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 911, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 24 P.3d 1191.)

The first of the two relevant statutes, section 418.10, subdivision (a) provides that "[a] defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion ... (2) To stay or dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum." Section 418.10, subdivision (e)(3) further provides that "[f]ailure to make a motion under this section at the time of filing a demurrer or motion to strike constitutes a waiver of the issues of lack of personal jurisdiction, inadequacy of process, inadequacy of service of process, inconvenient forum, and delay in prosecution." The second of the two statutes, section 410.30 provides, "(a) When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.[¶] (b) The provisions of Section 418.10 do not apply to a motion to stay or dismiss the action by a defendant who has made a general appearance."

The initial motion was filed within the time allowed under section 418.10, subdivision (a). The renewed motion was filed almost a year after most defendants answered. In granting the renewed motion, the trial court relied on its authority under section 410.30 to consider the convenience of the forum on its own motion.² The plain language of section 410.30 authorized the trial court to consider whether to stay the action on the ground of forum non conveniens. (Stangvik v. Shiley Inc. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744, 749-750, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 556, 819 P.2d 14 (Stangvik).)

Plaintiffs contend that the trial court lacked authority to raise the forum non conveniens issue, even on its own motion, because the issue was waived by defendants. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that under section 418.10, subdivision (a) defendants could only move to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens before expiration of their time to file a responsive pleading and that the issue was waived under subdivision (e)(3). Plaintiffs' argument is unavailing. Section 418.10, subdivision (e)(3), the only provision expressly providing for waiver, does not provide for waiver where a defendant fails to file a motion on forum non conveniens grounds before filing an answer. Rather, it provides for waiver only where a defendant fails to move on forum non conveniens grounds "at the time of filing a demurrer or motion to strike." (§ 418.10, subdivision (e)(3).) On its face, the provision is inapplicable because defendants never filed a demurrer or motion to strike.

Neither did defendants waive the issue under section 418.10, subdivision (a). First, defendants Dallas and Rolls Royce did file a forum non conveniens motion within the time specified in subdivision (a). Plaintiffs do not explain why the trial court was powerless to reconsider the issue, which was properly raised at the outset of the litigation. Second, the narrow scope and express nature of the section 418.10, subdivision (e)(3) waiver provision suggests that a defendant does not waive the forum non conveniens issue by failing to file a forum non conveniens motion under subdivision (a). It would be unreasonable to conclude that, on the one hand, the Legislature expressly provided for waiver in the narrow circumstances specified in subdivision (e)(3) but, on the other hand, implicitly provided for waiver anytime a motion is not filed within the time for filing a responsive pleading, as authorized by section 418.10, subdivision (a).

Further, plaintiffs' interpretation of section 418.10, subdivision (a) is contrary to section 410.30, subdivision (b), which provides that "[t]he provisions of Section 418.10 do not apply to a motion to stay or dismiss the action by a defendant who has made a general appearance." Under subdivision (b), a defendant who has generally appeared may make a forum non conveniens motion at any time, not only on or before the last day to plead. (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Jurisdiction, § 369, p. 967; see also 4 Pacific L.J. (1973) pp. 305-306.)

Plaintiffs contend that this...