Broadnax v. Wynne, CASE NO. 2:11-CV-1082-WKW [WO]
Decision Date | 26 January 2015 |
Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:11-CV-1082-WKW [WO] |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Parties | RAYMOND BROADNAX, #176710, Plaintiff, v. BILL WYNNE, et al., Defendants. |
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on an amended complaint filed by Raymond Broadnax ["Broadnax"], an indigent state inmate, on February 9, 2012. In this complaint, Broadnax alleges that his parole consideration date was improperly delayed from May 25, 2011, until June 29, 2011. Broadnax further challenges the constitutionality of the decision to deny him parole issued by members of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles as a result of this hearing and the conditions of confinement to which he has been subjected since this denial of parole. The defendants in this cause of action are Bill Wynne, Robert Longshore and Cliff Walker, members of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Parole, Kim Thomas, Commissioner of the Alabama Department ofCorrections, and David Barber, a former District Attorney for Jefferson County, Alabama.1 Broadnax seeks issuance of declaratory relief, a new parole consideration hearing before an independent body that will not utilize his criminal history in the decision-making process and monetary damages. Amended Complaint - Doc. No. 14 at 4.
The defendants filed special reports, supported by relevant evidentiary materials, addressing Broadnax's claims for relief. Pursuant to the orders entered in this case, the court deems it appropriate to treat these reports as motions for summary judgment. Order of April 25, 2012 - Doc. No. 40. Thus, this case is now pending on the defendants' motions for summary judgment. Upon consideration of these motions, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof and Broadnax's responses in opposition to the reports, the court concludes that the defendants' motions for summary judgment are due to be granted.
"Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) ( ); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ().2 The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -] of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-24.
The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3) (). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263.
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Consequently, to survive the defendants' properly supported motions for summary judgment, Broadnax is required to produce "sufficient [favorable] evidence" which would be admissible at trial supporting his claims for relief. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). "If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50. "A mere 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore, do notsuffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1564 n.6 ( ); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) ( ); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) (); Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (); Barnes v. Sw. Forest Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) ( ).
For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) (). "The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to admissible form indicates that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 ( ); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) ( ).
Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff's pro se status alone does not mandate this court's disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. In this case, Broadnax fails to demonstrate a requisite genuine dispute of material fact as is necessary to preclude summary judgment.
In 1994, Broadnax was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment for this conviction. At the time Broadnax filed the instant action, he had been considered for parole on two occasions, in the latter part of 20...
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