Bronson v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 April 1989
• Docket Number: Docket No. 100397
• Citation: 175 Mich.App. 647,438 N.W.2d 276
• Parties: Ella Lee BRONSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SISTERS OF MERCY HEALTH CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 276

438 N.W.2d 276

175 Mich.App. 647

Ella Lee BRONSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SISTERS OF MERCY HEALTH CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 100397.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 21, 1988.

Decided Jan. 11, 1989.

Released for Publication April 28, 1989.

Stegman & Kelin, P.C. by Alexander M. Kelin, Southfield, for plaintiff-appellant.

Kitch, Saurbier, Drutchas, Wagner & Kenney, P.C. by Susan Healy Zitterman, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before CYNAR, P.J., and SULLIVAN and ERNST, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court order awarding summary disposition to defendant. On March 4, 1984, plaintiff filed a malpractice action against Dr. Willard Holt, Jr., an anesthesiologist on staff at defendant hospital. Plaintiff alleged that she suffered cardiorespiratory arrest as a proximate result of Dr. Holt's negligence in administering an epidural steroid block on April 18, 1982. Plaintiff's action against Dr. Holt is not the subject of this appeal.

On April 3, 1985, plaintiff filed the instant action, alleging that defendant hospital was negligent and breached its duty to plaintiff:

"a. By granting staff privileges to Dr. Holt.

"b. By failing to discover that Dr. Holt was no longer competent to retain staff privileges.

"c. By failing to supervise the competency of its staff physicians, and in particular Dr. Holt.

"d. By failing to fully investigate the allegations concerning the incompetency and prior acts of negligence of Dr. Holt.

"e. By failing to take disciplinary action against Dr. Holt.

"f. By failing to revoke Dr. Holt's staff privileges and/or in renewing said staff privileges.

"g. By permitting Dr. Holt to practice in its hospital when it knew, or in the exercise of due diligence should have known, that said physician was incompetent to do so.

"h. By permitting Dr. Holt to practice in its hospital when it knew, or in the exercise of due diligence should have known, that to so permit said physician to practice in its hospital posed an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm to its patients and potential patients.

"i. By engaging in a pattern and practice of conduct in order to cover up the repeated acts of negligence by Dr. Holt by acting through its agents and attorneys to secure the suppression of otherwise public court files alleging malpractice on the part of Dr. Holt.

"j. By failing to warn patients and potential patients, including the plaintiff, that numerous complaints had been made concerning Dr. Holt's competency and negligence, that Dr. Holt was incompetent and/or had a history of being careless and/or negligent and/or otherwise not properly attending to the care of his patients."

Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), asserting that plaintiff's claim was barred by the running of the two-year period of limitation for malpractice actions, M.C.L. Sec. 600.5805(4); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.5805(4). Plaintiff argues that her lawsuit against defendant was founded on ordinary negligence, not malpractice, and accordingly was governed by a three-year period of limitation, M.C.L. Sec. 600.5805(8); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.5805(8), and thus was filed in a timely manner. The trial court disagreed and entered its order for summary disposition and dismissal.

When reviewing a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court accepts all of the plaintiff's well-pled factual allegations as true and construes them most favorably to the plaintiff. Male v. Mayotte, Crouse & D'Haene Architects, Inc., 163 Mich.App. 165, 168, 413 N.W.2d 698 (1987). A review of plaintiff's complaint reveals that plaintiff seeks to impose liability on defendant hospital for independent acts of negligence committed by the hospital; plaintiff does not seek to hold defendant vicariously liable for Dr. Holt's alleged malpractice. The precise issue presented for review is whether an action brought against a hospital asserting negligent selection, retention, and supervision of staff doctors is an action for malpractice against the hospital for purposes of the statute of limitations.

In Kambas v. St. Joseph's Mercy Hospital of Detroit, 389 Mich. 249, 205 N.W.2d 431 (1973), our Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the two-year statutory period of limitation applied to an action against a registered nurse for her alleged negligence. The Court, construing the then pertinent provisions of the Revised Judicature Act, held that it did not. Noting that the RJA did not define "malpractice," the Court found persuasive the reasoning of the Ohio Supreme Court in Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 371-372, 199 N.E.2d 878 (1964):

" 'Malpractice in relation to the care of the human body has been defined as the failure of a member of the medical profession, employed to treat a case professionally, to fulfill the duty, which the law implies from the employment, to exercise that degree of skill, care and diligence exercised by members of the same profession, practicing in the same or a similar locality, in the light of the present state of medical science.

* * * * * *

" 'If the General Assembly had wished to protect groups other than those traditionally associated with malpractice, it should have listed the ones to be covered. Of the 17 states which have a special statute of limitations for malpractice actions, all but five have listed the ones to be covered. See Lillitch, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdictions, 47 Cornell Law Quarterly, 339, 367.' " Kambas, supra, 389 Mich. pp. 254-255, 205 N.W.2d 431.

In 1975, the Legislature amended Sec. 5838 of the RJA, the section defining when a claim for professional malpractice accrues, by listing additional groups it wished to protect. 1975 P.A. 142. Following amendment by 1975 P.A. 142, M.C.L. Sec. 600.5838; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.5838 provided:

"(1) A claim based on the malpractice of a person who is, or holds himself out to be, a member of a state licensed profession, intern, resident, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, registered physical therapist, clinical laboratory technologist, inhalation therapist, certified registered nurse anesthetist, X-ray technician, hospital, licensed health care facility, employee or agent of a hospital or licensed health care facility who is engaging in or otherwise assisting in medical care and treatment, or any other state licensed health professional, accrues at the time that person discontinues treating or otherwise serving the plaintiff in a professional or pseudoprofessional capacity as to the matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim.

"(2) An action involving a claim based on malpractice may be commenced at any time within the applicable period prescribed in sections 5805 or 5851 to 5856, or within 6 months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever is later. The burden of proving that the plaintiff, as a result of physical discomfort, appearance, condition or otherwise, neither discovered nor should have discovered the existence of the claim at least 6 months before the expiration of the period otherwise applicable to the claim shall be on the plaintiff. A malpractice action which is...