Brooks v. Chicola, 87-C-0752

Decision Date19 October 1987
Docket NumberNo. 87-C-0752,87-C-0752
Citation514 So.2d 7
PartiesEdward BROOKS, Jr. v. A.J. CHICOLA, et al.
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court

George Flournoy, Fuhrer, Flournoy Hunter & Morton, Alexandria, for applicant.

Steven Crews, Watson, Murchison, Crews, Arthur & Corkern, Natchitoches, for respondent.

COLE, Justice.

The issue presented in this case is whether La.R.S. 23:1103 allows an employer or compensation insurer, intervening in an injured employee's third party suit, to recoup compensation benefits paid and receive credit for future compensation from sums awarded the employee for damages other than past and future loss of earnings.

Edward Brooks, Jr., a part-time employee of Natchitoches Warehouse and Compress, Inc. (Natchitoches) was injured when a bale of cotton fell from a truck onto his back. The truck was owned by John Guillot. The bale was dropped by Ronald N Chicola, an independent truck driver, as he attempted to place the bale on a forklift.

Brooks received worker's compensation benefits from Fireman's Fund Insurance Company (Fireman's), the compensation insurer of Natchitoches. Brooks then filed suit against Chicola. 1 Natchitoches and Fireman's intervened for reimbursement of weekly benefits and medical expenses pursuant to R.S. 23:1102. The parties made several stipulations at trial. They agreed Brooks was injured in the course and scope of his employment and the medical expenses would be added onto the jury's total award. They further agreed Fireman's paid Brooks $26,724.00 in weekly disability benefits and $13,249.42 in medical expenses and that the question of lost earnings would be submitted to the jury, while reserving to the trial judge the issue of reimbursement of compensation benefits due the intervenors.

Chicola was found to be 90% at fault; a Natchitoches foreman to be 10% at fault. Damages were awarded as follows:

                Past physical pain and suffering .... $ 7,000.00
                Future physical pain and suffering ... 30,000.00
                Past mental anguish ................... 5,000.00
                Future mental anguish ................. 2,500.00
                Past loss of earnings ................ 15,000.00
                Future loss of earnings .............. 65,000.00
                

The jury awarded a total of $124,500.00 to Brooks. Because of the seasonal nature of his work, Brooks had, prior to his injury, earned a yearly salary of only $5,000.00. Based on this figure, the jury awarded Brooks $15,000.00 for three years of lost wages. The trial court ruled Fireman's was entitled to $28,249.42. This award was comprised of $13,249.42 for medical expenses and $15,000.00 for weekly compensation benefits, which was equivalent to the jury's award for past lost earnings. The trial judge further limited Fireman's credit for future compensation to the $65,000.00 awarded for future loss of earnings.

Fireman's and Natchitoches appealed. A five judge panel of the court of appeal, with two members dissenting in part, amended the trial court's judgment and awarded Fireman's $39,973.42. This award encompassed the full amount for medical expenses, $13,249.42, and the full amount of weekly benefits paid, $26,724.00. The court also held the credit for future weekly compensation benefits was subject to the entire balance of the jury's award. The net effect of the appellate court ruling was to reduce the plaintiff's award for pain and suffering in order to reimburse the compensation insurer. The court reasoned that reimbursement may reach the tort award for pain and suffering because weekly compensation benefits are paid, in part, in lieu of recovery for pain and suffering and not limited to recovery of lost wages.

We disagree with the holding of the court of appeal, reverse its decision, and reinstate the trial court's judgment. We conclude a worker's weekly compensation benefits are paid only in lieu of his lost wages and his lost earning capacity, 2 during periods of disability resulting from job related accidents, not in lieu of his pain and suffering. Accordingly, we hold weekly benefits are wage replacement and, as such, reimbursement for benefits paid to the plaintiff in this case must be limited to the tort award for lost wages.

REIMBURSEMENT FOR WEEKLY COMPENSATION BENEFITS

La.R.S. 23:1103 provides that out of the damages awarded to the injured worker in an action against a third party tortfeasor an employer must be reimbursed in whole or in part for the compensation benefits he has actually paid. 3 The intervenors argue they are entitled to be reimbursed not only out of the damages awarded to the tort claimant for lost wages, but also out of the sum awarded for pain and suffering. 4 Their argument stems largely from the peculiar facts of this case and the way in which weekly benefits are computed under the Worker's Compensation Law.

In the usual compensation situation, an employee with year-round employment will receive two-thirds of his regular wages in weekly benefits. Later in a third party suit he may recover 100% of lost wages, reimbursing the compensation insurer or employer for the two-thirds already paid, and keeping the remaining one-third as the balance of his lost wages. However, in this case plaintiff, a part-time seasonal worker, was injured at the most productive time of his work year, thus entitling him to weekly benefits which exceeded his yearly earnings.

Intervenors contend under these circumstances weekly benefits are paid both in lieu of lost wages and pain and suffering. The court of appeal adopted this position relying in part on Malone and Johnson's Civil Law Treatise on Workers' Compensation, quoting:

When the employer or insurer does intervene, however, it is proper to assure that weekly benefits paid are reimbursed in the judgment out of the award to the employee for 'pain and suffering,' wage loss, or out of 'general damages ...'

W. Malone and A. Johnson, "Workers' Compensation Law and Practice," 14 La.Civil Law Treatise § 369, at 182-83 (2nd Ed.1980).

With all due respect to the authors of this learned treatise, we cannot accept this statement of law. Worker's Compensation weekly benefits are paid to a worker merely in lieu of his lost wages and lost earning capacity during periods of disability resulting from job related accidents. 5

The intervenors' contention that compensation benefits include compensation both for lost wages and for such items of general damages as pain and suffering is at first glance a seemingly logical conclusion which is amply demonstrated by the facts of this case. Plaintiff, according to the jury, lost only $15,000.00 in wages for his 3 years of disability because he had been earning only $5,000.00 per year. The jury also awarded the plaintiff a sum for pain and suffering. Therefore, the intervenors assert, the $9,500.00 in yearly compensation benefits which they had been paying to the plaintiff must necessarily have included $4,500.00 for pain and suffering. Intervenors argue this is the only reasonable interpretation to be given to the workman's compensation benefit.

As logical as this interpretation might appear at first glance, it is not the only reasonable interpretation of the Act. The intervenors' interpretation fails to account for the differences between compensation benefits as defined in the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act and damages which are awarded in tort cases based on fault.

It is true that tort damages can include compensation both for lost wages and for pain and suffering. Worker's compensation benefits, however, are different because compensation benefits include compensation for lost wages and for lost capacity to earn wages, but not for pain and suffering. This will be shown more fully below. For now, we postulate if compensation benefits may be said to compensate not only for actual wages lost from the worker's present job, but also for the diminished capacity to earn wages, then it is possible to interpret the Act differently than do the intervenors and conclude the $4,500.00 per year is a benefit paid to compensate for lost capacity to earn wages rather than to compensate for plaintiff's pain and suffering.

THE ELEMENTS OF BENEFITS UNDER THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION LAW

The Louisiana Worker's Compensation Law provides compensation payments be made to the employee by the employer or the compensation insurer. See, e.g., La.R.S. 23:1201. Those payments include both medical expenses, La.R.S. 23:1203, and disability compensation which is paid weekly. La.R.S. 23:1221. The Act does not, however, state specifically the elements of loss for which the benefits are paid. That is, the Act itself does not specify whether weekly benefits are meant to substitute for lost wages, lost earning capacity, pain and suffering, or for other elements of damage. That question, then, must be answered by looking at the purposes of the Act and by looking at implications of the particular provisions of the Act.

(1) PREVIOUS CASE TREATMENT

Before analyzing the purposes and implications of the Act in order to determine whether weekly compensation benefits substitute in whole or in part for the tort element of pain and suffering, it is appropriate to review how the Louisiana courts have approached this question. The courts of appeal are in conflict. The second circuit has held the reimbursement award for weekly compensation benefits cannot exceed the amount a plaintiff is awarded for lost wages in his third party tort action. Price v. Mitchell Const. Co., Inc., 482 So.2d 869 (La.App.2d Cir.1986). The second circuit in Price refused to allow reimbursement out of the plaintiff's award for general damages. The third circuit, however, has expressly declined in this case to follow the second circuit's holding in Price. Brooks v. Chicola, 503 So.2d 1086, at 1089, fn. 2 (La.App.3d Cir.1987). The court held:

an intervenor [is] entitled to be reimbursed for weekly benefits it [has] paid to an injured employee out of any award to [the] employee whether for pain and suffering, lost wages, or general damages.

Id. at...

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