Kevin C. v. Founds Behavioral Health
| Decision Date | 04 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 21-2771 |
| Parties | KEVIN C.; THERESA C., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARENTS AND NATURAL GUARDIANS OF B. C. v. FOUNDATIONS BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, a/k/a UHS of Doylestown, LLC; GINA M FUSCO, PSY. D.; MOHAMMED YUSUF MODAN, M.D.; JON LYFORD; ANTHONY CUSATE; WENDY MONTE; DANA BACHMAN; DONNA NEWTON-PUTIGNANO; AMY DOLLINGER; TIM (LAST NAME UNKNOWN); BERNARD OTABIL; UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES; UHS OF DELAWARE, INC.; UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., FOUNDATIONS BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, a/k/a UHS of Doylestown, LLC; GINA M FUSCO, PSY. D.; ANTHONY CUSATE; WENDY MONTE; DANA BACHMAN; DONNA NEWTON-PUTIGNANO; AMY DOLLINGER; UHS OF DELAWARE, INC.; UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., Appellants |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 9, 2023
On Appeal from the United States District Court For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-20-cv-06431) District Judge: Honorable Wendy Beetlestone
Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS and ROTH, Circuit Judges
The Appellants seek review of the District Court's order denying their claim to immunity under Pennsylvania's Mental Health Procedures Act ("MHPA"), 50 P.S §§ 7101, et seq.[1] Because the Appellants have not met their burden to demonstrate that we have appellate jurisdiction, we will dismiss their appeal.
B.C. is an adult with severe autism spectrum disorder who is unable to communicate verbally. He was allegedly abused during his inpatient stay at Foundations Behavioral Health ("FBH"), a psychiatric hospital in Pennsylvania. That abuse was allegedly perpetrated by Bernard Otabil, an FBH employee who was previously implicated in the abuse of another patient at FBH. Otabil's abuse of B.C. allegedly took place in view of other FBH employees, with some of the abuse being captured on video. His parents, Kevin C. and Theresa C. (the "Plaintiffs"), brought suit, individually and as B.C.'s parents and guardians, against multiple defendants, including Otabil and FBH, asserting claims under federal and state law. They allege that B.C. suffered severe physical and emotional trauma as a result of the abuse at FBH.
As relevant here, the Appellants moved to dismiss the state law claims in Count I (negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness), Count IV (breach of fiduciary duty), and Count V (negligent infliction of emotional distress) of the Amended Complaint, arguing that the MHPA grants them immunity.[3] Specifically, the Appellants argued that the Plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to show that the allegedly tortious conduct amounted to gross negligence or involved willful misconduct and so they are entitled to immunity under the MHPA as to those tort claims. The District Court disagreed, holding that the Appellants were not entitled to immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage.[4]
This appeal followed.
We have an obligation to examine our jurisdiction sua sponte, "[e]ven if the parties have not raised the issue[.]"[6] Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 2004). The Appellants, as the parties invoking our jurisdiction, have the burden of demonstrating that the case is properly before us. See id. at 396 (). In determining whether that burden is satisfied, we recall the admonition that "it is improper [for a federal court] to 'resolve contested questions of law when its jurisdiction is in doubt.'" Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998)). In that same vein, "we are mindful that statutes conferring jurisdiction on federal courts are to be strictly construed, and doubts resolved against federal jurisdiction." United States v. Merlino, 785 F.3d 79, 87 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We are generally limited to reviewing the "final decisions" of federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Nevertheless, "we may also review a 'small class' of non-final orders under the collateral order doctrine." Doe v. Coll. of N.J., 997 F.3d 489, 493 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). An order qualifies for review under that doctrine if three requirements are met: "the order must (1) conclusively determine the disputed issue, (2) resolve an important issue separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be 'effectively unreviewable' on appeal from a final judgment." Id. (quoting Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009)).
Whether denial of immunity conferred by state law is immediately appealable at the motion-to-dismiss stage under the collateral order doctrine turns on whether, under applicable state law, the immunity in question is immunity from liability or immunity from suit. See Saint-Jean v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 49 F.4th 830, 834 (3d Cir. 2022) ().
Bell Atl.-Pa., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 273 F.3d 337, 345 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). "[A] defense against liability," as opposed to a "guarantee against having to face a suit[,]" is not immediately appealable if denied, even if that defense can be decided as a matter of law on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. Id.
The relevant text of the MHPA's immunity provision speaks in terms of immunity from liability:
In the absence of willful misconduct or gross negligence, a county administrator, a director of a facility, a physician, a peace officer or any other authorized person who participates in a decision that a person be examined or treated under this act, or that a person be discharged, or placed under partial hospitalization, outpatient care or leave of absence, or that the restraint upon such person be otherwise reduced, or a county administrator or other authorized person who denies an application for voluntary treatment or for involuntary emergency examination and treatment, shall not be civilly or criminally liable for such decision or for any of its consequences.
50 P.S. § 7114(a) (emphasis added). The same is true of the title of § 7114 ().
The MHPA's immunity provision differs from the text of Pennsylvania's statutory reaffirmation of sovereign immunity, which provides that the Commonwealth and its officials "remain immune from suit" absent a specific waiver. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2310 (2021). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited that language to support its conclusion that § 2310's "protection [wa]s from a lawsuit itself not simply a mere shield from judgment or liability" for purposes of Pennsylvania's collateral order doctrine.[7] Brooks v. Ewing Cole, Inc., 259 A.3d 359, 372 (Pa. 2021); see also id. at 376 ().
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has described the MHPA immunity provision as immunity from liability on multiple occasions over the course of decades, albeit not in connection with the collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., Farago v. Sacred Heart Gen. Hosp., 562 A.2d 300, 302 (Pa. 1989) (describing the MHPA's immunity provision as "a limited immunity provision from civil and criminal liability for specific decisions regarding the treatment of the patient") (emphasis added); Albright v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 696 A.2d 1159, 1167 (Pa. 1997) (); Dean v. Bowling Green-Brandywine, 225 A.3d 859, 869 (Pa. 2020) () (emphasis added); Leight v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Physicians, 243 A.3d 126, 130 (Pa. 2020) () (emphasis added).
All that said, we can find no instance where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has squarely addressed whether the statutory immunity conferred by the MHPA's immunity provision would satisfy the Commonwealth's own collateral order doctrine rule, and the parties have identified none. For that reason we have looked to see whether either the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate courts - the Superior Court and Commonwealth Court - have reviewed the denial of immunity under the MHPA in a circumstance where the order under review would have needed to satisfy Pennsylvania's collateral order doctrine for appellate jurisdiction to lie. See Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097,...
To continue reading
Request your trial